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LITIGATION AND RECOUPMENT OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Stephanie L. Soondar*
Allen Major~
Candace Hines, editor***
I. INTRODUCTION
Merrill Lynch ("Merrill") suffered fourth quarter losses of $9.8 billion in
2008. Contemporaneous to its $50 billion federally aided acquisition by Bank
of America ("BofA"), Merrill was given the green light by BofA to pay as
much as $5.6 billion in incentive compensation. The legal fallout from the
acquisition and bonuses has been dramatic by any standard. Separately,
Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") Special Master Kenneth Feinberg
has been a constant presence in the media as he ruled throughout the Fall of
2009 on the compensation proposals for the 100 highest paid executives from
In his December
companies that received significant federal financing.
rulings, among other things, Feinberg required the majority of executives' pay
be held for a period of three years, including incentive compensation paid
partially in the form of company stock. New York Attorney General Andrew
Cuomo released a popular investigative report on the issue in July 2009,' and
as recently as January 2010 demanded new bonus information from some of
the same companies investigated. Such populist rhetoric and the ongoing
economic crisis could provoke shareholders and creditors to seek recoupment

* Co-Author Stephanie Soondar is licensed to practice law in New York and New Jersey. Although
currently involved in securities litigation, her research and practice areas include business bankruptcy,
corporate governance, and finance. She gives special thanks to Helen Mangano and Mary Gail Gearns for their
patience, support, and counsel. Additionally, SLS thanks: John Caldwell, Terence Fernando, Kathryne
Munroe, Desiree Nemec, and Olga Wayne.
- Co-Author Allen Major is formerly of Heller Ehrman, and has experience in corporate transactional
law, including securities, M&A and finance. His research interests include executive compensation and
corporate governance issues. He gives special thanks to David Kahan, Helen Mangano and Mary Gail Gearns
for their patience, support, and counsel.
* Editor Candace Hines is an attorney admitted to practice in New York. Her varied practice focuses
primarily on securities litigation and entertainment law. She is a graduate of the University of Michigan Law
School and Boston University's College of Arts and Sciences.
I. ANDREW CUOMO, ATTY. GEN.. N.Y., No RHYME OR REASON: THE 'HEADS I WIN, TAILS You LOSE'
BANK BONUS CULTURE, http://www.ag.ny.gov/media center/2009/july/pdfs/Bonus%2OReport%2OFinal%207.
30.09.pdf (July 30. 2009).
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of executive compensation. This article functions as a broad overview of the
possible state and federal legal authorities that parties may face in such an
environment. 2
For example, both TARP and the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX")
contain clawback provisions to recapture executive compensation in cases of
misconduct. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is also frequently used,
via Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 actions, to recapture executive compensation
under circumstances of fraud, although recent allegations have failed to survive
motions to dismiss for a variety of reasons. Additionally, the federal
Bankruptcy Code may also provide for recovery of executive compensation
paid by a debtor corporation.
State authority similarly offers a basis from which litigating parties can
find support for their claims and defenses. Delaware offers broad discretion
This
for board of director determination of executive compensation.
discretion, however, is not unlimited, as evidenced in Valeant
Pharmaceuticals. In New York State a variety of possible basis exist for
plaintiffs to state a claim, although Defense counsel will be comforted by the
lack of modem precedent, and the recent and substantial Richard Grasso
victory. Other jurisdictions, such as Alabama in the matter of Scrushy, have
taken traditional legal theories and applied them to contemporaneous fact
patterns, permitting recoupment.
"The perfect storm" involving recoupment of executive compensation
appears to have built and is breaking. Although precedent is a guide, it is
unknown how a court influenced by the current social and political
environment may interpret the fact intensive inquiries required by the laws
discussed in this document. The research presented here seeks to provide a
solid foundation from which to further explore or develop these inquiries.
11. FEDERAL AUTHORITY
A.

TARP

In the fall of 2008, the U.S. economy faced significant challenges,
including a weak housing market, elevated inflation, rising mortgage
delinquencies and a weakening labor market.3 Several large banks realized

2. It may or may not surprise the reader that shareholders and creditors are not the only parties pursuing
litigation in this context, as the variety of suits includes executives' claims that they were illegally denied
bonuses, or were fired for protesting other bonus rewards. Tresa Baldas, Executive Bonuses Triggering
Lawsuits Nationwide, LAW.COM, 1|2, Apr. 6, 2002, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202429689471.
This includes a suit against Citizens Republic Bancorp in Michigan, where the executive claims he was fired
for questioning a CEO bonus. Id. 15 (citing Schwab v. Citizens Republic Bancorp, No. 09-090916-CZ (Mich.

Cir. Ct.)). Another executive sued his employer in California for his bonus, was then fired, and then claims his
enforcing his rights lead to his dismissal. Id. 1 6 (citing Pautsch v. Centex Corp., No. 2:2008cv02360 (E.D.
Cal.)). A case was also settled in March 2009 in Connecticut, where a high-level employee filed suit for a
bonus not paid. Id. 1 7 (citing Edwards v. Edwards Wines. No. CV-08-5008054-S (Conn. Super. Ct.)).
3. Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets. Recent Actions Regarding Govt Sponsored Entities. Investment
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major losses, particularly on mortgage-related assets, and had difficulty raising
new capital to offset the losses. 4 Financial markets became increasingly
stressed, and the broader economy continued to deteriorate. 5 In response to the
financial crisis, Congress sought to strengthen the economy and stabilize the
financial system by offering public money to private companies through the
Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP").6 In turn, to help thaw frozen credit
markets, the government wanted the private banks who received government
money to lend to businesses, consumers and other banks. As part of these
bank bailout packages, Congress and the Treasury Department ("Treasury")
imposed restrictions on executive compensation at firms receiving government
money. The restrictions are intended to ensure that government funds are
used to further the public interest and not for inappropriate private gain. 9 In
particular, President Barack Obama indicated that he did not want the
government to subsidize large payouts to poorly performing bank executives
who played a part in endangering the financial system.1o Treasury indicated
that with the ultimate goal of systemic regulatory reform, the government is
engaging in a long-term effort to investigate the extent that past executive
compensation structures at banks contributed to the financial crisis, and how
corporate governance regulation can be improved to better promote long-term
economic growth and to prevent future financial crises.
Banks, and Other Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Aff'rs, I 10th Congress (2008) (statement of Ben. S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Gov'rs of the Fed. Reserve
Sys.), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/ bemanke2008O923a 1.htm.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (2008) [hereinafter EESA].
EESA, passed in late 2008, established TARP, the $700 billion financial sector bailout whose initial purpose was
to buy up toxic mortgage assets from financial institutions. The Treasury Department abandoned the initial plan
and decided that the funds would be used to make direct investments in banks and to shore up consumer credit
markets. David Lawder, U.S. Backs Awayfron Plan to Buy Bad Assets, REUTERS, Nov. 12, 2008, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4AB7P82008 1112
7. Erin Nothwehr, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of2008, The University of Iowa Center for
International Finance and Development, December 2008, available at http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/
issues/bailouts/eesa.shtml.
8. See, e.g., ESSA, supra note 6, § 11I, as amended by American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §7001 (2009).
9. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treas., No. TG-15, Treasury Announces New Restrictions On Executive
Compensation, Feb. 4, 2009, available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/tgl5.htm [hereinafter
Treasury Release].
10. Jonathan Weisman and Joann S. Lublin. Obama Lays Out Limits on Esecutive Pa', WALL ST. J., Feb.
17, 2009, at Al. More generally, President Obama said that executive pay helped lead to a "reckless culture
and a quarter-by-quarter mentality that in turn helped to wreak havoc in our financial system." Deborah
Solomon and Damian Paletta, U.S. Eves Bank Pay Overhaul, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2009, at Al.
I1. See, e.g., Treasury Release, supra. note 9. On October 22, 2009, the Federal Reserve Board issued a
proposal designed to ensure that banks' incentive compensation policies do not encourage excessive risk
taking and do not undermine their safety and soundness. One initiative would apply to 28 large, complex
banks. and would entail reviewing each bank's policies for risk-appropriate incentive compensation. The
practices of the 28 firms would be assessed in a special "horizontal review." Under the second initiative,
supervisors would review compensation practices at smaller banks as part of the regular, risk-focused
examination process. These reviews would cover all employees who might materially affect the risk profile of
a bank. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Federal Reserve Issues Proposed Guidance on
http://www.federalreserve.gov/
at
2009,
available
Oct.
22,
Compensation,
Incentive
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Congress Passes EESA, ARRA; Treasury Issues Interim Final Rule

Congress authorized the TARP bailout in the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 ("EESA"), and section Ill of EESA contains
provisions limiting executive pay at TARP recipients. 12 Treasury issued an
interim rule in October 2008 pursuant to EESA to provide guidance on
EESA's executive compensation and corporate governance provisions.' 3
Treasury issued an additional interim final rule in June 2009 (the "IFR")
pursuant to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ("ARRA,"
also known as the "stimulus bill"), which amended and restated the EESA
executive pay and corporate governance provisions.' 4
On February 4, 2009, before the release of the IFR, Treasury issued a set
of guidelines limiting executive pay ("Treasury Guidelines").' 5 The Treasury
Guidelines distinguished between firms participating in any new "generally
available capital access program" and firms receiving "exceptional financial
assistance."' 6 An example of a "generally available capital access program" is
the Capital Purchase Program created under TARP;t while institutions that
negotiate bank-specific agreements with Treasury are deemed to require
"exceptional assistance."' 8 The companies currently receiving "exceptional
assistance" include AIG, Chrysler, GM, GMAC, and Chrysler Financial.19 At
newsevents/presslbcreg/20091022a.htm.
12. See, e.g., ESSA, supra note 6, § 111.
13. TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,394 (June 15, 2009)
[hereinafter TARP Standards]. The IFR complies with the requirement in ARRA that Treasury promulgate
standards that implement the ARRA provisions. Id. at 28396.
14. TARP Standards, supra note 13.
15. See, e.g., Treasury Release, supra note 9. As noted in text accompanying note 27, infra, the IFR
superseded prior guidance regarding executive compensation. However, in his 2009 rulings, the Special
Master for TARP Executive Compensation, whose duties are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 3140, cited the Treasury Guidelines in limiting cash salaries to $500,000 or less, other than in exceptional cases.
See Press Release of U.S. Dep't of Treas., No. TG-329, The Special Master for TARP Executive
Compensation issues First Rulings, Oct. 22, 2009, available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/
tg329.htm; Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treas., The Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation Rules
on Compensation Structures for Certain Executive Officers and Most Highly Compensated Employees 26-100,
Dec. II, 2009, available at http://www.treasury. gov/press/releases/2009121111464313585.htm.
16. See, e.g., Treasury Release, supra, note 9.
17. Generally available capital access programs provide the same terms for all recipients, including limits
on the amount each company may receive and specified returns for taxpayers. The goal of these programs is to
make sure that the financial system, including smaller community banks, can provide the credit necessary for
economic recovery. Id. In the last week of December 2009, Treasury announced that it provided the last batch
of capital under the Capital Purchase Program to ten small banks. Spanning more than a year, Treasury
provided 707 banks with $204.9 billion in capital through the program. Meena Thiruvengadam, Treasury
Ends TARP Bank Investments, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2009.
18. See, e.g., Treasury Release, supra note 9.
19. AIG receives assistance under the Programs for Systemically Significant Failing Institutions. The
others receive assistance under the Automotive Industry Financing Program, http://www.financialstability.
gov/impact/DataTables/additionaltransactions.html. Both Bank of America and Citigroup at one time received
-exceptional assistance." but each has since repaid their TARP funds. On December 9. 2009, Bank of
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firms receiving "exceptional assistance," the Treasury Guidelines would
impose a strict cap of $500,000 in total annual compensation paid to each
The Treasury
senior executive except for restricted stock awards. 20
in the
was
abandoned
executive
pay
capping
Guidelines' framework of strictly
paid
to
most
bonuses
on
limiting
focuses
IFR, which, pursuant to ARRA,
the
primary
framework,
the
[FR
highly compensated employees.21 Under
distinction between firms receiving "exceptional assistance" and those that do
not is that the former must submit their compensation payments and structures
to the Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation (the "Special
Master") for approval, while the latter may apply to the Special Master for an
advisory opinion but are not required to do so.
Less than two weeks after the release of the Treasury Guidelines, on
February 17, 2009, President Obama signed ARRA into law.23 ARRA
amended and restated section Ill of the EESA, and, for the first time, imposed
limitations on bonuses paid to employees of TARP recipients. 24 The executive
America repaid the government's $45 billion TARP investment. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treas.. No. TG436, Treasury Receives $45 Billion Payment from Bank of America, Dec. 9, 2009. available at
http://www.treasury.gov /press/releases/tg436.htm. Citigroup repaid $20 billion in TARP funds on December
23, 2009. Additionally, Citigroup terminated guarantees from the government to share losses on a pool of
$300 billion of Citigroup assets. Press Release. U.S. Dep't of Treas., Treasury Receives $45 Billion in
Repayments from Wells Fargo and Citigroup, Dec. 23, 2009, available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/
releases/20091229716198713.htm.
20. See, e.g.,Treasury Release, supra note 9. A similar cap would be placed on senior executive pay at
firms participating in "generally available capital access programs," except that it would be waived if the
company disclosed senior executive compensation and, if requested, submitted a "say on pay" shareholder
resolution. .
21. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said that the Obama administration is not interested in "capping
pay" or "setting forth precise prescriptions for how companies should set compensation." Rather, he said, the
government wants to restrain pay practices that motivated executives to take excessive risks in pursuit of
profit. David Cho, Zachary A. Goldfarb, et al.. U.S. Targets Excessive Pay for Top Executives, WASH. POST,
June 11, 2009.
22. TARP Standards, supra note 13.
23. Jeffrey Martin, et al., The Road Ahead: Executive Compensation Provisions for TARP Recipients
Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 I (Grant Thornton LLP White Paper), available
at http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/GTCom/files/Industries/FSandF/FINAL_/"20road%20ahead_white%20paper
.pdf. In discussing an amendment to the bill that would have taxed bonuses at TARP recipients but was later
stripped from the bill, discussed infra note 75, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus made a
stunning admission: "Frankly it was such a rush-we're talking about the stimulus bill now- to get it passed,
I didn't have time and other conferees didn't have time to address many of the provisions that were modified
significantly. We shouldn't be here. [The bill taxing bonuses] should have passed, but it didn't." Dana Bush
& Ted Barrett, Bonuses Allowed Be Stimulus Bill, CNN, http://www.cnn.comI/2009/POLITICS/
03/1 7/aig.bonuses.congress/ index.html.
ARRA also contains provisions that seek to limit unnecessary risk-taking, require executives to certify that the
company has complied with the law and adoption of a policy limiting luxury expenditures. See American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001 (2009) [hereinafter ARRA].
24. "TARP Recipient" is defined as "any entity that has received or will receive financial assistance
under the financial assistance provided under the TARP." Id. The IFR includes an anti-abuse rule which
includes in the definition of TARP recipient any entity related to a TARP recipient whose primary purpose is
to evade the IFR. TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,412 §30.1.
Even before President Obama signed ARRA into law, the administration indicated that it thought that the bill's
approach to limiting executive pay was stricter than the one it favored, and that it would seek revisions.
Barney Frank, the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, said that administration officials may
not like the executive pay provision, but "it is going to be enforced." White House Wants to Revise
Conipensation Part ofStimulus, Assoc. PRESS, Feb. I 5, 2009.
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pay restrictions in ARRA apply to all recipients of TARP funds, including
those who received money in the past. 25 The ARRA pay restrictions apply
during the period in which any obligation arising from the receipt of TARP
funds remains outstanding, not including any period during which the
government holds only warrants to purchase the TARP recipient's common
stock (the "TARP Period"). 26 The IFR consolidates and supersedes prior rules
and guidance regarding executive compensation, and is effective as of June 15,
2009.
For the period between October 20, 2008, and June 15, 2009, the
October 2008 interim rule remains in effect. 28 Additionally, to the extent they
are not inconsistent with ARRA or the IFR, previous contractual provisions
entered into by TARP recipients remain in effect.29
2.

The Office of the Special Master

The IFR establishes the Office of the Special Master, and Treasury
immediately named Kenneth R. Feinberg as the Special Master. 30 The Special
Master's responsibilities include the interpretation and application of section
Ill of EESA and its rules and regulations. 3 1 The Special Master's decisions
are not subject to appeal.32 For TARP recipients receiving "exceptional
assistance," the Special Master must determine whether the compensation
payments and compensation structures for the TARP recipient's senior
executive officers ("SEO")33 and the twenty next most highly compensated
employees 34 may result in payments that are inconsistent with the purposes of

25. MARTIN, supra note 23. This is in contrast to the Treasury Guidelines, whose standards were not
applied retroactively to existing investments or to programs already announced. See. e.g., Treasury Release,
supra note 9.

26. ARRA, surpa note 23, § 700 1(a)(5).
27. TARP Standards, supra note 13, at 28,423. One exception is that the requirement that TARP
recipients provide shareholders with a "say on pay" became effective upon enactment of ARRA. Id at 28,404.
28. Id. at 28,404.
29. Id. at 28,423.
30. Press Release, U.S. Department of Treasury, Interim Final Rule on TARP Standards for
Compensation and Corporate Governance, TG-165, (June 10, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/tg I 65.htm.
31. TARP Standards, supra note 13, at 28,420 §30.16.
32. Deborah Solomon, Pay Czar Gets Broad Authority Over Executive Compensation, WALL ST J., Jun.
I1, 2009, at A4. A TARP recipient may request that the Special Master reconsider his rulings, but only if the
Special Master made a factual error or relevant new information comes to light. TARP Standards, supra note
13, at 28,423.
33. Senior executive officers are defined in ARRA as the five highest paid employees, whose
compensation must be disclosed under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 26 U.S.C. § 7001(a)(5). The IFR
includes in the definition of senior executive officer a "named executive officer" under Instruction I to Item
402(a)(3) of Regulation S-K who is an employee of the TARP recipient. TARP Standards, supra note 13, at
28,411.
34. A "most highly compensated employee" is an employee of a TARP recipient, other than a SEO.
whose annual compensation for the last completed fiscal year is determined, pursuant to Item 402(a) of
Regulation S-K, to be highest among all employees. A most highly compensated employee need not be an
executive officer of the TARP recipient. A former employee who is not employed by the TARP recipient on
the first day of the fiscal year for which the determination is being made is not a most highly compensated
employee, unless it is reasonably anticipated that the employee will return to employment with the TARP
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TARP or contrary to the public interest. 35 Additionally, compensation
structures for any remaining executive officers and the 100 most highly
compensated employees of a TARP recipient receiving "exceptional
assistance" must be submitted for review by the Special Master, and the
Special Master must determine whether the compensation structures may result
in payments that are inconsistent with the purposes of TARP or contrary to the
public interest. The IFR provides a safe harbor regarding compensation paid
to employees of TARP recipients requiring "exceptional assistance" so long as
the employee is not an SEO or one of the twenty next most highly paid
employees, and the employee's total annual compensation does not exceed
$500,000, excluding long-term restricted stock.
In such cases, the
compensation will automaticall, be deemed appropriate even without prior
approval of the Special Master.
Even at TARP recipients who have not received "exceptional assistance,"
the IFR allows such firms or employees of such firms to request an advisory
opinion from the Special Master as to whether a compensation structure may
result in payments that are inconsistent with the purposes of TARP or contrary
to the public interest.38 Additionally, the Special Master is given the power to
render advisory opinions at his own initiative as to whether compensation
payments or structures at any TARP recipient meet the appropriate standards.
If the Special Master renders an adverse opinion, he may negotiate with the
TARP recipient and employee for reimbursement to the TARP recipient or the
Federal government.:
Whenever the Special Master reviews compensation
payments or structures for consistency with the purposes of TARP and
conformity with the public interest, the Special Master must apply the
following principles: (1) avoidance of incentives to take unnecessary risk, (2)
taxpayer return, (3) appropriate allocation among the components of
compensation, (4) appropriate portion of performance-based compensation,
comparable structures and payments, and (5) employee contribution to TARP
recipient value. 40
On October 22, 2009, the Special Master released his first rulings
regarding pay packages for the twenty-five most highly paid employees at
firms receiving "exceptional assistance."41 Employees at Bank of America and
recipient during the fiscal year. Id at 28,398.
35. Id. at 28,420-2 1, §30.16.
36. Id. at 28,421, §30.16.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 28,422-23, §30.16.
41. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treas., The Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation Issues
First Rulings, No. TG-329 (Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg329.htm
[hereinafter Press Release No. TG-329]. Before the release of this first round of rulings, it was reported that
the Special Master pushed the then chief executive of Bank of America, Ken Lewis, into returning the $1
million he received to that point in 2009 and foregoing the S 1.5 million in salary he was due for the rest of the
year. Lewis was also asked to forfeit his 2009 bonus. Lewis, however, was due at least $69 million in
retirement benefits and unvested stock when he stepped down at the end of 2009. Deborah Solomon & Dan
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Citigroup were included in these rulings since the two banks still held TARP
funds at the time. By reducing overall compensation, particularly cash
compensation, and shifting the bulk of compensation to be paid in the form of
long-term company stock, the Special Master purported to align executive pay
with long-term value creation and financial stability.42 Compared to 2008
levels, affected employees' average total compensation was slashed by more
than 50 percent, and cash compensation reduced by more than 90 percent. 43
More than 90 percent of affected employees were limited to $500,000 in cash
salary, with exceptions where necessary to retain talent and protect taxpayer
interests.4 Salaries paid in company stock vest immediately, and may only be
sold in one-third installments beginning in 2011, unless TARP is repaid
earlier.45 The requirement that a majority of salary come in the form of longterm company stock serves to force executives to invest their own funds
alongside taxpayers and to align executives' interests with taxpayers'
46
interest.
The Special Master also ruled that incentive compensation must
only be paid in the form of long-term restricted stock that requires three years
of service and can only be cashed in once TARP is repaid. A company may
only pay such incentive compensation if executives attain predetermined
performance goals set in consultation with the Special Master, and the
company's compensation committee certifies the attainment of the goals. 47

16, 2009, available at
Fitzpatrick, Czar Blocks BofA Chief's Pay, WALL ST. J., Oct.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125564137421788337.html.
42. See Press Release No. TG-329, supra note 41.
43. Id. According to an analysis by the Wall Street Journal, the Special Master substantially increased
base salaries for this group of employees. Base salaries climbed to $437,896 a year on average compared with
$383,409 previously, an increase of 14 percent. 65 percent of employees had an increase in their base salaries.
At Citigroup, the Special Master more than doubled salaries for 13 of the 21 employees subject to the first
round of review. Government officials said that the increase in base salaries was a response to complaints
from the companies that the Special Master was planning on tying up too much employee compensation for
the long term. The companies also expressed concern with their ability to retain key employees. David Enrich
and Deborah Solomon, Pay Czar Increased Base Pay at Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2009, at Cl. Some
government officials have urged the Special Master to ease up in his 2010 pay rulings for AIG employees.
These officials argue that rulings in 2010 as restrictive as those from 2009 could make it more difficult for
AIG to repay its TARP funding because key employees would leave. Deborah Solomon, AIG's Rescue
http://online.wsj.com/article/
Nov.
23,
2009, available at
U.S.,
WALL ST. J.,
Bedevils
SB 10001424052748703819904574554241356640428.htm1.
44. See Press Release No. TG-329, supra note 41. The Special Master noted three exceptions where base
salaries greater than $1 million were approved: for the new CEO of AIG and for two employees of Chrysler
Financial, which is winding down its operations and cannot grant long-term incentives. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. In mid-2009, Citigroup asked Treasury for permission to pay special bonuses to key members of
its energy-trading unit, Phibro. Phibro made hundreds of million of dollars for the bank, and members of the
unit, who were paid based on how much revenue they produced, threatened to leave due to government pay
restrictions. David Enrich and Ann Davis, Citi Seeks Approval to Pay Out Bonuses, WALL ST. J., April 29,
Averting a showdown,
2009 available at http://online.wsj.comarticle/SB124096311194466041.html.
Citigroup, in October 2009, agreed to sell Phibro. In his October 22 ruling, the Special Master rejected
Citigroup's plan to pay Phibro's chief executive a "significant cash bonus," and ruled that nothing may be paid
to the chief executive until the sale of Phibro was complete. See Press Release No. TG-329. supra note 41.
On March 23. 2010, the Special Master issued 2010 rulings on pay for the twenty five highest paid
executives at the five firms still holding "exceptional assistance." The Special Master reaffirmed the
principles announced in his October 2009 rulings, including the requirement that the majority of compensation

Summer

201o0

RECOUPMENT OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

4o5

While the IFR instructs the Special Master to rule on specific payment
proposals for the twenty-five highest paid employees of firms receiving
"exceptional assistance," regarding the twenty-sixth through 100th highest paid
employees, the IFR directs the Special Master to rule only on compensation
48
As a result, for this group of employees, companies and their
structures.
compensation committees have the flexibility to set individual levels of pay
based on individual performance using methods approved by the Special
Master,. 49 The Special Master's rulings concerning the twenty-sixth through
100th highest paid employees, released on December 11, 2009, covered four
companies: AIG, Citigroup, GM, and GMAC. 50 Executive pay at Bank of
America is no longer subject to the Special Master's review because the bank
returned its TARP funding on December 9, 2009.5' Additionally, Chrysler and
Chrysler Financial were exempt from review in the December rulings because,
with one exception, their pay packages complied with the IFR's $500,000 safe
harbor provision. 52 In the December rulings, the Special Master echoed the
underlying principles emphasized in the first round: aligning pay with longterm value creation and financial stability rather than short-term gains. 3 The
Special Master required that the majority of each executive's pay be held for at
least three years, and that at least 50 percent of incentive compensation be paid
in the form of company stock that must be held for at least three years.5 4 The
Special Master again limited cash salaries to $500,000, other than in
exceptional cases, and the majority of total compensation must be paid in
company stock. Salary paid in the form of stock must be held for at least one
year from the date it is earned.56 Total incentive compensation will be strictly
limited to an aggregate "pool" based on metrics determined by the
compensation committee and reviewed by the Special Master. Incentives may
only be paid if objective performance measures are achieved. Incentive pay is
also subject to a clawback should the results giving rise to the payments prove
be paid in long-term stock, and that incentives may be paid only if objective performance results are achieved.
Compared to 2009 levels, the Special Master reduced average total compensation for the specific executives
by 15%, and cash compensation by 33%. 82% of affected employees received $500,000 or less in cash salary,
with exceptions when good cause was shown. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treas., Special Master Issues 2010
Rulings for 'Top 25' Executives at Firms Receiving Exceptional Taxpayer Assistance and 'Look Back' Letter
on Review of Pre-Recovery Act Compensation, No. TG-604 (March 23, 2010), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg604.htm [hereinafter Press Release No. TG-605].
48. TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. at 28,420-21, §30.16
49. Press Release, U.S. Department of Treasury, The Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation
Rules on Compensation Structures for Certain Executive Officers and Most Highly Compensated Employees
26-100, (Dec. I1, 2009), availableat http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tgl12112009.htmi.
50. Id.
Si. Id. However, Bank of America's twenty-five highest paid executives remained subject to the Special
Master's October ruling through the end of 2009.
52. Id. For details on this safe harbor provision, see supra text accompanying note 37.
53. Press Release,U.S. Dep't of Treas., The Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation Rules on
Compensation Structures for Certain Executive Officers and Most Highly Compensated Employees 26-100
(Dec. II, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/200912 Ill 1464313585.htm.
54. Id
55. Id. The Special Master noted that companies have identified about twelve exceptional cases.
56. Id.
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illusory or if an executive engages in misconduct.
3.

Clawback of Improperly DeterminedPay

ARRA requires a TARP recipient to recover or claw back bonuses,
retention awards, or incentive compensation paid to an SEO and the next
twenty most highly compensated employees based on materially inaccurate
statements of earnings, revenues, gains or any other performance metric
criteria.5 A determination of material inaccuracy depends on the facts and
circumstances, but if an employee knowingly provides inaccurate information
relating to financial statements or performance metrics, such financial
statements or performance metrics are deemed materially inaccurate with
respect to that employee.59 The IFR requires a TARP recipient to exercise its
clawback rights unless the TARP recipient demonstrates that it would be
unreasonable to do so.
Additionally, once an employee obtains a legally
binding right to a bonus payment, the bonus is deemed to be made.
4.

Limitations on Bonus Payments

The IFR, applying ARRA, prohibits the payment or accrual of any "bonus
or incentive
payment," defined to encompass "bonus,62 retention award,
compensation" 64 to a certain number of employees under a sliding scale tied to
the amount of TARP funding the company received.65 This bonus payment
57. Id.
58. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. I 1- 5 §7001, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
59. TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. 113, 28414 (June 15,
2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30).
60. Id. An example where it would be unreasonable for a TARP recipient to exercise its clawback rights
is if the expense of enforcing its rights exceeds the amount to be recovered.
61. Id. It is worth noting the anomaly that due to the restriction on the full vesting of bonuses during the
TARP period, discussed infra at text accompanying note 70, it is not clear that an employee can obtain a
legally binding right to a bonus payment during the TARP period that is potentially subject to the clawback.
62. The IFR defines a bonus as any payment in addition to an amount payable to an employee for
services performed at a regular hourly, daily, weekly, monthly or similar periodic rate. Commission
compensation is generally not a bonus so long as the commission rate is pre-established and reasonable, and is
applied consistently to the sale of substantially similar goods or services. Benefits under a qualified retirement
or a broad-based benefit plan, bona fide overtime pay and bona fide expense reimbursements are not
considered bonuses. Id. at 28,405-06, §30.1.
63. A retention award is generally defined as a payment that is contingent on the completion of a period
of future service with the TARP recipient or the completion of a specific project, and is not based on the
performance of the employee or value of the TARP recipient. Excluded from the definition is any payment to
an employee that is payable periodically for services performed at regular hourly, daily, weekly, monthly, or a
similar periodic rate. Also not considered retention awards are payments from a qualified retirement or benefit
plan, overtime pay, reasonable expense reimbursement, or amounts accrued under a nonqualified deferred
compensation plan. Id. at 28,411, §30.1.
64. An incentive compensation plan means an "incentive plan" as defined in Item 402(a)(6)(iii) of
Regulation S-K, any plan providing stock or options as defined in Item 402(a)(6)(i) of Regulation S-K, and
other equity-based compensation. The term includes a stock option or stock plan, regardless of whether the
plans are subject to performance-based vesting. A TARP recipient may, however, pay salary or other
permissible payments in the form of stock or stock units. Id. at 28.409, §30.1.
65. ARRA, supra note 23.
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limitation does not apply to bonuses paid or accrued prior to June 15, 2009.66
For a company that receives less than $25 million in TARP funding, only the
most highly compensated employee is subject to this limitation. Companies
that receive between $25 million and $249.999 million may not make or accrue
bonus payments with respect to at least the five most highly paid employees.
The SEOs and at least the next ten most highly paid employees are subject to
this limitation at institutions which receive between $250 million and $499.999
million. Finally, the bonus payment restriction at companies receiving more
than $500 million in TARP funding applies to the SEOs and at least the next
twenty highest paid employees.6 The IFR includes an anti-abuse rule that
recharacterizes certain bonus payments that are intended to bypass the bonus
restriction. For example, a bonus that is not permitted to accrue in a given year
for a certain employee because he is subject to the bonus restriction, but is paid
in the subsequent year when the employee is no longer subject to the bonus
restriction, would be prohibited pursuant to the anti-abuse principle. 69
Payments made in long-term restricted stock are allowed notwithstanding
the above limitation on incentive pay so long as the restricted stock does not
fully vest during the TARP Period, has a value less than or equal to one-third
of the restricted stock recipient's total annual compensation, 70 and is subject to
any other terms and conditions that Treasury deems to be in the public
interest. 7
Permissible long-term restricted stock awards include both
restricted stock and restricted stock units, which can be settled in stock or
cash.72 The IFR requires that before long-term restricted stock vests, an
employee must provide services to the TARP recipient for at least two years
after the date of the grant of the stock.73 Additionally, the IFR provides a
schedule under which the stock may become transferable.74 A second
exception which allows for the payment of bonuses notwithstanding the
restriction applies if a written employment contract executed on or before
February 11, 2009, requires a bonus payment. 5 The Treasury Secretary,

66. TARP Standards, supra note 13, at 28,404.
67. ARRA, supra note 23.
68. Id. ARRA grants the Treasury Secretary the discretion, concerning TARP recipients of $25 million
or more, to extend the prohibition on bonus payments to a greater number of employees than required by the
text of ARRA. Id.
69. TARP Standards, supra note 13, at 28,400.
70. For purposes of the long-term restricted stock exception, total annual compensation includes all
equity-based compensation only in the year in which it was granted at its total fair market value on the grant
date. Therefore, all equity-based compensation granted in fiscal years ending before June 15, 2009 will not be
included in annual compensation. Id.
71. ARRA, supra note 23.
72. TARP Standards, supra note 13, at 28,400.
73. Significantly, this limitation does not contain an exception for no fault termination events such as
death, disability, or involuntary termination.
74. The IFR generally permits the long-term restricted stock to be transferred in increments of 25 percent
for each 25 percent of financial assistance repaid by the TARP recipient. Once the final repayment is made,
the remaining stock becomes transferable. Id. at 28,401.
75. ARRA. supra note 23. This provision had the effect of exempting from ARRA pay restrictions the
$165 million in retention bonuses paid to AIG executives. The ensuing outrage over the bonus payments
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however, has the discretion to determine the validity of the employment
agreement.76 This employment agreement exception applies only if the
employee has a legally binding right to the payment under the employment
contract.77 The IFR adds that if a pre-February II employment agreement is
amended after February II and materially enhances the benefit to the
employee, such as a pay increase or an acceleration of vesting conditions, then
the benefit will not fall within the employment agreement exception.
Finally,
the Special Master may provide an advisory opinion regarding pre-June 15
bonus payments and/or payments made pursuant to a pre-February I I
employment contract to determine whether such payments are consistent with
TARP or contrary to the public interest. 79
5.

Limitations on Severance Pay

ARRA prohibits a TARP recipient from making a golden parachute

exhibited by lawmakers included some initial confusion as to who inserted this exemption in the bill. At first,
the Senate Banking Committee Chairman, Christopher Dodd, who originally introduced the executive pay
limits, denied that he included the last-minute exemption. A proposed bipartisan amendment would have
taxed bonuses at TARP recipients, but it was stripped from the bill during hurried, closed-door negotiations
between the White House and the House of Representatives. Dana Bush and Ted Barrett, Bonuses Allowed By
Stimulus Bill, CNN, March 18, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/17/aig.bonuses.congress/
index.html. After his initial denial, Senator Dodd acknowledged that he added the exemption, but did so only
after the Obama administration pushed for it. Ed Hornick, Ted Barrett, and Kristi Keck. Dodd: Administration
Pushed For Language Protecting Bonuses, CNN, March 19, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/
03/18/aig.bonuses.congress/. Representative Barney Frank said that the government, as owner of AIG, should
assert its ownership rights, including bringing lawsuits against people who did damage to the company. Alison
Vekshin, AIGs Liddv Acknowledges 'Distasteful' Retention Pay, BLOOMBERG, March 18, 2009,
Citing ARRA's provision
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ news?pid=20601087&sid=anFUui3W-YRI.
allowing the Treasury Secretary to claw back payments "inconsistent with the purpose" of TARP or
"otherwise contrary to public interest," discussed infra in text accompanying notes 86-87, Secretary Timothy
Geithner said that Treasury planned to deduct the cost of the bonuses from the government's upcoming round
of cash infusion for AIG and to extract additional penalties from AIG operating funds. Jonathan Weisman,
Naftali Bendavid and Deborah Solomon, TreasorY Will Make Grab to Recoup Bonus Funds, WALL ST. J.,
March 18, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/aticle/SBl23730459869257121.htmi. In response to the
populist outcry over the AIG bonuses, the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly, 328-93, to
approve a bill imposing a 90% surtax on bonuses paid to employees with household income of $250,000 or
more at companies that have received at least $5 billion from the government. It appears, however, that the
bill will not be taken up in the Senate in light of the fact that a number of AIG executives returned their bonus
payments. Greg Hitt, Drive to Tax AIG Bonuses Slows, WALL ST. J., March 25, 2009, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/ SBl23794222776332903.html. In the aftermath of the AIG bonus controversy, it
was reported that President Obama would seek "resolution authority" that would allow his administration to
abrogate contracts that it can show do not serve the good of newly regulated entities such as AIG. Jonathan
Weisman, Obama Seeks Legal Authority to Stop Future Bonuses, WALL ST. J., March 19, 2009, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB12373964010137321I.html.
76. ARRA, supra note 23. § 7001(b)(3)(D)(iii).
77. To determine whether an employee had a legally binding right to payment, the IFR points to 26 CFR
I.409A-I(b)(i). TARP Standards, supra note 13. at 28,416.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 28,404.
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payment to a SEO or any of the next five highest paid employees.80 A golden
parachute payment is defined as any payment to an SEO for departure from a
TARP recipient for any reason, except for payment for services performed or
benefits already accrued. 8 ' The IFR deems payments due to a change in
control of the TARP recipient to be golden parachute payments, including the
acceleration of vesting due to a departure or change in control.82 The present
value of all golden parachute payments is treated as paid at the time of the
employee's departure or change in control of the TARP recipient. Thus, if an
SEO terminates employment during the TARP period but does not gain the
right to a golden parachute payment until after the TARP period, the payment
would be barred because the payment is deemed paid while the TARP
recipient was subject to the prohibition on golden parachutes.8 4 The IFR
provides that payments are not golden parachute payments if they are from
qualified pension or retirement plans, payments due to an employee's death or
disability, or certain benefit and deferred compensation plan payments.85
6.

Other Notable ARRA Provisions

ARRA assigns broad discretion to the Treasury Secretary to review past
compensation decisions made at TARP recipients, but the legislation also
makes it easier for banks to withdraw from the program. ARRA directs the
Treasury Secretary to review past bonus payments, retention awards, and other
compensation paid to the twenty five most highly paid employees of a TARP
recipient, including payments made before February 17, 2009, to determine
whether any payments were inconsistent with the purpose of TARP or
otherwise contrary to the public interest. If such a determination is made, the
secretary must negotiate with financial institutions and affected employees for
The IFR
reimbursement of those payments to the federal government."
Additionally, ARRA removes
delegates these duties to the Special Master.
past provisions which required TARP recipients to wait for a certain time

80. ARRA, supra note 23, § 7001(b)(3)(C).
81. Id. at (a)(2). Whether a payment is for services performed or benefits accrued is determined based on
the facts and circumstances. Generally, a payment is considered a payment for services performed or benefits
accrued only if the payment would be made regardless of whether the employee departs or the change in
control occurs, or if the payment is due upon the departure of the employee, regardless of whether the
departure is voluntary or involuntary. TARP Standards, supra note 13, at 28,408.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 28,414, §30.9.
84. Id
85. Id. at 28,408-09, §30.1.
86. ARRA, supra note 23, § 7001(f).
87. Id.
88. TARP Standards, supra note 13, at 28420. In March 2010, the Special Master issued a "look back"
letter to all 419 firms that received TARP assistance before February 17. 2009, iequesting information on
compensation paid to the twenty five highest paid executives prior to that date. Pursuant to ARRA and the
[FR. the Special Master will review the payments to determine conformity with the public interest standard.
and he will negotiatc for reimbursement of payments where the standard is not met. Press Release No. TO6(04. supra note 47.
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period and to replace the funds through other sources before repaying the
government. 89 A TARP recipient may repay the government funds at any time
so long as the federal banking regulator approves the repayment, After the
assistance is repaid, the Treasury Secretary will sell outstanding stock warrants
at the current market price. 90 In fact, in June 2009 the Treasury allowed ten
banks to repay $68 billion in TARP money. These banks included J.P. Morgan
Chase, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. 9 1 Subsequently, in December
2009, Bank of America, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo repaid their TARP
funds.92

ARRA requires that shareholders of institutions that have or will receive
TARP money be given a non-binding "say on pay" advisory vote to approve
In its annual meeting proxy statement, a
the compensation of executives.
TARP recipient must disclose its executive compensation pursuant to the
SEC's compensation disclosure rules, including the compensation discussion
and analysis, compensation tables and the associated narrative. Shareholders
then may vote, by resolution contained in the proxy statement, to approve or
disapprove of the company's executive compensation. The shareholder vote is
not binding on the Board of Directors, and does not overrule any Board
decision.94 In the area of corporate governance, ARRA requires each TARP
recipient to establish a compensation committee made up entirely of
The
independent directors to review employee compensation plans. 95
compensation committee must meet at least semiannually and assess any risk
posed to the company from the compensation plans. 96
89. SHERYL VANDER BAAN & KEVIN F. POWERS, CROWE HORTWATH INT'L, DEVELOPMENTS IN TARP
https://www.crowehorwath.com/Crowe/
(Feb. 23, 2009),
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION RESTRICTIONS

Publications/detail.cfm?id=2041.
90. ARRA, supra note 23, § 7001(g).
91. The other banks given permission in June 2009 to return government money were U.S. Bancorp,
BB&T, American Express, Capital One Financial, Bank of New York Mellon, State Street and Northern Trust.
Robin Sidel and Deborah Solomon, Treasury Lets 10 Banks Repay $68 Billion in Bailout Cash, WALL ST. J.,
June 10, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ SBI24455528999797923.html.
92. Bank of America returned $45 billion, Citigroup repaid $20 billion, and Wells Fargo $25 billion.
Matthias Rieker, Citi Wells Repay TARP Funds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBl0001424052748704254604574614082322331944.htmi.
Starting in 2010, Citigroup was no longer subject to the Special Master's review, but it will continue to be
subject to the ARRA pay restrictions until the government sells its entire ownership stake. Eric Dash and
Andrew Martin, Wells Fargo to Repay U.S., a Coda to the Bailout Era, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/business/economy/]5bank.html?scp=1&sq=Wells%20Fargo%20to%20R
epay%20U.S.,%20a%2OCoda%20to%20the%2OBailout%2OEra&st=cse.
93. The SEC leadership has indicated that it supports the adoption of "say on pay" for all companies,
even those not subject to ARRA. Mary Schapiro, chairman of the SEC, said "giving shareholders a greater say
on . . . how company executives are paid" is on the SEC's agenda. BEVERLY FANGER CHASE, NING CHIU, ET
AL., DAVIS POLK WARDELL LLP, "SAY ON PAY" NOW A REALITY FOR TARP PARTICIPANTS (Feb. 25, 2009),

Compensation experts expect
http://www.dpw.com/1485409/clientmemos/2009/02.25.09.say.on.pay.pdf.
Congress to pass a law requiring all listed companies to adopt "say on pay." Opponents of "say on pay" argue
that the practice is vague and ineffective. It is unclear what a "no" vote means and companies are free to
ignore the voting results. Phred Dvorak, Hundreds of Firms Must Grant 'Say on Pay,' Wall St. J., Feb. 27,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/ article/SB123569317570788185.html..
94. ARRA, supra note 23, § 7001 (e).
95. Id. § 7001(c).
96. Id.
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Consequences of Government Regulation of Executive Pay

While the pay restrictions outlined above were intended to prevent
companies from paying out rewards, subsidized by U.S. taxpayers, to poorlyperforming executives, 97 the restrictions may result in unintended
consequences. For one, to comply with ARRA's limitations on the use of
incentive compensation, banks may be forced to raise salaries, a development
which corporate governance reformers oppose. Big banks typically pay their
executives a small salary, but offer large bonuses tied to organizational,
98
This practice, known as pay for
division, and individual performance.
performance, serves to align an executive's desire for high pay with
However, with the
shareholders' interest in increased company value.
restriction on bonuses, banks might need to raise salaries to retain and recruit
executives, and such salaries will have to be paid no matter how poorly the
company performs. 99 In short, with incentive compensation restricted, an
executive's incentive for guiding his company to reach its performance
benchmarks is diminished. Supporting the prediction that TARP recipients
would raise salaries, a report stated that Citigroup was planning on boosting
salaries for certain rank and file employees by as much as 50 percent to offset
smaller bonuses. 00
Other unintended negative consequences resulting from the pay
restrictions on TARP recipients include the possibility that firms might rush to
repay the government even before they are sufficiently capitalized, and some,
particularly those subject to the Special Master's review, might have difficulty
The government's rationale for
hiring and retaining senior executives.
extending financing to private banks was to shore up the balance sheets of
weak banks, to increase lending activity and to build up confidence, in
particular, in the financial system and in the economy in general.1oi However,
if TARP recipients view the restrictions as too onerous and therefore pressure
the banking regulators to allow them to return the funding, these banks might

97. President Obama said, "This is America. We don't disparage wealth. We don't begrudge anybody
for achieving success. And we believe success should be rewarded. But what gets people upset-and rightfully
so-are executives being rewarded for failure, especially when those rewards are subsidized by U.S.
taxpayers." Jonathan Weisman and Joann S. Lublin, Obama Lays Out Limits on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 17, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB123375514020647787.html.
98. Mark Maremont and Joann S. Lublin, Limits on Pay Left Unclear in New Law, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18,
2009, at A4.
99. Id. A senior executive responsible for human resources at an investment bank, regarding the limit on
bonuses said, "[t]o be put in a situation where you're limiting performance-based compensation is the dumbest
thing you can do. Everything that shareholder advocates have been seeking for years is thrown out the
window." Id.
100. Eric Dash, Citigroup Is Said to Be Raising Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2009, at B]. Another bank,
Wells Fargo, increased the base salaries of its CEO and two other executives in early 2009. Kate Kelly and
David Enrich, Wall Street Pursues Pay Loopholes. WALL ST. J., March 17, 2009.
101. Erin Nothwehr, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of2008, UNIV. OF IOWA CENTER FOR INT'L
FIN. & DEv., Dec. 2008. http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ issues/bailouts/eesa.shtm.
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still be at risk of failure even after returning TARP money.'I 2 In fact, TARP
recipients now have further incentive to push for permission to repay the
government because now that numerous banks have been allowed to return
their money, the market might perceive those that continue to hold government
money as relatively weak and unstable. Another problematic consequence of
limiting bonuses only at certain banks is that executives at TARP recipients
might be tempted to leave for financial institutions not constrained by the pay
restrictions, such as private equity funds, subsidiaries of foreign banks or
strong U.S. banks which do not hold government funds.'0 3 Similarly, a
tottering TARP recipient that is integral to the financial system might have
difficulty recruiting top executives due to the pay limitations.I0 4
Clarifying an ambiguity in ARRA, the IFR states that most highly
compensated status is determined based on employees' compensation earned in
the prior year. os However, this provision leaves room for TARP recipients to
"intentionally cycle" employees in and out of most highly compensated

102. Some analysts question whether some of the banks that returned TARP funding were allowed by the
government to do so prematurely. Some worry that if banks, particularly Citigroup, deplete their capital levels
too soon to pay back the government, the banks might stumble again and set the stage for another crisis.
Another possible consequence of banks repaying TARP is that extra capital that might otherwise be used for
lending is removed from the system. Eric Dash and Jeff Zeleny, Citigroup Has Reached a Deal to Repav U.S
Bailout Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009.
103. Thorold Barker, Capping the Banks' Wages ofSin, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at C10. In fact, the

New York Times reported in early 2009 that a brain drain was occurring at some of the biggest Wall Street
banks. Top bankers left Goldman Sachs. Morgan Stanley, Citigroup and others to join foreign banks, smaller
start-up companies and hedge funds which do not face pay caps. A professor of finance at New York
University indicated that there is a positive element to the exodus from large banks. By spreading risk to
smaller institutions, there is no longer a systemic threat; and innovation is spread as well. Graham Bowley &
Louise Story, Crisis Altering Wall St. as Starts Begin to Scatter, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2009, at Al. With the
Special Master's October 2009 rulings, it became known that about a quarter of the top twenty five executives
at the seven firms receiving "exceptional assistance" left their respective companies between June 2009 and
the end of the year. Of the potential 175 employees subject to his review, the Special Master, due to the
departures, ruled on just 136 pay packages. Only fourteen of the twenty-five highest paid Bank of America
employees remained by the time of the Special Master's October rulings. At AIG, thirteen of the top twentyfive remained. Tomoeh Murakami Tse & Brady Dennis, Top Employees Leave FinancialFirmsAhead ofPay
Cuts, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2009.
104. The pay restrictions compounded the challenges Bank of America faced in hiring a new chief
executive following Ken Lewis's announcement that he was retiring. Some analysts suggested that potential
candidates for the chief executive job turned it down because of the pay restrictions. With the repayment of its
TARP funding, Bank of America was freed from the rules limiting pay. A company spokesman remarked that
repayment makes the company more attractive to a CEO candidate. Bank ofAmerica to Repay TARP, Raise

Cash, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 2, 2009. Bank of America ended up hiring an internal candidate as CEO, but only
after the Special Master indicated that the total pay package sought by an external candidate might cause alarm
and be seen as excessive. According to a Wall Street Journalreport, even though Bank of America executives
were no longer subject to the Special Master's review, the company asked Feinberg for his views on a $35
million to 40 million pay package for an outside candidate. Feinberg said he would have rejected the pay
package if he still had the power to do so. His comments contributed to the directors' shift towards hiring the
internal candidate. Dan Fitzpatrick & Deborah Solomon. Last Days of BofA s Huntfor a CEO: Pay. Politics.
WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2009. An additional concern of some bank executives as a result of government
involvement in the banking system is the politicization of lending. Said Kelly King, chief executive of BB&T
Corporation. "Rational, objective lending is one of the most important purposes of the banking system, and
when you inject Congress and the administration into it, it effectively politicizes the process, which is not
healthy." 3 Banks Plan to Raise Cash to Repay Government, REUTERS, May 11, 2009.
105. Federal Register, Vol. 74, No. 113. June 15, 2009. 28398.
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employee status in alternate years.o To illustrate, pursuant to the IFR, a firm
receiving more than $500 million in TARP funds must impose the bonus
restriction in 2009 on the twenty-five highest paid employees of 2008.107 Due
to the pay restriction, the twenty-five highest paid employees are unlikely to be
the highest paid in 2009, and thus a different group of twenty-five would be the
highest paid in 2009. Moreover, in the following year the 2009 highly paid
employees would not be allowed to earn bonuses in 2010. The bonus
restriction would thus be lifted from the original group who earned the most
money in 2008 so that they could earn bonuses in 2010. This might result,
intentionally or unintentionally, in groups of twenty-five employees trading
places as highest paid every year.
The preamble to the IFR contemplates the possibility of cycling the
twenty-five highest paid employees and proposes potential methods to mitigate
abuse. One suggestion the IFR proposed is to determine most highly
compensated status based on an average of the preceding two or three years'
Another approach is to require most highly
annual compensation. os
compensated employees identified for one year to remain subject to the
restrictions for a certain number of additional years.' 0 9 The Treasury invites
comment on the issue, including the extent to which intentional cycling is
likely to occur and how to address the issue.' 0
8.

Other Re-Regulatory Efforts

In addition to the Treasury Department's efforts under TARP and the
actors are instituting new
Special Master's office, other federal
compensation rules for publicly-held corporations and various types of
financial service firms. Some of the more significant efforts are discussed
here.
9.

The United States Congress
House of Representatives Member Barney Frank (D-Mass.) introducedl12
106. Id.

107. Id. at 28,399.
108. Id. at 28,398.
109. Id.
110. Id.
IlI. The United States is not the only government who is re-regulating the matter of executive
compensation. Out of interest and provided as only one example, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer
Alistair Darling announced in December 2009 that his office would assess a one-time 50 percent tax on banker
bonuses equal to or greater than $40,700. Ian Katz, US Probably Will Avoid Matching U.K. 50% Bonis Tar,
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 9, 2009. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aVvu7PkQtUsk&
pos=3. In addition, the United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority announced in January 2010 that
banking executives and highly compensated employees would have to defer 60 percent of their compensation
for a period of three years. Landon Thomas Jr., U.S. Bankers Are Fed Up With British Regulators, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/1I/business/global/I I pound.htmil.
112. The draft legislation had eleven co-sponsors, including Representatives Capuano (D-Mass.), Carson
(D-Ind.), Ellison (D-Minn.), Green (D-Tex.), Gutierrez (D-Ill.), Hinojosa (D-Tex.), Kilroy (D-Ohio), Peters
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the Corporate and Financial Institutional Compensation Fairness Act in July
2009 to the House Committee on Financial Services.
Shortly thereafter, the
draft legislation was successfully voted out of both the Committeel 14 and the
House of Representatives."' 5 The Act was sent to the Senate and is currently
with the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.' 16
The Act amends the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934' 1 to address
compensation structures in the context of greater security for the financial
system as a whole.'' 8
Among the proposed changes is a nonbinding
shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation practices." 9
The
advisory vote encompasses matters of severance compensation,I20 and
institutional investment managers casting advisory votes are required to
disclose how they vote each year.121 The issue of compensation committee
independence is also addressed; committee members are explicitly prohibited
from accepting "any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the
issuer.'12 A corporation in non-compliance of the new independence rules
would face delisting from the national securities exchanges and associations.123
Interestingly, language in the bill directs federal regulators of various types of
financial institutions to come together to create new compensation rules and
disclosure requirements for incentive-based compensation. 24 The language is
quite clear, however, that no individual's income will be disclosed;'
rather,
the legislation seeks to align risk management with pay as a general matter.126
In coming together, the federal regulators are further directed to define and
(D-Mich), Sherman (D-Calif.), Waters (D-Calif.). and Watt (D-NC). List of Co-Sponsors, Corporate &
Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, H.F. 3269, 110th Cong., LIB. OF CONG., THOMAS
DATABASE, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dI I I:HRO3269:@@@P.
i 13. OpenCongress, H.R.3269- Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of2009
"Actions and Votes", http://www.opencongress.org/bill/1 II-h3269/show (accessed Jan. I1, 2010).
114. The Committee vote was 40 to 28. Id.
I15. The House Floor vote was 237 to 185. Id.
116. Id.
117. Corporate & Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 3269, I 10th Cong.
(2009), also available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=hlll-3269 [hereinafter H.R.
3269). Provisions of the act that provide for new federal rule-making regarding what is and is not appropriate
incentive pay is enforced under section 505 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Id. § 4(c).
118. David Brown, Alston & Bird LLP, Financial Markets Crisis Blog, "House Passes Executive
Compensation Bill," http://www.alston.com/financialmarketscrisisblog/blog.aspx?entry=2394 (July 31, 2010).
119. H.R. 3269, supra note 117, § 2(i)(I).
120. Id. § 2(i)(2)(A-B).
121. Id. § 2(i)(3) (where institutional investment managers are subject to section 13(f) of the '34 Act).
122. Id. §§ 3(a), IOB(b)(2) (where § 3(a) inserts proposed language of§ IOB(b)(2)). The independence of
paid consultants to the compensation committee will be determined by SEC regulation. Id. § 3(a), § IOB(c).
123. Id. §§ 3(a), I 1B(a)(I).
124. Id. § 4(a)( 1). Federal regulators included are specified as the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the National Credit Union
Administration Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
Id. § 4(d)(1)(A)-(G). The legislation also specifies the financial institutions to include depository institutions
or depository institution holding companies, broker-dealers, credit unions, investment advisors, the Federal
National Mortgage Association, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or "any other financial
institution that the appropriate Federal regulators" determine is appropriate. Id. § 4(d)(2)(A)-(G).
125. Id. § 4(a)(2).
126. Id. § 4(a)( I)(A)-(C).
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prohibit any incentive-pay that "encourages inappropriate risks by . .. financial
institutions that could threaten [the] safety and soundness . . . or have serious

adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability."'
10.

27

The FederalReserve

In the Fall of 2009, the Federal Reserve ("the Fed") issued Proposed
Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies.128 The Fed is able to
issue such "guidance" under its supervisory authority granted by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act.129 The Fed has clearly communicated its expectation
that banking organizations will come into immediate compliance,130 and has
threatened to adjust a bank's supervisory rating or pursue enforcement action
should a deficiency be identified.' 3 '
The guidance is structured to prevent incentive compensation that
threatens the stability of the organization itself and the larger financial banking
system.1 32 The guidance is applicable to all banking organizations supervised
by the Fed.' 33 Further, the guidance is applicable to both executive employees
and individual or groups of employees whose activity exposes the banking
organization to risk.134 However, the guidance does not mandate pay caps.I
Rather, the guidance proposes three broad principles that banking
organizations may independently determine how to accommodate. 136 The
principles focus on creating incentive packages that encourage employees to
risk-take: within an organization's ability to identify and manage risk, in ways
compatible with effective control and management, and in ways supported by
internal governance structures. 37 In an effort to urge the American banking
industry towards compliance, and as a means of identifying best practices, the
Fed has initiated a supervisory program to monitor the industry's progress.
127. Id. § 4(b)(1)-(2).
128. Proposed Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,227 (Oct. 27, 2009),
available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-25766.pdf [hereinafter Fed. Reg. 55.227].
129. Posting of Laura Thatcher to Fnancial Markets Crisis Blog (citing Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1818), http://www.alston.com/ financialmarketscrisisblog/blog.aspx?entry=2716 (Oct. 22 2009, 18:56
ET).
130. Fed. Reg. 55,227, supra note 128, at 55,227, 55,229, and 55,231.
131. Id. at 55,229, 55,232. See also Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Proposed Incentive Compensation
Guidance Questions and Answers (Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/bcreg/bcreg20091022a2.pdf (accessed Jan. I1,2010) [hereinafter Fed. Reserve Press Release Oct. 22].
Where appropriate, the Fed will allow a banking organization to develop a corrective action plan to remedy the
deficiency. Federal Register, supra note 128, at 55,230. 55,232.
132. Fed. Reserve Press Release Oct. 22, supra note 131.
133. Id. 1 5 (naming "U.S. bank holding companies, state member banks. Edge and agreement
corporations, and the U.S. operations of foreign banks with a branch, agency, or commercial lending company
subsidiary in the United States" as entities subject to compensation guidance).
134. Memorandum from Fried Frank, New Federal Reserve Proposed Guidance on Sound Incentive
Compensation Policies 1, I (Oct. 27, 2009), available at http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/
3347EFB5DO88F79466A9E6CFC6BO38D8.pdf.
135. Thatcher, supra note 129, at "How Will the Oversight be Conducted?"
136. Federal Register, supra note 128, at 55,228, 55,231-38.
137. Id
138. Id. at 55,229, 55,231.
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The program is divided between large complex banking organizations
("LCBO") and smaller, more localized banking organizations.' 3 9 An LCBO
will be expected to offer the Fed a detailed description of its current
compensation practices, and a plan for remedying weaknesses.140 On the other
hand, smaller banks will have their incentive compensation reviewed as part of
Both large and small bank
their regular risk examination process.141
organizations will have the Fed's findings incorporated into their Federal
Reserve supervisory ratings. 42
1/.

The Securities and Exchange Commission

In December 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
voted to amend how publicly traded corporations disclose executive
compensation data.143 Companies will be required to come into compliance
with the new disclosure rules, effective February 28, 2010.144 Some of the new
45
rules are discussed below.1
The SEC wants to prevent undue risk-taking, and considers the new
disclosures helpful to investors identifying how a company handles and
rewards safe or excessive risk-taking.14 The final rules adopted require a
company 47 to disclose its compensation polices regarding all employees where
the compensation creates a "reasonably likely" risk of "material adverse"
effect on the company.148 These new disclosure requirements will be made in
a separate paragraph in Item 402 of Regulation S-K and not as part of the
CD&A. 149 As part of this disclosure, a company will provide a non-exclusive
situational list of when a compensation practice is reasonably likely to create a
materially adverse risk to the company.ISO The SEC also modified the
disclosure requirements for the Summary Compensation and Director

139. Id. (the LCBO program is referred to as "horizontal review").
140. Id.(timetables for completion are expected and the Fed has allocated human resources to work with
the LCBOs to achieve the guidance goals).
141.Id.
142. Id. at 55,229, 55,231-32.
143. Securities Law Advisory from Alston & Bird LLP, SEC Adopts Rules Related to Executive
Compensation and Corporate Governance Disclosure (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.alston.com/files/
Publication/ee6c59ae-045d-486b-8fce-71647c8805a8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a5a86418-83a841 0e- bl75-71786713el fe/SEC%20Adopts%2ORules%20Exec%20Comp.pdf (the vote was 4-1 in favor).

144. Id.
145. Regarding executive compensation, the amendments also discuss new rules designed to better
communicate potential conflicts of interests to investors as regards compensation consultants. See Proxy
Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 9089, Exchange Act Release No. 61,175, Investment
Company Act Release No. 29,092, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 239, 240, 249, 274. available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/final/2009/33-9089.pdf (accessed Jan. 11, 2010). Additionally, the SEC amendments also describe new
disclosures regarding director nominees and directors, as well as regards nominee diversity and the board's
leadership structure. Id. at 34-40.
146. Id. at 9.
147. Smaller companies are anticipated to be exempted from the additional disclosures. Id. at 16.
148. Id. at 12-13.
149. Id.at 13.
150. Id. at 14-15.
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Compensation Tables, requiring the use of an aggregate grant date fair value
for stock and option grants.' 5 '
B.

SARBANES-OXLEY AND SECTION

304

The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 was the legislative response to the
Enron and WorldCom financial scandals of 2000.152 By enacting SOX,
Congress gave the SEC a greater tool for enforcement, and afforded aggrieved
shareholders a means of recapturing some of their value lost to fraud and
mismanagement. 53 Among these tools is the "clawback" mechanism of
Section 304.154 Broadly speaking, it provides for disgorgement of executive
compensation in instances of "misconduct."15 5 Executive compensation here
means any incentive or equity-based pay received from the issuer during the
twelve months following the misconduct.156 This does not include salary.
Profits earned from the sale of issuer securities during the same twelve-month
period are also subject to disgorgement.' 5 8
Though the potential for
recoupment under SOX may appear quite broad, § 304 is subject to significant
limitations.
1.

Vague Statute Language

Section 304 allows for recoupment of executive compensation awarded
only to a properly named chief executive officer ("CEO") and chief financial
officer ("CFO"). 9 No other corporate employees' compensation is included
in the statutory language.' 60 The statute's language does not explicitly exclude
holding the CEO or CFO responsible for the misconduct of other executives
and corporate employees, but until recently the SEC was focused on cases that

151. Id. at 21-23 (where awards are computed according to FASB ASC Topic 718 and awards for
performance are accompanied by footnote disclosure of an award's maximum value).
152. See generallv Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Looking Back and Looking Forward: SarbanesOxlev and the Future of Corporate Governance, 40 AKRON L. REV. I, 3 (2007).
153. See generallv David B. Pitofsky and Matthew Tulchin, Limiting, Clawing Back Executive Pay In the
Wake of Financial Bailout, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 28, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.goodwinprocter.com/
-/media/32869322B5754960AD I B I86DECBD6C58.ashx.
154. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7243(a) (2009). SOX 304 provides: If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting
restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial
reporting requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief financial officer of the
issuer shall reimburse the issuer for (I) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation
received by that person from the issuer during the twelve-month period following the first public issuance or
filing with the Commission (whichever first occurs) of the financial document embodying such financial
reporting requirement; and (2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that twelvemonth period.
155. Pitofsky and Tulchin, supra note 153, at "Existing Legal Options."
156. JAMES F. REDA, STEWART REIFLER & LAURA G. THATCHER, COMPENSATION COMMITTEE HANDBOOK

156 (3d ed. 2007).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Pitofsky and Tulchin, supra note 153, at "Existing Legal Options."
160. Id.
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involved only CEO and CFO misconduct.' 6 ' This was ironic in light of broad
consensus that corporate culture and tone-as regards business ethics and
aggressiveness-was set by the CEO and CFO, to be followed by other senior
management and by employees generally throughout the corporation.162 In
July of 2009, however, the SEC filed a complaint against Maynard Jenkins,
CEO of CSK Auto Corporation.13 The complaint seeks disgorgement under §
304 of more than $4 million in bonus and equity compensation.164 However
the com laint does not contain any allegations of securities fraud by Jenkins
himself. as Rather, the complaint alleges only that the original financial
statements were fraudulent, that Jenkins signed them, and that Jenkins was
paid $4 million in various compensation upon publication of the misstated
financial statements.166 The resolution of this complaint is eagerly anticipated,
as it potentially broadens CEO and CFO liability to include securities fraud
committed by other corporate employees during the CEO's or CFO's tenure.I67
Because the SEC has not adopted enforcement provisions for § 304,168
courts are left to determine what various terms mean and how to apply them.
For example, although the statute punishes "misconduct," it does not define
what that term encompasses.169 However, the courts have found that it is not
enough for "misconduct" to occur, or to even have been known about by the
CEO or CFO.o70 Rather, a public financial restatement must be formally filed
by the corporation. 171
The factual allegations of cases successfully filed under § 304 offer us
some guidance as to what "misconduct" means. Section 304 has been alleged
successfully in instances of stock option backdatingl72 and manipulated profit

161. See generally Nader H. Salehi & Elizabeth A. Marino, Section 304 of SOX: New Tool for
Disgorgement?, N.Y. L. J., May 22 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?
id=1202421589570.
162. See generally Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 152, at 29.
163. SEC, Lit. Release No. 21149A (July 23, 2009).
164. SEC v. Jenkins, No. 2:09-cv-01510-JWS (D. Ariz. July 22, 2009).
165. Id.
166. Id. The SEC's formal actions against CSK include a March 2009 civil injunction charging former
executives with various securities charges, including fraud. See SEC Release No. 21 149A. supra note 163, at

1

4.

In May 2009, the SEC also instituted settled cease-and-desist proceedings against the company for

releasing two years of fraudulent financial statements. Id. CSK, of course, neither admitted or denied the
charges in accepting the settlement. Id. See also In re Intelligroup Sec. Lit., 468 F. Supp. 2d 670, 707 (D.N.J.
2007) complaint dismissed (concluding SOX certifications alone do not constitute scienter).
167. JORDAN ETH & BRIAN L. LEVIN, MORRISON FOERSTER, SEC RAISES STAKES ON RESTATEMENTS

(Aug. 2009), available at http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/1 5847.htm.
168. MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP, NINTH CIRCUIT FINDS No PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
UNDER SECTION 304 OF SARBANES-OXLEY, (Jan. 2009) available at http://www.milbank.com/NR/rdonlyres/
09C IC769-7795-4AO7-960C-83C23CI A89DB/0/01 0509_1n.re DigimarcCorporationDerivative_
Litigation.pdf.
169. C.f In re AFC Enterprises, Inc. Derivative Litig., 224 F.R.D. 515, 521 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
170. Teachers' Retirement Sys. of La. v. Hunter. 477 F.3d 162, 188-89 (4th Cir. 2007).
171. Id.at 189.
172. SEC v. McGuire, 2007 SEC LEXIS 2837 (D. Minn. 2007) (Litigation Release No. 20387). See also
SEC v. Nicholas III, Civil Action No. SACV 08-00539-CJC (RNBx) (C.D. Cal 2008), civil proceeding stayed
pending completion oferiminalproceedings. 569 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2008), SEC v. Jasper, Case No.
C-07-6122 HRL (N.D. Cal. 2007) pending.

Summer

20 10

RECOUPMENT OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

419

margins.17 3 SEC v. McGuire' 74 involved backdating and was the first
settlement with an individual under § 304, totaling a record $468 million. 7 5
McGuire was the former CEO and Chairman of the Board at UnitedHealth
Group, Inc., and was accused of stock-option backdating. 76 The allegations
described a twelve year period where McGuire selectively chose low common
stock closing prices, and signed backdated documents falsely indicating that
options had been granted on the dates with the lowest price. 7 7 The false
documents lead to UnitedHealth understating its compensation expenses on
public financial statements, contrary to existing accounting rules and
misleading shareholders. 78
When UnitedHealth restated twelve annual
financial statements for the years 1994 through 2005, the errors totaled $ 1.526
billion.'
In SEC v. Brooks, a former CEO and Chairman of the Board at
DHB Industries was alleged to have overstated inventory values, falsified
journal entries, and failed to charge obsolete inventory, thereby manipulating
the company's gross profit margin.
Brooks also allegedly misused corporate
money, engaged in insider trading, and ultimately facilitated the delivery of
false financial documents to the public.
Currently, the case is still pending
in the Southern District of Florida. 83
Other statutory terms not identified by the Legislature or defined by the

173. SEC, Lit. Release No. 20345, SEC v. David H. Brooks, Civil Action No. 07-61526-CIVAltonaga/Tumoff(S.D. Fla. 2007), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20345.htm..
174. McGuire, 2007 SEC LEXIS 2837.
175. McGuire, 2007 SEC LEXIS 2837 at *4. At the time, the largest settlement in options backdating
case. Id. at *1. The amount represents $11 million in ill-gotten gains, $2 million in prejudgment interest, $7
million as a penalty, and $448 million in disgorged cash bonuses and profits made from the exercise and sale
of UnitedHealth stock and unexercised UnitedHealth options. Id. at *4. In December 2008, the S.E.C. again
moved against UnitedHealth, and separately, its General Counsel (who settled his case privately). SEC,
Litigation Release No. 20836. http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/Ir20836.htm (Dec. 22 2008).
Neither case alleged § 304 violations, however. Id.
176. McGuire, 2007 SEC LEXIS 2837 at * 1. The derivative settlement was S 900 million, historically the
largest settlement to date among the backdating settlements, rivaled only by the recent Comverse and
Broadcom settlements. Comverse settled in December 2009 for $ 225 million. Edvard Pettersson, Coinverse,
Ex-ChiefSettle Backdating Case for S225 Million, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 18, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601127&sid=aGdnxEpKy-fw (former CEO Jacob Alexander will contribute S 60 of the $
225 million). An additional $ 1.35 million of the $ 225 million will be paid by former General Counsel
William Sorin and former CFO David Kreinberg. Former Comverse Execs to Pay $62M to Settle Suits,
Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 28, 2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=9435101 (their
contribution will in exchange drop a suit against them that was filed by the company). Broadcom reached a
$160 million settlement in December 2009. Broadcom Agrees to Pay $160 Million To Settle Securities Suit,
Wall St. J. Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/12/29/broadcom-agrees-to-pay-160-million-to-settlesecurities-suit/tab/print/ (Dec. 29, 2009, 17:26 ET).
177. McGuire. 2007 SEC LEXIS 2837 at *2.
178. Id. at **2-3 (the fabricated documents were those relied on by outside auditors).
179. Id. at *3.
180. Brooks, Civil Action No. 07-61526-CIV-Altonagafumoff(S.D. Fla. filed Oct. 25, 2007).
181. SEC, Lit. Release No. 20345, supra note 173 at 1 2.
182. Id. at 13.
183. Though DHB Industries did settle the class action and derivative suit against it in the Eastern District
Court of New York for S35,200,000. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement 9 at 1.30, available at
http://www.techagreements.com/agreement-preview.aspx?search= lawfirm&lawFirml D= I97&num=418744
&title=DHBX201ndustries%20-%20Stipulation%20And%20Agreement/,20Ofo20Settlement (Nov. 30, 2006)
(resolving class action CV 05-4296(JS)(ETB) and derivative action CV 05-4345(1S) (ETB)).
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courts include: "required [to prepare]" when discussing when an issuer must
restate its financials, and the meaning of "material noncompliance" when
discussing misconduct.184 Also, § 304 does not identify the state of mind the
CEO or CFO must have while perpetrating the misconduct.' 85 Rather than
alleging acts were committed recklessly or with intent, the SEC has alleged
fraud in every case. 1 Other minor limitations include: no retroactive money
award to the issuer for executive compensation awarded before SOX
enactment in 2002,
and reimbursement is solely to the issuer and not any
individual or collection of shareholders. 88
2.

No Private Right ofAction

Section 304's most significant limitation is the lack of a private right of
action.
The statutory language does not explicitly include or exclude a
private right of action, but the courts have interpreted the statute to carry
none.190 At the time of authorship, however, only one circuit court has
definitively ruled on the matter. 19' There is, however, some debate that the
legislative intent was to include a private right of action.192 Some scholars also
argue an implied private right of action exists, relying on Cort S 93 four-factor
test. 194 This test enables a court to find a private right of action in a statute that

184. Reda, Reifler & Thatcher, supra note 156, at 155 (questioning whether a restatement is "required"
under § 304: when a new accounting firm offers advice to the corporation; or, only under the counsel of SEC
comments and suggestions). Also not defined by the language of § 304 is when compensation is in fact
"received" by the executive, and what time period is to be used when assessing "profits" from the sale of
shares (comparing the sale price to the purchase price of the acquisition). Id
185. Salehi & Marino, supra note 161, at "SOX 304's Ambiguities."
186. Id.
187. AFC Enterprises, 224 F.R.D. at 521.
188. In re Qwest Communs. Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig, 387 F. Supp. 2d 130, I150 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 2005).
189. Diaz v. Davis, (In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig.), 549 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir. 2008). See
also In re Brocade Communs. Sys. Derivative Litig., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 295 at **51-52 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6,
2009); In re InfoSonics Corp. Derivative Litig., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66043 at *24 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2007);
Mehlenbacker v. Jitaru. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42007 at *33 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Whitehall Jewelers, Inc.
S'holder Derivative Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16635 at *27-28 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2006); In re iBasis, Inc.,
Derivative Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 214, 223-25 (D. Mass. 2007); In re BISYS Group Inc. Derivative Action,
396 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Diebold Derivative Litig.. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15747 at
**5-6 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 29, 2008); Neer v. Pelino. 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Pedroli ex rel.
Microtune, Inc. v. Bartek, 564 F. Supp. 2d 683, 686 (E.D. Tex. 2008).
I90. Id.
191. Diaz, 549 F.3d at 1233. See also Teachers' Retirement Sys. of La., supra note 170 (Fourth Circuit
Court explicitly states it is not discussing the matter of private right of action under § 304, but that in any
event, none exists); Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Raines. 534 F.3d 779, 793
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (indicating in dicta that "§ 304 does not create a private right of action").
192. Salehi & Marino, supra note 161, at "SOX 304's Ambiguities" (discussing the significance of
language being dropped from the final bill indicating an exclusive SEC enforcement role under §304).
193. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
194. Harshbarger and Jois, supra note 152, at 30. The Cort four factor test is used to determine if an
implied private remedy is contained in a federal statute. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. The factors include: whether
plaintiff is among the class for whom the statute was passed to protect or help; if there is legislative intent
creating or prohibiting a private right of action; whether recognizing a private right of action is consistent with
the "underlying purposes" of the statute: and whether the private cause of action sought is actually a matter of
state legislation, and inappropriate to recognize in a federal context. Id.
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does not explicitly contain one, if, inter alia., the plaintiff is among the class
protected by the statute. 195 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
96
but still held there was no § 304
entertained this Cort argument in Diaz,1
19
Diaz noted that harm under a federal statute does not
private right of action.
automatically give rise to a private right of action.' 9 8 Seeing no explicit
statutory language creating such a right, the Court then analyzed the implied
right via the Cort four-factor test, treating as dispositive: "whether Congress
intended to provide the plaintiff with a private right of action." 19 9 The Court
concluded that Congress had not for several reasons. First, the language of §
304 focuses on the person regulated (the executive) and not the person
ultimately protected (the issuer or shareholder). 200 Secondly, the Court looked
to other sections of SOX for guidance, finding for example, Congress had
explicitly made a private right of action available in § 306 for equitable remedy
and explicitly unavailable in § 303.201 The Court concluded that Congress,
therefore, was equally capable of drafting, or excluding, language for a private
right of action under § 304.202 The Diaz holding has since been followed in the
Ninth Circuit. 203
Interestingly, it took nearly five years after the enactment of SOX for a
claim to be filed under § 304.204 The limited amount of circuit court opinions
regarding a private right of action under § 304 may be an opportunity for
aggrieved shareholders to continue to file § 304 actions in district courts. In
light of the public outrage over executive compensation and the current
economic crisis, an activist district court unrestrained by a contrary opinion
from its circuit court may choose to read the statutory language more broadly.
It is somewhat perplexing that academia would suggest modem courts look to Cort for guidance, as
this factor test has since been changed. In Sandoval, the Supreme Court concluded that "statutory intent [ ] is
determinative" as regards the existence of a private right of action. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286
(2001). The Court specifically instructed that any subsequent court's task is to determine whether the statute,
as passed by Congress, "displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy." Id.
Apart from these considerations, courts "may not create [a private right of action]." Id. at 291. This has been
adopted in the Second Circuit by the Court in both Olmstead and Bellikoff, as regards provisions of the
Investment Company Act of 1940. Halebian v. Berv, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55326 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(discussing Olmstead v. Pruco Life Ins.l Co. of New Jersey. 283 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2002); Bellikoff v. Eaton
Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2007)). The Olmstead factor test includes considerations of: whether the
statute contains an explicit private right of action; if the statute contains "rights-creating language" for the
protected class; whether the statute provides for alternative methods of enforcement; and whether there was a
private right of action provided for anywhere else in the statute. Halebian, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55326 at
*40 (citing Olmstead, 283 F.3d at 432-434).
195. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
196. Diaz, 549 F.3d 1223.
197. Id. at 1232-33.
198. Id. at 1229-30 (citing Touche Rosse & Co. v. Redington, 422 U.S. 560, 568 (1979)).
199. Id. at 1230-31 (citing Opera Plaza Residential Parcel Homeowners Ass'n v. Hoang, 376 F.3d 831,
835 (9th Cir. 2004)).
200. Id at 1232 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289 (2001)).
201. Id. at 1232-33.
202. Id
203. In re Brocade Communs. Sys. Derivative Litig.. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 295 at *52 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
2009).
204. Salehi & Marino, supra. note 161, at "Lack of Use of SOX 304" (citing McGuire, 2007 SEC LEXIS
2837).
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However, this seems unlikely where district and circuit courts follow Diaz,
barring shareholders from pursuing a private claim under § 304.205 Therefore
shareholders intent on pursuing disgorgement of executive bonuses and profits
in a private action must look to alternative law to state a claim.206

C.

2 08
STOCK OPTION BACKDATING207 AND SECURITIES LAW

Frequently, corporate compensation includes equity-based stock option
grants,209 and is therefore also subject to recoupment. Private rights of action
exist under federal securities laws, empowering the shareholder as an
individual or derivatively, on behalf of the corporation.

1.

How Stock Option Grants are Backdated

A stock option grant creates within the recipient executive the right to
purchase a specific number of stocks at a specific exercise price on a specific
date.210 As a matter of corporate governance, options are generally granted "at
the money."211 This means the exercise price is equal to the current fair market
205. MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP, supra note 168. at "Conclusion."

206. Id.
207. The breadth of stock option backdating is wide and complex, and warrants its own and investigation.
It involves securities law, tax law and accounting principles. For purposes of focus and clarity to the topic of
this paper, stock option backdating is treated as relevant, but ancillary to the global topic of litigation and
executive compensation.
208. The Securities Act of 1933 ("33 Act") has been cited in some litigation to combat fraud allegations .
15 U.S.C. § 77a (2009); see generally SEC v. Reyes, No. 06-CV-3844 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006). The 33 Act
focuses almost exclusively on the sale and purchase of securities. See generally THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW
OF SECURITIES REGULATION 326-57 (5th ed. 2005). In contrast, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("34

Act") deals more generally in the transacting of securities, as well as the regulation of the market and industry.
15 U.S.C. § 78a (2009); HAZEN, supra. So as to retain this paper's litigation focus, this research document
will focus on the 34 Act allegations.
209. STAFF OF

JT. COMM.

ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 2 (2006), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-39-06.pdf.

The practice of

equity-based compensation, in theory, is to link the executive's compensation to her performance at the
company. M.P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani, & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Economic Impact of Backdating of
Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 8, 1606 (2007). The harder and smarter she works, the more the

corporation benefits, the fair market price of the corporation's stock rises, and the executive earns more money
when her stock options vest in the future. Too, linking the executive's compensation this way to her
performance sometimes ameliorates criticism of excessive executive salary. John D. Shipman, The Future of
Backdating Equity Options in the Wake of SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules. 85 N.C.L. REV.

1194, 1200 (2007). The practice of backdating, however, dilutes the interests of existing shareholders by
increasing the number of outstanding shares. Id. at 1200. Equity-based compensation also creates a moral
hazard when the vesting period is short, causing the executive to focus on short term growth, and perhaps
tempting executives to circumvent existing laws to reap greater profit. Id.
210. Frank Ahrens, Scandal Grows Over Backdating of Options. "How Does Backdating Work?", The

POST, Oct. 12, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/1 I/
WASH.
AR2006101100425_ pf.htmi (Oct. 12, 2006).
211.

DR. SUNIL PANIKKATH, ET. AL, NERA ECoNOMIC CONSULTING, OPTIONS BACKDATING: A PRIMER 7,

http://www.nera.comlimage/PUBBackdating- Part I Primer SEC1381_-final.pdf(Oct. 5, 2006). There are a
number of reasons at-the-money options are typical. First, before the summer of 2005, companies were
required to grant options with a strike price "at least equal" to the fair market value of the option. JEFFREY M.
TAYLOR,

BLANK

ROME

LLP,

UNDERSTANDING

THE

OPTIONS

BACKDATING

CONTROVERSY-NEW
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price of the stock on the day of the grant.212 "In-the-money," or discounted
options, means that the exercise price is lower than the fair market stock price
on the day of the grant.213 Backdating describes the act of, either at the time
the grant is written or retroactively after the grant is written, changing the grant
date to an earlier date so that the exercise price is lower than the fair market
stock price on the day of the grant.214 This practice creates a gain for the
recipient executive, between the low backdated price and the hiph grant date
price.
This practice of backdating is not categorically illegal.
Where the
practice is duly-authorized by the board, 2 17 fully disclosed, and in compliance
with relevant accounting and tax provisions, then backdating is not illegal. 218
However, as of January 2007, over 200 companies had come under
investigation for backdating by either the SEC, the Justice Department, or their
2
own boards. 19 Backdating came to light in 2006, and to date the ultimate
ramifications are not yet fully known.220
2.

Tax 2 and FinancialReporting Consequences
The tax and financial reporting consequences of backdating is complex. 222

DEVELOPMENTS
4
at
note
I,
http://www.blankrome.com/siteFiles/News/
0583BEE9934239C296F74285849E0AAD.pdf (2007) (citing Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 25).
Second, in most cases, an option characterized as an "incentive stock option" must be issued as at-the-money
or out-of-the-money on the date of the grant. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 422 (1986)). Third, public corporations must
disclose to the investing public any grant of in-the-money options. Id. (citing Item 402(d)(2)(vii) of
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(d)(2)(vii)).
212. PANIKKATH, ET AL., supra note 211, at 7.

213. Shipman, supra note 209, at 1201-1202.
214. COOLEY GODWARD KRONISH LLP, COOLEY ALERTS, STOCK OPTION BACKDATING: THE LATEST

"HOT ISSUE" f/ 4 (June 5, 2006), http://www.cooley.com/news/alerts.aspx?id=39704820. It should also be
noted that business academics also track and analyze "forward dating." Narayanan, Schipani, & Seyhun,
supra note 209, at 1602-03. This is the practice of deferring a grant date in light of a current low stock price
that will foreseeably continue to fall in the short-term. Id. The option grant is then set on a date when the fairmarket price of the stock is at a foreseeable low of lows. Id. There is also "spring loading" or bullet dodging,"
which respectively means, timing a grant before a public announcement of good news or directly after a public
announcement of bad news.
Eric Lie, Backdating of Executive Stock Option Grants (ESO),
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elielbackdating.htm (accessed Mar. 15, 2009).
215. Ahrens, supra note 21 I, at "How Does Backdating Work?"
216. PANIKKATH, ET AL., supra note 211, at 9.

217. Compare Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 355-356 (Del. Ch. 2007) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984)) ("Backdating options qualifies as one of those rare cases [in which] a transaction
may be so egregious on its face that board approval cannot meet the test of business judgment."); Matter of
Tyson Foods Inc. Consol. Shareholder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 592 n. 74 (Del. Ch. 2007): In re Comverse
Technology, Inc., Derivative Litigation Leonard Sollins, et al, v. Comverse Technology, Inc., 56 A.D.3d 49,
56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2008).
218. Narayanan, Schipani & Seyhun, supra note 209, at 1601-1602.
219. Daniel W. Collins, Guojin Gong & Haidan Li, Corporate Governance and Backdating of Executive
Stock Options 2 note I (2008), http://ssm.com/abstract=934881 (citing Options Scorecard, WALL ST. J.,
available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-full.html).
220. See generally S.E.C., Spotlight on Stock Options Backdatings, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
optionsbackdating.htm (last updated Dec. I1, 2009).
22 1. N.B. This disclosure is made per Treasury Department Circular 230. Any discussion of federal tax
issues contained within this document is not advice. This document was written as a means of marketing and

research. Any discussion of federal tax issues was not written as advice, and therefore cannot reasonably be
used by any person to avoid obligations imposed upon them via the Internal Revenue Code.
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For instance, an at-the-money stock option is considered performance-based
and therefore does not count towards the corporation's $1 million dollar
executive compensation deduction cap under Internal Revenue Code §
162(m).223
However, in-the-money stock options are not considered
performance based with regards to the difference between the low exercise
price and the higher fair market price of the stock on the day of the grant224
(referred to as intrinsic value). 225 That difference in rice counts towards the
$1 million dollar deduction under § 162(m).22
Depending on the
circumstances of backdating, a corporation may have taken full deductions on
amounts that should have been limited.2 27
With regards to financial statements which are represented as "GAAP
compliant," the corporation must record a compensation expense when in-the228
money stock options are granted.
The expensed amount is the intrinsic
value of the in-the-money options. If this expense was not properly recorded
during the financial period it was incurred, a corporation may need to restate
financial statements to accurately reflect the compensation expense. 229 Since
the accounting of options is recorded over the course of the designated vesting
period, a single act of backdating may result in the restatement of several years
222. Although it would be beyond the scope of this document to discuss in greater detail the tax environment
surrounding options backdating, some basic information is appropriate. For example, where options are granted as
incentive stock options: the exercise of that option by the optionee does not typically result in taxable income.
Taylor, supra note 211, at 37. This presumes, however, that certain incentive stock option rules are followed, one
of which is that the option's exercise price is equal or greater than the fair market value of the stock on the day of
the grant. Id Non-compliance would disqualify the option for favorable treatment. Id. at 41.
A false or inaccurate tax return can be treated a variety of different ways. Taylor, supra note 211 at
39. If the taxpayer-corporation or individual-willfully made a false return, there is possible criminal
penalty of up to three years incarceration and a S100,000 fine for each violation. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 7206(1)
(West 2002)). Alternatively, if the taxpayer innocently made a false return, the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") may collect any unpaid taxes, penalties, or interest. Id.
223. KAREN

FIELD,

KPMG,

MISDATED

AND

OTHER

DISCOUNTED

STOCK

OPTiONS

4,

http://www.kpmginfo.com/Payrollinsights/downloads/Section409AExplanation.pdf (2007) (discussing I.R.C.
§ 162(m) (2007). There is small debate that this deduction cap of $1 million can legally be exceeded. See,
e.g., Shipman, supra note 209 at 1201 n. 42 (citing Eric Lie, On the Timing ofCEO Stock Option A wards 51
Mgmt. Sci. 802, 803 (2005)).
224. FIELD, supra note 223 at 4.
225. Raquel Meyer Alexander, Mark Hirschey & Susan Scholz, Backdating Emplovee Stock Options:
Accounting and Legal Implications, CPA J., Oct. 2007, http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2007/1007/
infocus/pl 8.htm.
226. FIELD, supra at 1. The tax effects are more complex. In brief, know that 162(m) also requires that
the options be granted by a compensation committee, and by shareholder approval. Narayanan. Schipani &
Seyhun, supra at 1620-21. Also note there is differing tax treatment under §§ 409(a) and 422 of the Code, for
deferred compensation, statutory incentive stock option ("ISO") plans, and non-statutory stock option plans
("NSO"). Id.
227. FIELD, supra at 1.
228. Narayanan, Schipani & Seyhun, supra at 1606. The 34 Act requires a public corporation to maintain
its books to accurately reflect that corporation's assets. Taylor, supra note 211 at 20-21 (citing 34 Act §
13(b)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2007)). Public corporations are also required to
maintain an internal system of accounting and controls to ensure continued accurate reporting of transactions.
Id. (citing 34 Act § 13(b)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2007)). A public corporation must
assess this internal system annually, and disclose any material impact caused. or foreseeably caused, by any

changes. Id. (citing Exchange Act Rule 13a-15(c). (d), 17 C.F.R. §240.13a-15(c). (d)).
229. COOLEY GODWARD. supra note 214, at "What are the potential ramifications?"
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of financial statements.230 Additionally, corporations must disclose their
executive compensation in proxy statements to shareholders.2 31
If a
corporation published that at-the-money options were granted, but as a result
of backdating, in-the-money options were in fact granted, those proxy
statements would be inaccurate and might be considered fraudulent.232
SOX requires corporations to file a Form 4, reporting changes in
beneficial ownership of securities to insiders within two days of a
23323
transaction.
Since 2002, the possible universe for backdating is two days.234
Although Form 4s are not always timely filed,235 a late Form 4 suggests
possible backdating.236 SOX's Form 4 was followed by the "new" Executive
237
Compensation rules released by the SEC in August and December of 2006.
Among the several things accomplished by these new rules was the
Compensation Discussion and Analysis ("CD&A").238 The CD&A requires
the corporation to articulate in detail the objectives of executive compensation,

230. Id.
231. Corporate Counsel s 2008 GC Compensation Survey 1 2. LAW.COM, Aug. 2008, http://
www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlel HC.jsp?id= 1202423065928..
232. COOLEY GODWARD, supra note 214. at "What are the potential ramifications?" Federal securities
law provides a number of different means for combating fraud in investor and shareholder disclosures. Fraud,
in this case, includes materially misleading misstatements in registrations statements (33 Act § I1, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 77j (West 2002)), prospectuses (33 Act § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k(a)(2) (West 2002)), securities
transactions (e.g. 33 Act § I 7(a)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77p(a) (West 2007)), proxy statements (Exchange Act Rule
14a-9(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a)). SEC reports (34 Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78r(a) (West 2002)), and
public announcements, such as press releases (Exchange Act Rule 10b-5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)).
Taylor, supra note 211, at 15.
233. In re Zoran Corp. Derivative Litigation. 511 F. Supp. 2d 986, 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2007), settlement
approved. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76623 (N. D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2008) (citing 15 U.S.C. 78p(a)(2)(C)). The 34
Act prohibits insider trading. Taylor, supra note 211 at 17. Where a person owes a duty of trust or confidence
to the corporation or the corporation's shareholders, and is in possession of material and non-public
information, that person must either disclose the information to the person she is trading with, or abstain from
trading altogether. Id. (citing Chiarella v. U.S.. 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980)). A person is also guilty of insider
trading if she has confidential information of another who she owes a duty of loyalty and confidence to, and
trades on that information ("misappropriation theory"). Id. (citing U.S. v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652
(1997)); Exchange Act Rule I0b5-2, 17 C.F.R. §240.1 Ob5-2.
234. Id. at 1006.
235. Id.
236. VINSoN & ELKINS, OPTIONS 13ACKDATING UPDATE, V&E SECURITIES LITIGATION ECOMMUNICATION
(July 26, 2006), http://web.archive.org/web/20070820052 126/www.vinson-elkins.com/
resources/resourcedetail.asp?rid=322803901&rtype=pub
(discussing academic studies which report 10
percent to 21 percent of option grants are untimely filed, suggesting backdating). Other red flags include: a
spike in the corporation's stock price immediately after publicly reporting a grant, or the practice of grants by
unanimous written consents. COOLEY GODWARD, supra note 214 at "What is Backdating?"
237. SEC Staff Interpretation, Item 402 of Regulation S-K-Executive Compensation I I,
(last updated Aug. 8, 2007)
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/execcomp402interp.htm
(discussing Securities Act Release No. 8732A and Securities Act Release No. 8765). The SEC is considering
changing, once again, how corporations report executive income, so as to effectuate greater disclosure.
CENTER ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. SCHAPIRO SAYS SEC CONSIDERING BROADER PAY DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS] L, (May 1, 2009), http://www.execcomp.org/news/news-story.aspx?lD=723.
238. EMERY B. SHEER & DANIELLE K. SHEER, INST. OF INTERNAL AUDITORS, BUSINESS NETWORK,
SHEDDING LIGHT ON EXECUTIVE PAY: IN THEIR AUDITS OF COMPENSATION, AUDITORS SHOULD REVIEW THE
CONTROLS THAT ENSURE APPROPRIATE DISCLOSURE AS MANDATED BY NEW SEC RULES 1 5 (Apr. 2007),
available it http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi.i-m4l53/is_2_64/ai-nl9020895 (discussing Item 402(b) or
Regulation S-K).
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citing specific elements used to arrive at a final compensation package.239
Also required by the new executive compensation rules is a tabular disclosure
requirement. 240 This tabular format includes a number of columns that will aid
the shareholder in better understanding the value of the option grant at the time
it was awarded.241 The tabular format includes the date on which the option
242
was awarded and the fair market value of the security on that date.
Both the
CD&A and tabular data must be filed with the SEC, and therefore any
statements or representations made within are subject to the liability provisions
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 2 43
3.

Backdating and Derivatives Litigation

Zoran244 is an example of how disgruntled shareholders, in derivatives
litigation have recaptured some of the value high level executives gained when
compensated with stock option grants. Zoran involved claims of backdating
and false proxy statements. 245 After surviving a motion to dismiss, plaintiff
settled and the corporation was reimbursed $3.4 million, and several options
were re-priced at an estimated recaptured value of nearly $2 million. 24 The
suit alleged against the corporation's CEO and CFO, violations of § 10(b),
Rule lOb-5, and § 20(a) of the 1934 Act.247 Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5
claims involve the existence and use of manipulative and deceptive devices.248
Plaintiff alleged that defendant Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and Chief
Financial Officer ("CFO") had misrepresented to the corporation the value of
the stock options granted.249
The corporation relied on these
239. Id. Item 402 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.402(b) (2010). This includes, but is not limited to:
the policy behind awarding equity compensation as opposed to cash compensation, id. § 402(b)(2)(ii); how
compensation is designed to award executive performance, id. at 402(b)(2)(vii); the affect of the executive
compensation on corporate tax and financial reporting matters, id. at 402(b)(2)(xii).
240. Shipman, supra note 209 at 1207-1208.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Sheer & Sheer, supra note at N 5. See also Taylor, supra note 211, at 25-26. The principal executive
officer and principal financial officer must sign certifications for each annual and quarterly reports. Id. (citing
34 Act 13a-14, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14). These certifications attest to, among other things: the accuracy of
the financial statements, the proper disclosure of information to auditors, as well as the disclosure of any fraud.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2002); Item 601(b)(31) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(31)).
244. Zoran, supra note 233.
245. Id.
246. In re Zoran Corporation Derivative Litigation, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76623 at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(court approved settlement).
247. Zoran, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 1010-10 l.
248. Id. (discussing 15 U.S.C.S. § 78j (2008) and 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2008)). A successful § 10(b) and
Rule l0b-S claim in the Ninth Circuit requires the plaintiff to plead with regard to each defendant:
(I) that defendants made a material misrepresentation or omission;
(2) the misrepresentation was in connection with the purchase or sale of a security;
(3) that the misrepresentation caused plaintiffs loss
(4) that plainti ff relied on the misrepresentation or omission;
(5) that defendants acted with scienter; and
(6) that plaintiff suffered damages.
Zoran. 511 F. Supp. 2d at 1010-1011

249. Id.
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misrepresentations in awarding option grants, suffering harm by "parting with
its shares at a lower price than was right." 250 The Court found the allegations
were successfully plead and refused to dismiss the claim. 251 The claim for
control person liability under § 20(a) was also leveled against the CEO and
252
CFO.
However, plaintiff failed to successfully plead that the people who
committed fraud were under the control of the CEO and CFO, and thus the
Court dismissed plaintiffs claim. 253
4.

'EssentialLink 254 and Proxy Statements

The plaintiff also made a claim under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act against the
members of the audit and compensation committees for issuing false proxy
statements to the corporation's shareholders.255 The Court found this claim
was properly plead and denied a motion to dismiss.256 Of important note
regarding the § 14(a) proxy claim is that the plaintiff properly plead the
"essential link" element.257 This has been a problematic element for other

250. Id.
25 1. The court found the elements of the § I Ob and Rule I Ob-5 claims were satisfactorily plead. Id. at
1013. The element of material misstatement or omission was successfully plead as both the CEO and CFO
personally administered option grants and knowingly signing false and misleading financial statements and
SOX certifications. Id. at 101 I. As a result of these misstatements, several financial statements were restated,
recognizing a "charge of twelve to fifteen million dollars in compensation expenses." Id
Transactional causation and reliance was successfully plead as all stock options were pre-approved
by the CEO before granted, and witnesses indicated that the CFO was "integral [to] every aspect." Id. at 1012.
The corporation in turn, then, relied on the representations made to it by its executive officers, and issued
shares for prices that were below the fair market price the corporation would have otherwise received. Id.
Scienter was successfully plead as not only as the CEO and CFO were "involved" in the granting of
backdated options and therefore should have known of the backdating, but that the CEO and CFO gave
approval of the option granting process and in fact oversaw the process. Id. at 1013. In addition, the CEO and
CFO prepared and signed false proxy statements. Id The claim was timely filed under the statute of
limitations element, as the action was filed within five years of the violation. Id. at 1013-1014.
252. Id. at 1015 (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 78t (2008)). In the Ninth Circuit, "plaintiff must allege that: (I)
there was a primary violation of the securities laws; and (2) that the defendant exercised actual power or
control over the violator." Id Compare Take-Two 20(a) element test, infra note 275.
253. In the Ninth Circuit, plaintiff must first successfully plead a violation of securities law, and then
successfully plead the defendant had "control over the violator." Zoran, supra note 233.
254. Id. at 1016.
255. Id. See Belova v. Sharp. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19880 at *20 (D. Or. 2008) (successfully plead the
"essential link" element in a 14(a) allegation). Compare Engel v. Sexton, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12778 (E.D.
La. 2009) (14(a) complaint dismissed); In re Marsh & McLennan Cos. Sec. Litig., 536 F. Supp. 2d 313
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (14(a) compliant dismissed without prejudice). To plead a claim under [§] 14(a) in the Ninth
Circuit, plaintiff must allege that:
(1) defendants made a material misrepresentation or omission in a proxy statement;
(2) with the requisite state of mind; and
(3) that the proxy statement was the transactional cause of harm of which the plaintiff complains.
Zoran, supra note 233, at 1015 (interpreting 34 Act, 15 U.S.C. 78n(a) (2008)).
256. Id. at 1016. The element of misstatement and state of mind was successfully plead as plaintiff
indicated a reasonable shareholder would consider self-dealing material in regards to voting, and that the proxy
statements for an eight-year period misstated not only option grant dates, compensations expenses, and
financial results, but also falsely stated the board was compliant with the shareholder approved stock option
plans. Id. at 1015. The statute of limitations element was successfully plead as to proxy statements issued
between years 2003 and 2005. as they fall within the three-year statute of repose. Id at 1017.
257. Id- at 1016.
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plaintiffs to satisfy.25 Plaintiff had to show that the proxy solicitation itself,
and not the fraud contained within it, was the cause of the injury to the
corporation.259 Zoran's plaintiff survived this standard by pleading that the
board used the proxy statements to maintain their positions and continue the
backdating practice.26o The shareholders voted on the information contained
inside those proxy statements without knowledge of the nature of the
backdating having occurred.261 Once re-elected, board members could then
continue the process of backdating.262 The corporation was harmed by
distributing corporate assets inefficiently, causing an SEC inquiry, and causing
reputational damage within the investing community. 263 Plaintiff alleged that
had the shareholders known of the backdating, those shareholders would not
264
have voted affirmatively on the proxy statements.
5.

Special Committees and Demand Futility

Derivative actions filed in either a federal district or a New York supreme
court must meet a demand futility test.265 The New York Business Corporation
Law § 626(c) requires plaintiffs in a shareholder derivative action to plead with
particularity that a demand was made to the Board of Directors to initiate the
action on behalf of the corporation, or that such demand would have been
futile. 266 In New York a demand is futile, and therefore excused, where a
majority of the directors are interested in the transaction(s) in dispute, or the
directors were not reasonably informed about the transaction(s), or the
directors failed to use business judgment regarding the transaction(s). 267

258. Compare In re iBasis, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 2007 WL 4287591 (D. Mass. 2007) (Shareholders
also argued, via derivative action, that § 14(a) of the 1934 Act was violated by false or misleading proxy
statements. The court dismissed the claim for several reasons. First, the court considered the claim untimely.
Second, the court dismissed the claim because the alleged backdating occurred prior to the issued proxy
statement, and therefore there was no connection between the injury to the company and the statements and
transactions approved by shareholder vote based on the information in that proxy.).
259. Zoran, supra note 233, at 1016. Compare Fisher v. Kanas, 467 F. Supp. 2d 275, 281-284 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (plaintiff failed to allege: that the proxies contained specific misstatements regarding compensation; that
causation existed, as there was no allegation that the proxy votes would have been different; and there were no
allegations that there was a plaintiff injury as a result of the misstatements).
260. Zoran, supra note 233, at 1016.

261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See e.g. Plymouth Cty. Retirement Ass'n v. Shroeder, 576 F.Supp.2d 360, 369, 374-375, 378-380,
383 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing the various requirements a plaintiff derivative action must satisfy in a federal
court, including: the demand futility test, statute of limitations requirements, and sufficiency of the pleadings
under, inter alia., the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA")).
266. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §626(c) (McKinney 2003).
267. Marx v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189 (N.Y. 1996). The Court in Comverse elaborated on this third test,
finding a demand on the Board futile "when [the] complaint alleges with particularity that the challenged
transaction was so egregious on its face that it could not have been the product of sound business judgment of
the directors." In re Comverse Technology Inc., Derivative Lit., 866 N.Y.S.2d 10. 16-17 (quoting Ryan v.
Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 354-356 (Del. Ch. 2007)).
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Although the plaintiffs in Cornverse268 had successfully plead two of the three
tests for demand futility, the trial court dismissed the claim because the
director defendants had created a special committee to internally investigate
the backdating matter.269 The trial court found the special committee
represented the Board's willingness to remedy the problem on behalf of the
corporation, rendering the demand futility question moot.270 The Appellate
Division disagreed, however, and found the creation of the special committee,
alone,271 insufficient to establish the "board's willingness to take all the
necessary and appropriate steps to obtain the relief available." 272 The Court
reversed the trial opinion and reinstated the claim. 273
6.

Backdating and Class Action

The requirements for demand futility can be avoided if the moving party
pursues class action. Class action, of course, has separate requirements which
must be satisfied, 274 but shareholders have experienced some success in option
backdating cases. The Southern District Court of New York recently analyzed
the sufficiency of backdating claims in Take-Two.275 Plaintiffs alleged two
counts of securities fraud as regards options backdating.276 Count one alleged
268. Comverse, supra note 267.
269. Id. at 17.
270. Id.
271. Id. (citing Katzv. Renyi, 722 N.Y.S.2d 860 (2001)).
272. Id. The Court found a number of problems with the special committee. First, one of the special
committee members was a director and compensation committee member for the period of interest at the
litigation, suggesting a serious conflict of interest. Id. Two, the Court found the actions taken by the special
committee "tepid." Id. at 17-18. For example, once the perpetrators of the fraud were found, they were kept
on with the corporation as "advisors" until the SEC filed charges seeking restitution of5 51 million. Id at 18.
Compare Wandel ex rel. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc. v. Eisenberg, et al., 871 N.Y.S.2d 102 (N.Y. App. Divs. Ist
Dept. 2009) (plaintiffs failed to plead with particularity what the egregious behavior was, and the corporation
and its special committee had remedied the matter with repricing unvested options and adopting new controls).
273. Comverse, supra note 267, at 19.
274. (1) [A] district judge may certify a class only after making determination that each of the Rule 23
requirements has been met; (2) such determinations can be made only if the judge resolves factual disputes
relevant to each Rule 23 requirement and finds that whatever underlying facts are relevant to a particular Rule 23
requirement have been established and is persuaded to rule, based on the relevant facts and the applicable legal
standard, that the requirement is met; and (3) the obligation to make such determinations is not lessened by overlap
between a Rule 23 requirement and a merits issue, eve a merits issue that is identical with a Rule 23 requirement."
In re Monster Worldwide, Inc. Sec. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 132, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (intemal quotations and citations
omitted). Class certification requires satisfaction of Rule 23(a)'s "familiar requirement." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(a) (2008)). This requirement is "referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of
representation," and also must satisfy an additional 23(b) element. Id.
275. In re Take-Two Interactive Securities Litigation, 551 F. Supp. 2d 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
276. Id. at 258-59. Count three was for control person liability under § 20(a) for fraud unrelated to the
options backdating. Id. at 259. Count three was dismissed in its entirety. Id. at 306. Count four alleged
trading with inside information against several executives pursuant to § 20A(a), as these executives were
alleged to have sold their shares timed to the release of negative Take-Two news. Id. at 259. Section 20A(a)
under the 34 Act creates a private right of action for claims of trading with inside information. Id. at 308-09.
This action was not based on the options backdating facts, however. Id at 308-12. Section 20A(a) provides:
Any person who violates any provision of [the 34 Act] or the rules or regulations thereunder by
purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, nonpublic information shall be
liable ... to any person who, contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of securities that is the
subject of such violation, has purchased ... securities of the same class. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a)
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fraud in light of § 10b and Rule lOb-5, where fraudulent statements regarding
the backdating practices were made, causing the investing public to purchase
Take-Two shares at inflated prices.277 Count two alleged control person
liability under § 20(a) against two former CEOs and a former CFO, as these
individuals controlled the corporation during the fraud perpetrated in count
one. 278
The defendants made several motions to dismiss for inadequacy in the
pleadings for the § l0b and Rule lOb-5 claims, including: insufficient loss
279
280
281
causation,
material misstatements,
and scienter.
The Court dismissed
the bulk of these motions, granting in part those regarding scienter.282 With
respect to loss causation, the Court concluded the plaintiffs had successfully
plead a diminution in share price as a result of a summer 2006 Take-Two
public disclosure revealing an SEC investigation.283 This particular disclosure
was credited with a 7.5 percent drop in the company's share price.284 The loss
in value and simultaneous announcement of SEC activity were sufficient to
satisfy the causation element.285 The Court also concluded the plaintiffs had
successfully plead materiality because the defendants' fraud caused the
company to overstate earnings by 20 percent in 2002, 11 percent in 2003, and

(2008).
A successful private right of action under § 20A(a) requires the moving party to: (I) plead a predicate
insider trading violation of the [34 Act] (see Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 32 F.3d 697,
703 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig, 503 F. Supp. 2d 611, 664(S.D.N.Y. 2007)); and (2) allege
sufficient facts showing "that the defendant traded the security at issue 'contemporaneously' with the
plaintiff." In re Openwave Sys. Sees. Litig, 528 F. Supp. 2d 236, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Take-Two, 551 F. 2d
at 309.
277. Id. at 258.
278. Id. at 259.
279. Loss causation is required under § 10b and Rule lOb-5 claims. Id. at 282. A plaintiff must allege that
losses were caused by defendant misstatements or omissions that "concealed something from the market that,
when disclosed, negatively affected the value of the security." Id. (citing Lentel v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396
F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005)).
280. Materiality is required in Rule lOb-5 claims. Take-Two, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 290-291. A plaintiff
must plead that a defendant statement or omission that a "reasonable investor would have considered
significant in making investment decisions." Id. (citing Ganin v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 161 (2d
Cir. 2000)).
281. Id. at 282. Scienter is required for claims pursuant to § 10(b) and Rule l0b-5. Id. at 293. The
plaintiff must allege facts "giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with 'an intent to deceive,
manipulate or defraud."' Id (citing Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2001)). This inference of
scienter can be based on facts showing the defendant had a motive and opportunity to commit the alleged acts,
or alternatively, "strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness." Id. (citing ATSI
Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd.. 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2007)). The inference is considered
"strong" if it is as plausible as other, non-fraudulent explanations for the defendant's behavior. Id. (citing
Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2510 (2007)). To properly plead motive, "a

plaintiff 'must assert a concrete and personal benefit to the individual defendants resulting from the fraud."'
Id. at 294 (citing Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 139). To properly plead opportunity, a plaintiff "must show that the [ I
defendants possessed 'the means and likely prospect of achieving concrete benefits by the means alleged."'
Id. at 297 (citing Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp. Inc.. 25 F.3d I 124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994)).
282. Take-Two, supra note 275, at 313.
283. Id. at 282.
284. Id at 287.
285. Id. (citing in re Dura Pharm. Inc. Secs. Litig.. 452 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1021-23 (S.D. Cal. 2006); In re
Openwave Sys. Secs. Litig., supra note 276, at 252-253 (4.5 % drop)).
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286

Plaintiffs successfully alleged that a
nearly 6 percent in 2004-2005.
reasonably objective investor would have taken this information into
consideration before purchasing Take-Two shares, and therefore materiality
was present. 287 Although the Second Circuit has refused to create hard-andfast quantitative markers of materiality, "the significant overstatement of a
company's earnings may constitute a 'material' misrepresentation., 28 8
The plaintiffs also successfully alleged the § 10b and Rule lOb-5 element
289
several compensation
scienter against several of the defendants: one CEO,
committee members,290 and Take-Two as a corporation. 29 In the instance of
the CEO, the Court considered the backdating admissions made to the
Manhattan District Attorney's office sufficient to infer an intent to make false
statements, and that such an inference was more believable than innocent
Regarding the compensation
explanations for the CEO's conduct.
committee members, the Court considered the allegations well-plead as regards
both motive and oportunity.293 The committee members allegedly received
295
backate
and was evidenced by each
backdated options.
This constituted motive,
committee member reaching an agreement with the corporation to repay the
value of the inappropriately backdated options.296 It was also adequately
alleged that the compensation committee defendants sat on the committee
when the options were backdated, and were in fact responsible for determining
the exercise price for the options.297 The Court went further and considered it
dispositive that the compensation committee defendants had the ability to
"influence the drafting and preparation" of the company's public
The Court did not give weight to the explanations by
disclosures.298
defendants of their innocence,299 but rather concluded facts taken as alleged
constituted opportunity.3o As regards the corporation, the Court reasoned,
286. Id. at 293 (earning percentages, as disclosed in Take-Two's 2006 restated 10k).

287. Id.at 291.
288. Id. (citing Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co.. 228 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2000); SEC v. Penthouse Int'l,
Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 344, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig, 10 F. Supp. 2d 398, 409-12
(S.D.N.Y. 1998)). Compare Basic Inc. v. Levinson. 485 U.S. 224, 231-232 (1988) (material is judged at the
time the misrepresentation or omission entered the market, as opposed to when the fraud was revealed); Oran
v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275. 282 (3d Cir. 2000) (different test for materiality, where the price of the stock is
evaluated following the disclosure).
289. Take-Two, supra note 275. at 293290. Id. at 293-94.
291. Id. at 305-06. Scienter was also found as regards three directors who sat on Take-Two board's
compensation committee. Id at 294 (where each director had entered a private agreement with the company to
repay Take-Two, see infra note 296).
292. Id. at 293 (former CEO Brant plead guilty in New York state court to falsifying business records; his
plea agreement contained admissions of stock option backdating).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 294.
295. Id. at 294, 297.
296. Id at 294 (defendant Emmel repaid S 171,494, defendant Flug repaid S305,720, defendant Grace
repaid S 249,927).
297. Id at 297.
298. Id. at 297-98.
299. Id. at 301.
300. Id. at 298.
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"Courts readily attribute [ ] the scienter of management-level employees to
corporate defendants." 30' In this case, the plaintiffs had adequately alleged
scienter against the former CEO and compensation committee members, which
therefore reflected on the corporation. 302
The Take-Two Court also addressed a claim of control person liability
under§ 20(a) against former executives, two CEOs and a CFO. 303 Take-Two
defined control as "'the power to direct or cause the direction of the
management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting
securities, by contract, or otherwise."'304
Here, although the plaintiffs
successfully alleged that two former CEOs and a former CFO influenced the
content and dissemination of various false statements and day-to-day
supervision of the corporation, 305 plaintiffs failed to plead culpable
participation for any defendant other than one of the former CEOs. 306
Culpable participation requires that a defendant have a reckless mental state, 307
or alternatively, that scienter was "adequate ly]" plead. 30s In this case,
plaintiffs failed to establish a reckless state of mind.30 The pleadings did not
allege that the former president and second CEO knew or should have known
of the corporation's fraudulent misrepresentation of the company's options
granting policy. 310
The corporation settled with the SEC and the Manhattan District
Attorney's office for $3.3 million. 311 Several of the executive defendants have
individually plead guilty to falsifying Take-Two documents to accomplish the
backdating.
The class action in the Southern District Court of New York
301. Id. at 305 (citing In re Marsh & McLennan Cos., Inc. Sec. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 452, 481 (S.D.N.Y.
2006)).
302. Id. at 306.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 307 (citing SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472-73 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting 17
C.F.R. § 240.12b-2)). Section 20(a) provides:
[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of [the
Exchange Act] or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with
and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is
liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the
act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action. Id. at 306 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)). In the
Second Circuit, a plaintiff must plead: (I) there was an underlying primary violation, (2) the
defendant exercised control over the primary violator, and (3) the defendant culpably participated
in the primary violation. Id (citing In re Marsh & McLennan, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 493). This
element test is slightly different from that used in Zoran, supra note 252.
305. Take-Two, supra note 275, at 307.
306. Id. (lead plaintiffs' plead successfully against defendant Brant, only).
307. Id. at 308 (as required by § 10(b) and Rule lOb5, citing Marsh, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 494). Plaintiffs
also must satisfy the stringent pleading requirements of the PSLRA, pleading their allegations with
particularity. Take-Two, supra note 275, at 308 (discussing I5 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2008)).
308. Id. (citing In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & "ERISA" Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 192, 235 (S.D.N.Y.
2004)).
309. Id. at 309.
310. Id.
311. Assoc. PRESS,Take-Two Settles Stock Options Backdating Case, Apr. I, 2009, at 11 2, 7, available
at http://www.thestreet.com/story/10480741/I/take-two-settles-stock-options-backdating-case.htmi.
312. Former CEO Ryan Brant plead guilty in 2007 to first-degree felony of falsification of business
records. paying $7.2 million in restitution. Id. 13. Several other executives plead guilty that same summer to

Summer 2010

RECOUPMENT OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

433

settled in agreement for more than $20 million.3 13
It is important to emphasize the similarly plead claims that have not
survived motions to dismiss. 314 Many claims are also settled out of court
before they reach trial. 315 Further, please note that though this section has
focused on claims arising under the 33 and 34 Acts, such claims represent only
a portion of the possible civil and criminal actions that could be brought in the
context of stock options backdating.316
falsifying company records. Id. 14.
313. Press Release. Take-Two Interactive. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. Announces Settlement of
Securities Class Action, available at http://ir.take2games.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=406450 (Sept. I
2009).
3 14. Most courts, however, allowed for later amended complaint. dismissing the claims without prejudice.
See generallY In re Hansen Natural Corp. Sec. Litigation, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (class action
dismissed because allegations did not include financial detail assessing impact): In re CNET Networks. Inc.,
Derivative Litigation, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51309 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (derivative action which failed to
properly allege demand futility, even after third amended complaint); In re Openwave Sys., 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32589 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (derivative action where statistical analyses provided were insufficient to
reasonably infer backdating); Rudolph v. UT Starcom, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63990 at **19-20 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (class action that was dismissed in part because plaintiff failed to make the "essential link" argument
required in allegations that involve proxy statements); Britton v. Parker, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70430 (D.
Colo. 2008) (derivative action dismissed because allegations were insufficiently specific); Edward J. Goodman
Life Income Trust v. Jabil Circuit, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (class action dismissed upon
third amended complaint for, inter alia., insufficient fraud admissions and insufficient detail as to misconduct);
In re Keithley Instruments, Inc., Derivative Litigation, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107781 (N.D. Ohio 2008)
(derivative action dismissed for failure to make a demand upon the board); Winters v. Steinberg, 529 F. Supp.
2d 237 (D. Mass. 2008) (derivative action did not adequately allege scienter); In re Comverse Technology.
Inc. Securities Litigation, 543 F. Supp. 2d 134, 155-156 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (class action where claims were
dismissed in part, inter alia, failure to satisfy the PSLRA), accouniing claims independent qf backdating
claims dismissed, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55032 at **2-3 (2008); In re Openwave Systems, supra note 267
(class action dismissed in part because control person liability and scienter were misplead as to some
defendants); Pedroli v. Bartek, 564 F. Supp. 2d 683, 689 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (derivative action, "scatter-gun"
pleading
insufficient).
See
also
Posting of
Kevin
M.
LaCroix
to
D&O
Diary,
updated Mar.
17,
2010)
(last
http://www.oakbridgeins.com/clients/blog/optionsbackdatingtable.doc
[hereinafter Settlement Table].
315. Settlements include: Mercury Interactive options class action settlement for S 177.5 million; KLATencor options class action settlement for $65 million; and Brocade options class action settlement for $160
million. Settlement Table, supra note 314, at 2.
316. See. e.g. SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107706 at **6, 26 (N.D. Cal.
2008). After having settled with the corporation itself for a fine of $28 million, the SEC pursued four high
level executives with various fraud allegations. Id. The SEC sought permanent injunctive relief, disgorgement
of wrongfully obtained benefits plus prejudgment interest, civil monetary penalties, an order precluding the
Individual Defendants from serving as officers or directors of any public company, and repayment of bonuses
and stock profits. Id.
The court dismissed several claims, but not those alleging fraud in the purchase and sale of Mercury
stock, as well as claims of false financial statement certifications. Id at *26. It should be noted that claims
made against former Mercury General Council Susan Skaer, now Tanner, were recently dismissed. Dan
Levine, Judge Dismisses SEC Case Against Mercury Interactive s Former GC, LAW.COM, Sept. I 8 2009,
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC jsp?id= I202433875438&JudgeDismissesSECCaseAgainst
MercuryInteractivesFormer LegalChief=&src= EMCEmail&et=editorial&bu=Corporate%20Counsel&pt=
Corporate%20Counsel%2ODaily%20Alerts&cn=cc20090918&kw=Judge%20Dismisses%20SEC%20Case%
0
20Against%20Mercury% 201nteractive's%2OForme /o2OLegal%20Chief.
Both the Broadcon and Brocade cases are interesting in the breadth of litigation undertaken from the
same backdating fact patterns. To date, there has been: separate shareholder derivative and class actions,
criminal indictments against executives, and civil enforcement actions by the SEC. See e.g. In re Brocade
Derivative Litig., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 295 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (dismissed claims in part against defendants
because, inter alia. the l0b allegations were flawed as evidence was insufficient regarding Canova and the
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BANKRUPTCY CODE 3 17

For companies that file for bankruptcy, creditors may be able to recover
compensation paid by the debtor corporation to its executives.
L

Key Employee Retention Programs

The Enron and WorldCom crises of 2000 can also be credited with the
legislative effort to stop corporate insiders from benefiting while the
corporation fights for survival in bankruptcy. 319 In particular, there appears to
be clear Congressional intent addressing the oftentimes substantial executive
pay packages awarded, despite the dramatic job losses labor and non-

reliance element was not met regarding Reyes); SEC v. Reyes, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65895 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(action is against then Broadcom CEO Reyes, VP Jensen, and CFO Canova; pending); SEC v. Byrd, No. 074223-CRB (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 17. 2007) (action is against then Brocade CFO and COO Byrd; pending);
Roth v. Reyes, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66066 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Broadcom litigation dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted); Smajlaj v. Brocade, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97618 (N.D.
Cal. 2005), defendant notion to dismiss denied. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64968 (N.D. Cal. 2007), partial
sunmarvjudgment granted in favor of plaintiffs. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38885 (N. D. Cal. 2008); U.S. v.
Reies, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27427 (N.D. Cal. 2007), criminal conviction against Broadcon CEO ReVes
overturned; U.S. v. Reyes, No. 08-10047 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18. 2009), criminal conviction of Broadcom human
resource executive Jensen upheld with resentencing; U.S. v. Jensen, No. 08-10140 (N.D. Cal. 2009). In
December 2009, separate criminal and civil suits were dismissed against various former Broadcom executives.
Amanda Bronstad, OJf the Hook: Judge Tosses Out Broadcom Prosecutions, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 16, 2009,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202436348562&Off theHookJudgeTosses
Out_ BroadcomProsecutions=&src=EMC-Email&et=editorial&bu=Corporate%20Counsel&pt=Corporate%
20Counsel%2ODaily%2OAlerts&cn=cc20091215&kw=Off"/20the%2OHook%3A/2OJudge%20Tosses%
200ut%20Broadcom%20Prosecutions (against former CFO William Ruehle, co-founder Henry Nicholas, cofounder Henry Samueli, and former general counsel David Dull). Later that month the company settled
outstanding shareholder suits. Karen Guilo, Broadcom to Pay $160.5 Million, End Backdating Suits
(Updatel), BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 30, 2009, available at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2009-1230/broadcom-to-pay-160-5-million-end-backdating-suits-updatel -.html. The Brocade corporation released a
press release in 2008 announcing a preliminary settlement of S160 million to resolve the class action against it.
Press Release, Brocade Communications Systems, Brocade Reaches Settlement in Federal Securities ClassAction Lawsuit (June 2, 2008), available at http://newsroom.brocade.com/article -display.cfm?articleid-491.
The corporation also settled with the SEC, paying a $7 million penalty without either admitting or denying the
SEC, Lit. Release No. 20137, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/
backdating allegations.
Ir20137.htm (May 31, 2007). See Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 18 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2009),
providing a private right of action for fraudulent interstate transactions, and frequently alleged with § 10b and
Rule lOb-5 claims in the context of options backdating. See, e.g., SEC v. Schroeder. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
46465 at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (17(a) in context of stock options backdating); Goldman v. McMahan. 1987 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5356 at *39 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (17(a) private right of action exists).
317. This section is not intended to be an exhaustive investigation of the Bankruptcy Code or creditor
rights; bur rather, is a fair representation of possible actions brought under the circumstances of a corporation
facing bankruptcy. See infra note 342 and accompanying text (creditor rights under New York state law).
318. Posting of Jesse Fried to The Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Forum 1 4,
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2008/10/04/uncle-sam-should-claw-back-wall-street-bonuses/ (Oct. 4,
2008 09:11 EST). See infra discussion at 330 and accompanying text (Lehman): infra note 352 (Madoff);
infra note 473 (Connecticut Attorney General Blumenthal).
319. See general/v Melissa C. King. Are KERPs Alive in Essence? The Viability of Executive Incentive
Bonus Plans After II U.S.C § 503(c)(1), 82 ST. JoHN'S L. REV. 1509, 1514-21 (2008).
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management employees sustained.320 Specifically, these legislative efforts
targeted retention bonuses, 32 1 or Key Employee Retention Programs
("KERP").322 KERPs were once used by debtor corporations to persuade
existing managers to remain with the corporation through and until the
conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings. 323 The rationale for such a practice
being that those individuals who knew the business and company best were in
the best position to quickly and efficiently move the company through the
bankruptcy process. 32 KERPs were also intended to retain management talent
The argument against this is
who otherwise would flee the sinking ship.
predictable: KERPs reward the very same people who managed the company
Recent "mega-bankruptcies" used such retention
into bankruptcy.326
bonuses.327 WorldCom, for example, had a court approved plan to pay $25
million in bonuses to key employees.328 Gary Winnick of Global Crossing
received $512 million; Ken Lay of Enron received $247 million;329 and Jeff
Skilling, also of Enron, received $89 million.330 The philosophical arguments
for and against KERPs aside, Congress and then President Bush acted in 2005
to eliminate them. 33 '
2.

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and ConsumerProtection Act of 2005

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
("BAPCPA") amends the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 332 to limit the transfers a
debtor can make during and prior to filing for bankruptcy.333 The trustee is

320. See generallv Rebecca Revich, The KERP Revolution, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87, 88-93 (2007).
32 1. See generally Raymond M. Patella, Bankruptcy Law Reform: A Primer For the General Practitioner:
Business Bankruptcies, 77 PA BAR ASSN. Q 100, 103 (2006).
322. New Bankrupicy Act: Employee Benefits and Erecutive Compensation Provisions, McDermott
Newsletters (McDermott Will & Emery) Mar. 10, 2005, at "Executive Compensation Provisions", available at
http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nidetail/objectid/30f82c89-c809-48c8-8flb3728eb30bcea.cfm (hereinafter McDernott Newsletter.
323. David A. Skeel, Jr., Doctrines and Markets: Creditors' Ball: The -New" Corporate Governance in
Chapter I. " 152 U. PA. L. REv. 917, 926-27 (2003) (also referred to as "pay-to-stay" bonuses).
324. Id. at 927.
325. k. at 926-27.
326. Id. at 927.
327. Id.
328. Bonuses ranged between $20,000 to $125.000 for approximately 329 of these key employees. Id.
329. Creditors in Enron failed to recover over $120 million in executive compensation, paid months before
the 2001 Enron bankruptcy. Linda Sandier & Tiffany Kary, Lehman Creditors Can Ti' to Recover Fidds
Pay, BLOOMBERG. Sept. 19. 2008, at 1 5, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=

aM8r4dakjoQk&refer =news.
330. King, supra note 319, at 1509 (citing len Cheng, Survivors Who Laughed All the Way to the Bank:
Barons ofBankruptcy Part I, Fin. Times (London), July 31, 2002 at 10)..
331. McDermott Newsletter, supra note 322, at 1 1.
332. Nichole Wong. Note, Note and Comment: Chapter II Bankruptcy Under the Bankruptcv Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act: The Needfor Big Brother, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 237, 242 (2007).
333. Id at 246.
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334
Three types of transfers were
given more power to set-aside these transfers.
First, administrative expenses, such as KERPs, were subject to
affected.
significant change.336 Section 331 of BAPCPA amended § 503 of the
Subsection (c) is a test that debtors
Bankruptcy Code to add subsection (c).
In
must meet in order to obtain court-approval of their compensation plan.
its broadest terms, the proposed KERP must: be essential to keep a person who
has an outside job offer paying equal or higher compensation; who is essential
to the survival of the business; and the KERP amount cannot be greater than
certain transfers to nonmanagement employees or other insiders for the year
preceding the payment. 339 The test provides for more involvement by the court
in reviewing debtor transfers. 340
Second, severance payments were limited by § 331 of BAPCPA.34 In
broad terms, severance payments will not be court approved unless the amount
is less than ten times the mean severance pay nonmanagement employees
receive in the calendar year preceding the payment. 342
Lastly, BAPCPA affected fraudulent transfers.343 Section 548 of the

334. Id.
335. Id. at 246-58.
336. Id. at 253.
337. Id. at 254: see also infra text discussion at 323 (discussion of post BAPCPA opinions illustrating
varying courts' treatment and understanding of 503(c) application).
338. Id. at 254; Wong, supra note 332, at 254 (where "compensation plan" here refers to any transfer of
funds to an upper level management employee).
339.The statutory test provides that a transfer:
To, or ... for the benefit of, an insider of the debtor for the purpose of inducing such person to
remain with the debtor's business, ... [unless] ... (A) the transfer ... is essential to retention of the
person because the individual has a bona fide job offer from another business at the same or greater
rate of compensation; (B) the services provided by the person are essential to the survival of the
business; and (C) either - (i) the amount of the transfer ... is not greater than an amount equal to
ten times the amount of the mean transfer or obligation ofa similar kind given to nonmanagement
employees for any purpose during the calendar year in which the transfer is made ... or (ii) if no
such similar transfers were made to ... nonmanagement employees during such calendar year, the
amount of the transfer ... is not greater than an amount equal to 25 percent of the amount of any
similar transfer ... made to ... such insider for any purpose during the calendar year before the year
in which such transfer is made.
II U.S.C. § 503(c)( I )(A-C) (2007).
340. Wong, supra note 332, at 256.
341. Id.
342. Section 331 provides:
The payment is part of a program that is generally applicable to all full-time employees; and ... the
amount of the payment is not greater than 10 times the amount of the mean severance pay given to
nonmanagement employees during the calendar year in which the payment is made.
II U.S.C. § 503(c)(2)(A-B) (2007).
343. Wong, supra note 332, at 246-47. BAPCPA also affected preferential transfers. Id. Executive
compensation is typically pursued as a fraudulent conveyance, however, and therefore preference actions will
not be discussed in detail in this section.

SHAKED & POSNER, PREFERENCE LITIGATION AND FRAUDULENT

TRANSFER LITIGATION, WHAT IS FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LITIGATION?, http://www.shakedandposner.com/
Practice-Areas/Preference-Litigation-Fraudulent-Transfer-Litigation.shtml (accessed May 14, 2009).
Academia has questioned whether executive compensation can be avoided by the trustee as a
preferential transfer, in that it may or may not be an antecedent debt (where "antecedent debt" is required by
II U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (2007)). Steven H. Kropp. Article: Corporate Governance. Execative Compensation.
Corporate Performance. and Worker Rights in Bankruptcy: Some Lessons from Game Theory, 57 DEPAUL L.

Summer 20o
1

RECOUPMENT OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

437

Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee to set aside fraudulent transfers. 344 The
Bankruptcy Code defines a fraudulent transfer by a debtor's "intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud [creditors]," 345 and by a nonequivalent exchange made during
insolvency, or which when made created the insolvency. 346 Pre-BAPCPA, a
fraudulent transfer could be avoided if made or incurred one year prior to the
bankruptcyu etition.347 Section 1402 of BAPCPA extended this reach-back to
two years.
BAPCPA § 1402 also expanded the definition of "fraudulent
transfer" to include transfers made "to or for the benefit of an insider 349 under
an employment contract." 350
In Teligent,35 ' a plaintiff recovered $12 million from a former CEO under
claims of a fraudulent conveyance.352 At the time of hire, the terms of the
REV. 1, 38 n. 178 (2007). Compare Id. at 37 n. 171 (citing Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992) (debtor
checks to executives as compensation are antecedent debt)). Section 547(b) provides in part:
Except as provided in subsections (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property (I ) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made (A) on or within ninety days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at
the time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this
title.
344. Wong, supra note 332, at 247. BAPCPA also allows a trustee to "avoid any transfer of an interest of
the debtor in property ... made ... within 10 years before the date of the filing," where the debtor is the
beneficiary, and the intent of the debtor in the transfer is to defraud a creditor. Id. at 247-148 (discussing
addition of subsection (e) to § 548). Section 548 provides:
The trustee may avoid any transfer any transfer of an interest of the debtor ... made ... with actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date
that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted.
Section 548 (a)( I)(A) (2007).
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property ... that was made or
incurred on or within [two] years before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor
received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer ... and ... was
insolvent on the date that such transfer was made ... or became insolvent as a result of such
transfer[.]
Section 548(a)(1)(B) (2007).
345. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)( I )(A) (2007).
346. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(I )(B) (2007).
347. Wong, supra note 332, at 247.
348. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)( I) (2007).
349. Kropp, supra note 343, at 37 n. 170 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(b) (Supp. 2007), which defines a
corporate insider to include any officer, director, or their relatives).
350. II U.S.C. § 548(a)( 1) (2007). This language is repeated in subsection § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV),
suggesting Congress is reinforcing its intent to eliminate the historical abuses that provided impetus to
BAPCPA, that being a debtor freely distributing its assets prior to bankruptcy. Wong, supra note 332, at 247.
351. Savage & Assocs. v. Mandl (In re Teligent Inc.), 380 B.R. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
352. Id at 328. 336, 344 (the complaining party also requested relief, and was awarded avoidance, from a
debtor transfer for $40,000 as preferential, pursuant to § 547). The closely watched issue of alleged fraudulent
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CEO's compensation agreement included a $15 million loan.353
The
agreement provided for stages of forgiveness. 354 For example, the loan would
be "'automatically [] forgiven' if the company terminated the CEO without
cause, or the CEO left for "good reason," before the fifth year of the CEO's
employment.35 s Additionally, there was an amendment to the compensation
Where the CEO
agreement which accelerated the loan forgiveness.
continued in his position through the first year of employment, one-fifth of the
principal, or $3 million, would be forgiven.357 The CEO was employed
between 1996 and 2001, thus satisf ing the amendment and reducing the
balance of the loan to $12 million.
When the company went through an
acquisition, the CEO departed. 359 There was a question of whether the CEO
ended the employment, or whether he was terminated.36o The facts developed
at trial persuaded the court that the CEO should have been forced into repaying
the loan.36 However, a Separation Agreement had been signed at the time of
the CEO's departure which stated the CEO's termination was for something
"other than cause," and restructured the loan to forgive in twenty annual

transfers is involved in the Madoff matter. The Trustee for the Madoff brokerage firm, Irving Picard, wrote
hundreds of former investors, requesting they return profits and principal withdrawn from as far back as
Posting of Andrew Longstreth to The AmLaw Daily Litigation Update,
December 2002.
(Apr. 23,
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/04/the-am-law-litigation-daily-april-23-2009.htm
2009 09:00 EST). Two possible theories of recovery exist. Philip Bentley, Legal Battle Looms for Madoff
2, http://www.thedeal.com/newsweekly/community/legalEar/'v Exiters, DEAL MAGIZINE. Jan. 7, 2009,
battle-looms-for-madoff.php#bottom.
First, the trustee could recover preferential transfers made between
Sept. 15 and Dec. 15 2008. Id 1 2-3. Investors who relied on an investment intermediary may have a strong
defense of holder-in-due course. Id. 1 4. Alternatively, the trustee may litigate to recover alleged fraudulent
transfers. Id. 12 (Where these fraudulent transfers can be further categorized into intentional fraud - transfers
for the purpose of specifically avoiding creditors-or constructive fraud-payments made while the firm was
insolvent that were for less than fair value.). Conjecture exists that Bavou may be followed. Id. 1 8
(discussing Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P., 396 B.R. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
Bavou involved a decade-long Ponzi scheme, that upon discovery of such and ultimate bankruptcy filing, the
court ordered investors to forfeit their profit and principal. Id. (discussing Bayou, 396 B.R. at 843). This
included investors who had redeemed their interests years in advance of the bankruptcy filing, ifat the time the
investor redeemed she "should have known" of the fraud. Id. 1 9 (discussing Bay'ou, 396 B.R. at 845).
Though this argument is anticipated to be problematic if applied to the Madoff matter: if sophisticated
investigations by the SEC and institutional investors did not discover fraud over the course of years, how
would an individual investor reasonably suspect fraud. Id. 1| 13. The Bayou trustee claimed intentional
fraudulent transfer, and the court ordered those investors who withdrew their funds after discovering "red
flags" to forfeit profit and principal. Id. 1 10 (discussing Bayou, 396 B.R. at 845). The court stated the red
flags should have caused further investigation on the investors' part, and absent that, the redemptions were not
protected by a "good faith" transfer defense. Id. | II (discussing Bayou, 396 B.R. at 845). See generally
Madoff Watch, LAW.COM, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/madoff.jsp (accessed May 21, 2009).
353. In re Teligent, 380 B.R. at 328.
354. Id. at 329.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 330.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 335 (where the CEO left for no "Good Reason").
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installments rather than one. 362 The plaintiff argued this separation agreement
inappropriately released the CEO from repaying the $12 million loan and was
a fraudulent transfer.363 The facts plead showed the company transferred
property to the CEO while insolvent, and for less than equivalent value.364 The
Court found this to be a fraudulent transfer and avoided it under § 548.365
3.

Debtor Defenses

Under §
The debtor does have recourse to defenses in bankruptcy.
547(c), the ordinary course of business defense, a debtor can argue a transfer is
"made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and
the transferee.
Alternatively, the transfer can be "made according to
ordinary business terms." " In National Gas Distributors,369 the Court stated
the defense involves both the dealings of the parties and the industry of the
creditor as well as the "consideration of the debtor's industry standards and the
standards applicable to business in general.,370 Alternatively, parties can use
the contemporaneous exchange for new value defense in adversary trustee
A debtor must prove the transfer was
claims of preferential transfers.
intended to be contemporaneous, for new value, and that the value exchanged

362. Id. at 330-31.
363. Id. at 332.
364. Id. at 333-36. The Court considered whether the CEO had forfeited claims against the company, etc.,
as a matter of equivalent value, but found none. Id at 333.
365. Id. at 336.
366. Other transfer defenses, new under BAPCPA, allow the debtor to include an unavoidable transfer, or
perfected security interest. Wong, supra note 332, at 251-52. Section 1222 of BAPCPA increases the number
of days available to a debtor to perfect a security interest to avoid the trustee blocking the transfer of funds
later to pay the same security interest. Id. at 252. An additional defense includes the unavoidable transfer
under $5,000. Id. Section 409 of BAPCPA amends provision nine to subsection (c) of § 547 to permit a
transfer that is less than S 5,000 and is not wholly consumer debt. Id. Lastly, a trustee is prohibited from
avoiding a transfer in real property interest to a "good faith purchaser" if the purchaser had no knowledge of
the bankruptcy and paid "fair equivalent value. Id. at 252-53 (discussing how § 1214 of BAPCPA changed
549(c)).
367. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(A-B). Section 547(c)(2)(A-B) provides:
To the extent that such transfer was in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary
course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee, and such transfer was:
(A) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; or
(B) made according to ordinary business terms.
The defense can also be used to combat claims of preferential transfers. Wong, supra note 332, at 248.
368. 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(2)(A-B).
369. /i re Natl. Gas Distributors. LLC, 346 B.R. 394 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) (trustee won a motion for
summary judgment to recover a note payment by debtor to a bank as a preferential transfer).
370. Id. at 405.
371.

ROBERT S. BERNSTEIN,

BERNSTEIN

LAW

FIRM,

A

PRIMER ON

PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS

IN

BANKRUPTCY 12. http://www.bernsteinlaw.com/publications/preferential/pref8.htm (accessed May 06, 2009).
In the matter of preference litigation, a party could also rely on the Subsequent New Value defense. SHAKED
& POSNER, supra note 343, at "What is Preference Litigation?" A party must receive full payment from the
debtor in the ninety day period, and the continue to provide services or goods without receiving subsequent
debtor payment. Id.
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372

The provision essentially offers incentive for
between the parties was equal.
third parties to continue business with the insolvent party during bankruptcy,
ensurin 73debtor payment for goods or services is not recoverable by the
trustee.
4.

Debtor Company Adaptation to 503(c)

In light of these BAPCPA limitations, some debtor companies have
modified their approach to have a compensation proposal approved.374 Section
503(c) has been considered a "KERP Killer," and debtors have taken the
KERP characteristics-retention plans known as "pay to stay"-and
recharacterized them as performance incentive plans ("PIPs"), 375 or "produce
Debtor counsel have tried to avoid BAPCPA§ 503(c)
value for pay."37
scrutiny, and instead have sought to have incentive plans evaluated by the
historic § 363 business judgment criteria.377 This approach was used in the
37 8
where the Court refused to accept the payment
case In re Dana Corporation,
plan offered for approval as incentive-based. 379 The debtor company filed a
compensation plan that requested relief under a number of Bankruptcy Code

372. Id. at 12.
373. Kropp, supra note 343, at 37-8 n. 173 (citing II U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (Supp. 2007)).
374. Revich, supra note 320, at 114-16 (discusses "creative lawyering").
375. Matt Miller, KERP Your Enthusiasm, THE DEAL, June 22, 2007, 1 6, available at http://thedeal.com/
serviet/Satellite?cid=1181188647067&pagename=BI%2FBIArticle&c=TDDArticle (accessed Apr. 25, 2009)
(copy on file with author).
376. Posting of Kyle Matthews to Sheppard Mullin Bankruptcy and Restructuring Blog 1 1,
http://www.bankruptcylawblog.com/other-nationally-significant-cases-if-it-looks-like-a-duck-kerp-and-quacks
-like-a-duck-kerp-its-a-duck-kerp- ILhtmi (Sept. 7, 2006).
377. See generallv Emily Watson Harring, Note, Walking and Talking like a KERP: Implications of
BAPCPA § 503(c) for Effective Leadership at Troubled Companies, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1285, 1293 (2008)
(discussion of § 363(b)). Section 105(a) of the Code gives courts jurisdiction over debtors and debtor assets.
Id. at 1293 n. 46 (citing II U.S.C. § 105(a) (2008)). Section 363(b)(l) authorizes the trustee to "use, sell, or
lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate." Id at 1293 n. 48 (citing II U.S.C.
§ 363(b)( 1) (2008)). Section 363(b) requires that uses of the debtor's property outside of the ordinary course
must be approved by the court. Id. at 1251 n.51 (citing I I U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)). The courts developed a twoprong test to approve KERPs under § 363(b): did the debtor use "proper business judgment" in creating the
KERP, and was the KERP "fair and reasonable." See, e.g. In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 80-81 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2001); In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. 147. 154 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999); In re Am. W.
Airlines, Inc., 171 B.R. 674, 678 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994); In re Interco, Inc., 128 B.R. 229, 234 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1991). Anything passed unless the KERP was "so manifestly unreasonable that it could not be based
upon sound business judgment, but only on bad faith, or whim or caprice." In re Aerovox, 269 B.R. at 80.
378. In re Dana Corporation, 351 B.R. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), executive compensation motion modified and
approved. 358 B.R. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (approved on condition of a ceiling for senior executive pay during
the course of the bankruptcy).
379. In re Dana Corporation, 351 B.R. at 102 n.3 ("Ifit walks like a duck (KERP) and quacks like a duck
(KERP), it's a duck (KERP)."). Compare In re Pilgrim's Pride Corporation, 401 B.R. 229, *12-13 (N.D. Tex.
2009) (Trustee argued payments for a non-compete agreement were tied to severance, based on Dana.
Pilgrim s Court distinguished Dana in that there: it was a pre-termination agreement and not a post-severance
agreement: the Dana non-compete agreement was included among the severance terms; and that the Dana
plaintiffs failed to properly plead to that Court that their payments were not severance per § 503(c)(2)).
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provisions, but 503(c) was not among them.3o The Court made clear that any
payment made to induce an insider to remain with the debtor, or made as
severance, must satisfy 503(c) evidentiary standards.38 The Court found that a
payment that fell in either of those categories could not be scrutinized under
the § 363 business judgment rule.382
The Court ultimately concluded that the debtor's compensation proposal

380. In re Dana Corporation, 351 B.R. at (debtors sought relief under §§ 101(31) (definition of an insider),
105 (jurisdiction over debtor assets), 363(b) (ordinary course of business defense), 365 (administrative powers
over executory contracts)).
381. Id. at 100-0 1 ("to the extent a proposed transfer falls within §§ 503(c)( I) or (c)(2)"). Section
503(c)( I) provides:
There shall neither be allowed, nor paid - - (I) a transfer made to. or an obligation incurred for the
benefit of, an insider of the debtor for the purpose of inducing such person to remain with the
debtor's business, absent a finding by the court based on evidence in the record that - (A) the transfer or obligation is essential to retention of the person because the individual has a
bona fide job offer from another business at the same or greater rate of compensation
(B) the services provided by the person are essential to the survival of the business; and
(C) either - - (i) the amount of the transfer made to, or obligation incurred for the benefit of, the
person is not greater than an amount equal to 10 [sic] times the amount of the mean transfer or
obligation of a similar kind given to nonmanagement employees for any purpose during the
calendar year in which the transfer is made or the obligation incurred; or (ii) if no such similar
transfers were made to. or obligations were incurred for the benefit of, such non-management
employees during such calendar year, the amount of the transfer or obligation is not greater than an
amount equal to 25 percent [sic] of the amount of any similar transfer or obligation made to or
incurred for the benefit of such insider for any purpose during the calendar year before the year in
which such transfer is made or obligation is incurred.
Id. at 101 n. I (citing II U.S.C. § 503(c)(1)). Section 503(c)(2) provides:
There shall neither be allowed. nor paid - - (2) a severance payment to an insider of the debtor,
unless - -

(A) the payment is part ofa program that is generally applicable to all full-time employees; and
(B) the amount of the payment is not greater than 10 [sic] times the amount of the mean severance
pay given to nonmanagement employees during the calendar year in which the payment is made.
Id. at 101 n. 2 (citing I I U.S.C. § 503(c)(2)).
382. Id. at 101 ("[even if] a sound business purpose may actually exist"). Debtors had argued, in the
alternative, that if the Court felt so compelled to use § 503(c), that the Court should then use § 503(c)(3). Id.
The trustee objected to this use, arguing 503(c)(3) applies to high-level employees hired after the bankruptcy
petition is filed. Id The Court, however, did not feel the statute's language "prohibited" its analysis of
prepetition hires under 503(c)(3). Id Section 503(c)(3) provides:
There shall neither be allowed, nor paid - - (3) other transfers or obligations that are outside the
ordinary course of business and not justified by the facts and circumstances of the case, including
transfers made to, or obligations incurred for the benefit of, officers, managers, or consultants hired
after the date of filing of the petition.
Id. (citing II U.S.C. § 503(c)(3)). Debtor company also argued the Court should rely on its earlier reasoning
and decision in In re Calpine. Id. at 102 (citing In re Calpine Corp., No. 05-60200 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(the Court there found a compensation proposal incentivizing, and the decision suggests that § 503(c)( I)
should be used only in circumstances where retention is the focus)). The Court distinguished Calpine as the
objections raised in Dana were not raised in Calpine, and therefore the Court was not asked to address the
same issues. Id. at 101-02. Too, the Court insisted any analysis ofa compensation proposal under 503(c) must
be a case-by-case, debtor-by-debtor, fact-specific inquiry. Id. The Court did indicate, however, that the
business judgment rule could be used to consider a compensation motion under § 503(c)(3). Id. at 102. See
also Revich, supra note 323. at 104 (discussing a hearing transcript from In re Nobex Corp., 2006 Bankr.
LEXIS 417 (Bankr. D.Del. Jan. 30, 2006) (No. 05-20050) that suggests 503(c)(1) is to be used only for strict
retentive compensation).
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did not satisfy § 503(c) BAPCPA standards.383 The Court found the
completion bonus had a retentive affect, in that executives could capture nearly
two thirds of their bonus if the company lost a quarter of its value.384 The
Court did not consider this incentive-based under 503(c).385 Further, the
severance/non-compete payment failed to satisfy § 503(c)(2)'s definition of
severance. 3 To avoid 503(c) scrutiny, debtor company re-characterized the
severance payments as "exchange for non-compete agreements" upon
The Court interpreted
involuntary dismissal or resigning for good reason.
this characterization in light of the Second Circuit's definition of severance,
"amounts due whenever termination of employment occurs."388 The Court
concluded the payments were in fact severance, and therefore subject to
503(c). 38 1
Other courts have also acted to restrain executive compensation. The
Court in Ownit Mortgage Solutions390 found a $150,000 bonus outside the
ordinary course of business, where the performance exchanged was relocating
the company's headquarters, resolving the remaining mortgage loans, and
The Court in Delphi392 reduced an executive
filing a tax return. 3
393
compensation plan from $87 million to $16.5 million for unreasonableness.
5.

Lehman Bankruptcy

The executive compensation topic becomes especially interesting in light
of, inter alia, the Lehman bankruptcy and the compensation that was paid prior
to entry into bankruptcy. 394 According to a March 5, 2008, proxy statement,
the top five executives at Lehman were awarded $ 81 million dollars in
bonuses; a small fraction of the $5.7 billion in bonuses the company paid in

383. In re Dana, 351 B.R. at 103 (the Court indicated, broadly, that the compensation proposal would not
had survived § 363 scrutiny, either).
384. Id. at 102.
385. Id
386. Id.at 102-03.
387. Id.at 102.
388. Id. (citing Straus-Duparquet, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 386 F.2d 649,
651 (2d Cir. 1967)).
389. Id. at 102-03.
390. In re Ownit Mortgage Solutions, Inc., Case No. 06-12579 (KT) (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 28, 2006).
391. Miller, supra note 376, at 1 5.
392. In re Delphi, Case No. 05-44481 (RDD) (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 8, 2005).
393. Delphi Judge Orders Bankruptcy Emergence Bonuses Slashed. Cuts Exec Payout by 80 Percent,
WORKFORCE, Jan. 29, 2008, 114, 6, http://www.workforce.com/section/00/article/25/33/46.php.
394. In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Case No. 08-13555 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Securities Investor
Protection Corp. v. Lehman Brothers Inc., 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3543 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (winding-down brokerdealer business). See relatedli Bay Harbour Mgmt., L.C. v. Lehman Bros. Holdings, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20893 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (investment funds who maintained prime brokerage accounts with Lehman challenged
a sale order to Barclays of Lehman's investment banking and capital markets operations and infrastructure; the
court affirmed the sale order). See also, infra note 473 (discussing Connecticut Attorney General Blumenthal's
objection to debtor corporation compensation proposal).
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2007.395 Then CEO, Richard Fuld, was awarded $34.4 million in 2007
alone.396 Lehman had $613 billion in debt when the company collapsed in
2008.
Creditors may yet seek possible recovery of these monies via
fraudulent transfer theory, reasoning that the company did not receive full
value for its money.398
Ill.

STATE AUTHORITY

A.

NEW YORK STATE

I.

Common CorporateResponsibilities in New York

Customary cororate responsibilities in New York include fiduciary
duty, 399 good faith, o and business judgment. 40' This section will discuss
claims stemming from these theories that parties may use to recapture
executive compensation. 402 The discussion begins with the Grasso litigation
and defense victory,403 involving the former Chairman and CEO of the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE").
395. See Sandier and Kary, supra note 332.113 (Sept. 19, 2008); Adam Levitin, Lehman 2007 Bonuses?,
CREDIT SLIPS, Sept. 14, 2008,1 I, http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/09/lehman-2007-bon.htm1.
396. Sandier and Kary, supra note 332, at "Most to Give Up." Then Chief Operating Officer ("COO")
J.M. Gregory made $26 million in 2008; then Chief Legal Officer ("CLO -) Thomas A. Russo made $12.1
million; then Chief Financial Officer ("CFO ") C.M. O'Meara made $3.7 million, and then Co-Chief
Administrative Officer ("Co-CAO") Ian Lowitt made $4.9 million. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id 112 (reasoning "the value of the services of a CEO who runs a company into bankruptcy is less
than $34 million).
399. Directors and officers owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation. TJI Realty, Inc. v. Harris, 250 A.D.2d
596, 598 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1998) (citing N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 717, 720 (McKinney 2003));
Limmer v. Medallion Group, 75 A.D.2d 299, 303 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1980).
400. "All corporate responsibilities [will] be discharged in good faith and with 'conscientious fairness,
morality, and honesty in purpose."' Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 569 (N.Y. 1984)).
401. The business judgment rule refrains judicial examination into decisions made by corporate directors,
where those decisions are the result of "'good faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in the lawful and
legitimate furtherance of corporate purposes."' Owen v. Hamilton, 44 A.D.3d 452, 456 (N.Y. App. Div. Ist
Dept. 2007); Lippman v. Shaffer, 836 N.Y.S.2d 766, 772 (2006).
402. This section will not discuss, however, state criminal actions to combat matters of executive
compensation, although such has been suggested as a possible remedy. See, e.g., Pitofsky and Tulchin, supra
note 153, at "State Laws." See, e.g., Kozlowski, 47 A.D.3d Il1 (table), 2007 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11780
(N.Y. App. Div. ist Dept. 2007), affd, 11 N.Y.3d 223 (table), 2008 N.Y. LEXIS 3202 (N.Y. 2008).
Kozdowvsi involves the seemingly endless litigation of CEO and CFO of Tyco international, Dennis Kozlowski
and Mark Swartz. Id. at I13. The Appellate Division found the defendants had taken unauthorized bonuses,
and affirmed lower court convictions for larceny, conspiracy, securities fraud contrary to General Business
Law § 352-c(b), and falsifying business records. Id. at 120-21. Kozlowski also involved claims arising under
the Martin Act. Id. at 117-18 (refer text discussion at 44-46).
403. The Grasso procedural history is quite lengthy, in that not only did the matter reach each level of the
New York Judiciary. but the various parties made repeated claims. counter claims, and motions over the course
of the multiple year litigation (roughly 2003 to 2008). Two principal opinions, discussed throughout this
section are: People v. Grasso, II N.Y.3d 64 (N.Y. 2008) ("Grasso II, as nicknamed in People v. Grasso, 54
A.D. 3d 180, 184 (N.Y. App. Div. Ist Dept. 2008)); Grasso, 54 A.D.3d 180.
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Richard Grasso Litigation

Grasso was a party to several compensation agreements, covering the
period 1995 to 2003.404 From 1995 to 2002, Grasso earned a salary of $1.4
million.405 In contrast, in 2003 Grasso was paid a lump sum of nearly $140
million in salary, with an additional $48 million to be paid-out to him over the
course of the next four years.406 The bonus awards to Grasso also jumped
dramatically: from $900,000 in 1995 to $10.6 million in 2002.407 During
Grasso's employment, the NYSE was organized under New York's Not-ForProfit Corporation Law ("N-PCL").408 The Attorney General's office filed a
complaint asserting six causes of action against Grasso.4 09
Defendant Grasso moved to dismiss four of the non-statutory claims. 410
404.
405.
406.
407.

Grasso II, 11 N.Y.3d at 66.
Id
Id
Id.

408. Id.
409. Id. at 68 (in total, eight actions were filed: six against Grasso, one against Kenneth Langone (then
Chairman of the NYSE's compensation committee), and one requesting injunctive relief against the NYSE).
(I) against Mr. Grasso for annual compensation, SERP [Supplemental Executive Retirement
Program] and SESP [Supplemental Executive Savings Plan] benefits, which were unlawful and
ultra vires [sic] violating the New York Not-for-Profit Law ("N-PCL"). Plaintiff seeks imposition
of a constructive trust on and restitution of Mr. Grasso's compensation;
(2) for an unlawful conveyance against Mr. Grasso under N-PCL §§ 720 (a)(2) and 720 (b) for
knowingly receiving annual compensation and SERP benefits that were not reasonable and
unlawful. Plaintiff seeks to set aside the annual compensation and SERP payments;
(3) against Mr. Grasso for breach of fiduciary duty under N-PCL §§ 717, 720 (a) and (b) by
accepting unlawful ultra vires payments. Plaintiff seeks a judgment directing Mr. Grasso to
account for his official conduct and to make restitution;
(4) against Mr. Grasso for payment had and received. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Grasso's
compensation and benefits were not reasonable or commensurate with services Mr. Grasso
performed and thus constitute unjust enrichment. Plaintiff seeks return of excessive compensation;
(5) against Mr. Grasso for violation of N-PCL § 715 (f) because the NYSE Board did not approve
his CAP [Capital Accumulation Plan] and SERP payments. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that any
obligation by the NYSE to make future payments lacking the required N-PCL § 715 (f) board
approval is void and restitution by Mr. Grasso of all CAP and SERP payments;
(6) against Mr. Grasso under N-PCL § 716 for unlawful loans to Mr. Grasso made on May 11,
1995 in the amount of $6.571,397 and May 3, 1999 in the amount of $29,928,062;
(7) against Langone for breach of fiduciary duty under N-PCL §§ 717, 720(a) and (b), by failing to
explain Mr. Grasso's proposed compensation. Plaintiff seeks an order directing Langone to
account for his official conduct and to make restitution of the unlawful payments to Mr. Grasso;
and
(8) against the NYSE under N-PCL §§ 202(a)(12) and 515(b) for payment of compensation and
SERP benefits that were not reasonable and ultra vires. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the NYSE
paid Mr. Grasso compensation and SERP benefits that were unlawful and ultra vires. In addition,
plaintiff seeks to enjoin the NYSE to adopt and implement safeguards to ensure compliance with
the N-PCL.
People v. Grasso. 831 N.Y.S.2d 349, *2 (table), 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3023 (2006) ("Grasso 2006").
410. Grasso II, II N.Y.3d at 68-69 (arguing the Attorney General lacked standing; the court denied the
motion) (see People v. Grasso, 816 N.Y.S.2d 863 (2006)). This Court of Appeals opinion resolved actions one,
four. five. and six. Grasso II. II N.Y.3d at 71-72. The Supreme Court had denied defendant's motion to
dismiss. but was reversed at the Appellate level. Id. at 68-69. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate

level ruling regarding all four claims. Id. at 69.
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When reviewed by the Court of Appeals, the legislative intent was dispositive
of the underlying legal claims. 4 11 The N-PCL codifies the business judgment
rule for New York's non-profits.412 This means that liability in the case of a
not-for-profit officer or director requires knowledge or bad faith. 413 The Court
of Appeals found the Attorney General had "crafted"41 4 the four non-statutory
claims in such a way, that while premised on themes in the N-PCL, the claims
did not satisfy this element of knowledge or bad faith.415 The Court found that
although doing this made the Attorney General's claims easier to prove,4 16
failing to satisfy the knowledge or bath faith element essentially subverted the
legislature's role as policy-maker.417 The Court found that disregarding the NPCL as written by the Legislature was beyond the authority of the Executive
branch, in this case the Attorney General.418 The Court emphasized that
although the compensation may have appeared unreasonable on its face, the
Attorney General could not suggest liability for that reason alone. 4 19
The remaining two claims against Grasso, both statute-based, were
concluded in Grasso's favor by a separate court.420 The Appellate Division

411. Grasso II, I N.Y. 3d at 72. The Court acknowledged that although such was beyond the scope of its
opinion here, that the appeal did rest on the Attorney General's "assertion of parens patriae authority to
vindicate the public's interest in an honest marketplace." Id. at 70 (refer supra. text discussion at 40-42
detailing the later Appellate Division opinion resolving the remainder of Defendant Grasso's claims, and
discussing the parenspatriae authority in greater detail).
412. Id at 70 (citing N-PCL § 717). Officers and directors much discharge "the duties of their respective
position sin good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would
exercise under similar circumstances in like positions." Id (citing N-PCL § 717(a)). "Officers and directors
are permitted to rely on information, opinions or reports of reasonable reliability so long as the officer or
director acts in good faith." Id (citing N-PCL § 717(b)). "Moreover, the statute dictates that persons "who so
perform their duties shall have no liability by reason of being or having been directors or officers of the
corporation." Id. (citing N-PCL § 717(b)).
413. Grasso Il, I1 N.Y.3d at 71.
414. Id. at 70.
415. Id. at71.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 72.
418. Id. at 70.
419. Id at 72.
420. Grasso, 54 A.D.3d at 210, 213-14 (this opinion resolved actions two and three against Grasso). The
two claims asserted against Kenneth Langone and the NYSE itself, refer supra note 409 (the seventh and
eighth causes of action, respectively), were also addressed in this opinion. Id. at 210, 213-14.
Langone had made a motion to the Supreme Court to dismiss the action against him, which was denied.
Grasso 2006, 83 1 N.Y.S.2d 349. The Appellate Division, however, reversed the Supreme Court and granted
Langone's motion and dismissed the action. Grasso. 54 A.D.3d at 214. The Appellate Division reasoned the
Attorney General had lost his standing when the NYSE changed from a not-for-profit corporation to a forprofit corporation. Refer text discussion at 166-67; Grasso, 54 A.D.3d at 198-99.
The Supreme Court granted Grasso's motion to dismiss the Attorney General's claim for injunctive relief
against the NYSE. Grasso, 54 A.D.3d at 210 (discussing Grasso 2006, 831 N.Y.S.2d at *33). The Supreme
Court reasoned the NYSE's new for-profit status rendered the action "moot." Id. Grasso had also asked for
declaratory relief regarding the eighth cause of action, which the Supreme Court denied. Id. The Appellate
Division agreed with this ruling, but for different reasoning: Grasso had no standing vis-a-vis the Exchange to
be bound by the dismissal, and therefore had no standing to seek this dismissal. Id.
The NYSE entity change was dispositive as to actions two, three, and seven in this opinion. Id. at 189-90.
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reversed a Supreme Court ruling stating the Attorney General's enforcement
power had not lapsed when the NYSE became a for-profit corporation. 421The
Appellate Division reasoned that although the N-PCL explicitly authorizes the
Attorney General to bring suit on behalf of a not-for-profit corporation for noncompliance by the not-for-profit executives, there is no such enforcement
422
provision on behalf of a for-profit corporation.
Additionally, although there
is statutory authorization for such litigation to continue under these
circumstances,423 there is no statutory provision for standing by the Attorney
General to continue.424 The Appellate Division refused to infer such a right.42
The Court analyzed parens patriae as a possible means of allowing the
Attorney General's litigation to continue.4 26 Parens patriae is a common law
doctrine where the sovereign can initiate a legal action to protect those who are
unable to litigate on their own behalf.427 Parenspatriaerequires the Attorney
General have some quasi-governmental interest in representing the private
parties, apart from the interest the private parties themselves have in the
The Court, however, also composed separate reasoning as to why the Supreme Court's treatment of the third
action against Grasso, alleging he violated his fiduciary duties by influencing and accepting excessive
compensation, contrary to N-PCL 717(a) and 720(a)(1)(A-B), was incorrect. Id. at 185. The Supreme Court
had ruled Grasso violated this duty. Id. at 189. Grasso participated in two NYSE benefit programs. Id. at 185.
One was a retirement plan referred to as the Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan ("SERP"). Id. (Grasso
did not participate in NYSE's formal SERP program, but an equivalent program.) Id The second was a
savings plan, referred to as the Supplemental Executive Savings Plan ("SESP"). Id. With respect to SERP,
the Supreme Court ruled that the compensation committee and board of directors were not "fully informed" of
Grasso's benefits, and that Grasso knew or should have known this. Id. at 186. The Appellate Division found
evidence, however, that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded both: that the board had knowledge of
Grasso's benefits, and that Grasso believed this. Id. As regards SESP, the Appellate Division rejected the
Supreme Court's characterization of Grasso's early pay-out as ultra-vires, and therefore a breach of Grasso's
fiduciary duty in accepting such. Id at 187. The Appellate Division found the board had not committed the
NYSE indefinitely to the terms adopted under SESP, and that the Exchange had the power to amend SESP via
Grasso's 2003 compensation agreement. Id.
421. Id. at 189-190. Regarding the for-profit transformation: the then lead seat owner sued the NYSE to
halt a proposed acquisition that would make the not-for-profit NYSE a for-profit corporation. See Higgins v.
New York Stock Exch., Inc., 10 Misc. 3d 257 (2005). The suit was ultimately settled out of court. Michael J.
Martinez, NYSE Dissidents Settling Their Suit to Block Archipelago Deal, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, 1 1,
available at http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=2005111 5&slug=webnysel 5.
422. Grasso. 54 A.D.3d at at 190-91, 193-94. The matter of a not-for-profit organization becoming a new
for-profit entity during litigation, and whether the Attorney General's power under N-PCL 720(b) was
affected, was a question of first instance that divided the court. Id. at 183.
423. Id. at 191 (citing N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 906(b)(3), as enforced by N-PCL 908(i)(A-B)).
424. Id (citing Rubinstein v. Catacosinos, 91 A.D.2d 445 (1983); affd 60 N.Y.2d 890 (1983)). The Court
continued this reasoning, indicating that it is not enough for standing to exist at the onset of litigation, but that
such standing must continue until the matter is concluded. Id. at 197 (citing Stark v. Goldberg, 297 A.D.2d
203, 204 (2002)).
425. Id at 191.
426. Id at 193-194.
427. People v. Grasso, 12 Misc. 3d 384, 393 (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257
(1972)). There are three requirements for an Attorney General to rely on her parens patriae authority. Id. at
395 (citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592. 607 (1982)). The
sovereign must: have a sovereign or quasi-sovereign of the public; that interest must affect a "substantial
segment" of the citizenry; and the sovereign must have an interest in the litigation separate from the interests
of the involved private parties. Id. (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607).
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litigation. 428 The Court reasoned, however, there was no public policy concern
in the Grasso matter.429 Further, the Court considered a corporation engaging
in active business as in no need of the "nursing quality" of the parens patriae
power of the State,430 and that the wronged parties had "ample remedies" to
pursue resolution of the matter on their own initiative.4 3' Problematic for the
Attorney General in this regard was that money damages were sought against
the NYSE as the sole remedy.432 Not only would it had been ironic to return
these money damages to a now for-profit corporation, 433 but the Second Circuit
has ruled money damages are an inappropriate remedy to protect the integrity
of the state's marketplace.434
3.

Corporate Waste

Other remedies under New York common law include a claim for
corporate waste.435 An officer or director is responsible for mismanagement of
corporate assets, and can be held to account for her mismanagement or
misconduct.436 For a claim of corporate waste in executive compensation, a
plaintiff must plead and allege that executive "compensation rates [were]
excessive on their face or other facts which call into question whether the
compensation was fair to the corporation when approved, the good faith of the
directors setting those rates, or that the decision to set the compensation could
not have been a product of valid business judgment." 437 This test was

428. Grasso, 54 A.D.3d at 198 (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607).
429. Id. at 194.
430. Id at 193 (citing People v. Ingersoll, 58 N.Y. 1, 30 (1874)).
431. d. at 193-94 (citing People v. Lowe, 117 N.Y. 185, 195 (1889)).
432. Id. at 197.
433. Id. at 192 n. 7, 194-96.
434. Id at 197 n.10 (citing New York v. Seneca, 817 F.2.d 1015, 1017-1018 (2d Cir. 1987) (money
damages were rejected as an appropriate remedy for private parties where the state injury was the "integrity of
the state's marketplace and economic well-being of all citizens")).
435. A director or officer is liable for misconduct with corporate assets, as regards the "acquisition by
[herlself, transfer to others, loss or waste of corporate assets due to any neglect of, or failure to perform, or
other violation of [her] duties." Kossoff v. Samsung Co., 123 Misc. 2d 177, 179 (1984). Claims for
"excessive compensation" belong to the corporation and must be brought derivatively via the corporate waste
action. Savage & Assocs., P.C. v. Mandl (In re Teligent, Inc.), 358 B.R. 45, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Marx
v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189 (N.Y. 1996)).
436. Kossoff, 123 Misc. 2d at 179.
437. Fischbein v. Beitzel. 721 N.Y.S.2d 515, 516 (N.Y. App. Div. Ist Dept. 2001) (citing Marx, 88
N.Y.2d at 198 (though in all fairness, Marx is typically cited by New York courts for the demand futility test it
established for plaintiffs in a derivative action, refer suipra text discussion at 332). Marx went further,
indicating that at trial, if the directors involved were disinterested, a plaintiff would have to prove wrongdoing
or waste. Marx, 88 N.Y.2d at 204 n. 6. Moreover, if the directors approved their own compensation, the
burden of proof shifted to those directors to prove the transactions were fair to the corporation. Marx, 88
N.Y.2d at 204 n. 6. In Marx, the pleadings failed to make any fact-based allegations, and were considered by
the court to be conclusory. Marx, 88 N.Y.2d at 204 (plaintiffs had in fact plead generally, that the
compensation bore little resemblance to the services provided, that those services had not improved the
company's performance, or that the compensation increase was larger than that required by the cost of living).
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announced by the Court of Appeals of New York in Marx,438 but was limited
by the Court's reluctance to review matters of executive compensation.439
Cases subsequent to Marx follow Marx for the demand futility test it
announced, but not the element test for the recoupment of executive
compensation under the claim of corporate waste.440 Older cases discussing
executive compensation and corporate waste echo similar themes.
In Baker,441 for example, a 1942 New York trial court found that directors
and officers of a corporation had abused their fiduciary duties by awarding
themselves excessive compensation.442 The Court ordered them to repay
monies to the corporation.4 3 The Court reasoned that officers' and directors'
salaries must bear some proportional relationship to the services rendered and
444
Where the compensation was so
the income of the business.
disproportionate a rebuttable presumption existed that the defendants had acted
in their own interest at the cost of the company's. 445 The defendants in Baker
failed to defeat that presumption.446 Stearns,447 a 1948 case, used the same
rebuttable presumption448 and similar reasoning.449 In that case, a group of

438. Marx, 88 N.Y.2d at 203-204.
439. Id. at 203.
"The courts will not undertake to review the fairness of official salaries, at the suit of a shareholder
attacking them as excessive, unless wrongdoing and oppression or possible abuse of a fiduciary
position are shown. However, the courts will take a hand in the matter at the instance of the
corporation or of shareholders in extreme cases."
Id. Marx is further weakened by a number of other factors. First, Marx cited secondary sources in order to
Id. at 203-204 (citing, respectively, FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE
form the element test.
CORPORATIONS 5A, § 2122, 46-47 (1995); BLOCK, BARTON & RADIN, BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, 149 (4th ed.
1993); FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 2, § 514.1, 632 (1990); I AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.03). Second, the claim in Marx was ultimately
dismissed for conclusory allegations. Id. at 204 ("bare allegations that the compensation set lacked a
relationship to duties performed or to the cost of living are insufficient").
440. See generally Bansbach v. Zinn, I N.Y.3d I, 12 (N.Y. 2003); In re of Omnicom Group Inc., 842
N.Y.S.2d 408, 410 (N.Y. App. Div. ist Dept. 2007); Billings v. Bridgepoint LLC, 863 N.Y.S.2d 591, 593
(2008).
441. Baker v. Cohn, 42 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1942), modified, 266 A.D. 715 (N.Y. App. Div. 1943), affid, 292
N.Y. 570 (N.Y. 1944).
442. Id. at 167.
443. Id. at 167-68.
444. Id. at 165-66 (citing a district court case in the eighth circuit, Backus et al. v. Finkelstein et al., 23
F.2d 531, 537 (D. Minn. 1924)).
445. Id. at 1667 in equity is warranted. If a bonus payment has no relation to the value of services for
which it is given, it is in reality a gift in part, and the majority stockholders have no power to give away
corporate property against the protest of the minority. Winkelman et al. v. General Motors Corporation et al.;
Kahn v. Same, 39 F. Supp. 826, 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (citing Rogers v, Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933)). The
Winkelman court found an investigation was warranted by trial, where salaries of $100,000 per year were
enhanced by bonuses of$ 150.000 to 5400,000 per year. Winkelman, 39 F. Supp. at 834-835. As with Marx,
however, Winkelman is almost exclusively cited within the Second Circuit for procedural matters.
446. Baker.42 N.Y.S.2dat 167.
447. Steams v. Dudley. 76 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1947), afd, 274 A.D. 1028 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dept. 1948).
448. Id. at 112.
449. Id. at 127-28.
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directors and officers were ordered to repay compensation and bonuses.450
There, the bonus system should have been suspended after fire destruction of
the company, but was continued into a questionable and len thy liquidation. 451
Contrary precedent does exist, however.
In Epstein, 52 a 1939 case,
compensation was considered in relation to the services rendered in a claim
involving corporate waste.4 53 The Court refused to substitute its judgment for
that of the boards454 regarding the "conced[ingly]" large payments.455
4.

New York Blue Sky Provision, The Martin Act

The Fischbein456 case was a claim of corporate waste involving a merger
and acquisition.4 57 There, the acquirin entity paid high compensation to its
executives prior to the merger closing.
These facts are similar to BofA's s
Merrill acquisition.459 BofA relied on $20 billion in federal government
financing to take over Merrill for $50 billion in September 2008.460 Merrill
450. Id. at 129-30 (note that although the opinion is focused on the directors who continued the
compensation program, one executive also repaid money to the corporation).
451. Id. at 129.
452. Epstein v. Schenck, 35 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1939).
453. Id. at 977 (citing Rogers, 289 U.S. at 591-592). See also the Gallin factors:
To come within the rule of reason the compensation must be in proportion to the executive's
ability, services and time devoted to the company, difficulties involved, responsibilities assumed,
success achieved, amounts under jurisdiction. corporation earnmgs, profits and prosperity, increase
in volume or quality of business or both, and all other relevant facts and circumstances; nor should
it be unfair to stockholders in unduly diminishing dividends properly payable.
Mann v. Luke 272 A.D. 19, 24-25 (N.Y. App. Div. Ist Dept. 1947) (citing Gallin v. National City Bank, 152
Misc. 679, 703 (1934)). See also Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1941), aff d, 263 A.D. 815 (N.Y. App.
Div. Ist Dept. 1941) (same principle, though as applied to bonuses). Heller has been represented as the
modem approach to executive compensation. Kropp, supra note 343, at 3 1.
454. Though the court did discuss possible fraud in relation to the compensation, it found none and the
discussion was not dispositive. Epstein, 33 N.Y.S.2d at 978-980. See also Meyers v. Cowdin, 47 N.Y.S.2d
471, 476-477 (1944), af/d, 296 N.Y. 755 (N.Y. 1946). Although executive pay was increased each year over
a period of years, the court did not find the increases "excessive [ I or out of proportion to the value of the
services performed." Meyers, 47 N.Y.S.2d at 476. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed in that there was
"no bad faith, collusion or illegality having been established." Meyers, 47 N.Y.S.2d at 477. Altematively, the
discussion can also focus on directors approving their own pay increases. See Godley v. Crandall & Godley
Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 131-133 (N.Y. 1914) (found the directors acted in fraud and bad faith as regards diversion
of corporate profits to their own compensation).
455. Epstein, 33 N.Y.S.2d at 977. Plaintiff-favorable settlements do occur, however. See Diamond v.
Davis, 62 N.Y.S.2d 181, 185 (1945) (settlement modified the bonus system and its computation).
456. Fischbein, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
457. Id.
458. Id. (the court affirmed the trial dismissal of the claim because the plaintiff had neither standing nor
the appropriate pleading).
459. For information on the federal investigation into the matter, see generallY Sarah O'Connor and Greg
Farrell. SEC to review whether BofA broke law, FIN. TIMES. Apr. 14, 2009, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d3bcd4c4-2878- lIde-8dbf-00144feabdcO.html'?ftcamp=rss&nclick-check=1;
Zachary A. Goldfarb and Amit R. Paley. SEC Reviewing Omission of Merrill Bonusesv Front Filing, WASH.
POST. Apr. 14, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2009/04/13/
AR2009041302745.html?hpid=moreheadlines.
460. Heidi N. Moore, Deal Journal. Bank ofAnerica-Merrill Ly'nch: A S50 Billion Deal From Hell"
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had sustained losses of $27.5 billion dollars in 2008.461 Despite this record
loss, Merrill paid $3.6 billion dollars in bonus payments days before the
companies merged.46 2 In the Spring of 2009, it was alleged by BofA
shareholders that they were not informed of the bonuses prior to voting on the
merger. 463 In response, BofA maintained it had no legal obligation to so
464
inform its shareholders.
The matter has generated several separate legal
suits and investigations focusing on various issues. 461 SEC Chairwoman
466
Shapiro indicated in the Spring she was evaluating the matter.
By summer,

WALL ST. J., Jan. 22. 2009,

fil 1-2, http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/01/22/bank-of-america-merrill-lynch-a-50-

billion-deal-from-hell/.
461. O'Connor & Farrell, supra note 459 116.
462. Id. 11.
463. Id.
464. Id. 1 3.
465. Apart from the various shareholder suits, the SEC has pursued litigation as well. SEC v. Bank of
America Corp., Case No. 09 civ 6829 (S.D.N.Y. Filed Aug. 3, 2009). It is also widely rumored that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") is working closely with the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to bring
criminal charges against BofA actors. Rick Rothacker, FBI Looking Into BofA-Merill Deal, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Sept. 18, 2009, available at http://www.charlotteobserver.com/business/story/954477.html. State
actors are also pursuing BofA. In addition to New York Attorney General Cuomo, North Carolina Attorney
General Cooper has also launched a formal investigation into the matter. Rick Rothacker, N.C Demands
BofA s Records on Bonuses. NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 6, 2009, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/
business/story/1395981.htmi. Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray has also filed litigation against Bank of
America, as a member of a plaintiffs class action, and on behalf of several pension funds. In re Bank of
America Corp., Case No. 09 MDL 2058 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25. 2009), complaint available at
http://www.ohioattomeygeneral.gov/Briefing-Room/News-Releases/September-2009/Securities-LitigationBriefing-Documents/ Consolidated-Amended-Bank-of-America-Complaint).
The BofA and Merrill merger has revealed competing legal issues for resolution. For example, in
light of the defense BofA has pursued before Judge Rakoff of the S.D.N.Y., legal practitioners are questioning
the parameters of the attorney client privilege and advice of counsel defense. See, e.g.. Zach Lowe, Did Bank
of American Waive Attorney-Client Privilege in Merrill Bonus Flap?, AMER. LAWYER, Aug. 26, 2009,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202433336204&rss=newswire. As another example, both
federal and state agencies have publicly reported that a component of their investigation is to determine if the
federal government unduly pressured BofA to proceed with the merger despite knowledge of Merrill's fourth
quarter losses. See. e.g., Louise Story, Congress Presses for Details From Bank of America on Talks. N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept. 20, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/business/21bank.html?_r2&adxnnl=l&adxnnlx=1253546944-IvJIVLPkPNZ4ZX9BSzR2ew. Or, was it BofA who unduly pressured
the federal government'? See, e.g., Sue Reisinger, Corporate Counsel, What Was BofA 's Lawyer s Advice on
Merrill? It Depended on the Audience, LAW.COM, Oct. 26, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.
jsp?id=1202434896537&What-WasBofALawyersAdviceonMerrilLItDependedon the_Audience=&s
rc=EMC-Email&et=editorial&bu=Corporate%20Counsel&pt=Corporate%2OCounsel%2Daily%20Alerts&
cn-cc2009l024&kw=What%2Was%20BofA%20Lawyer. And of course, BofA is subject to a number of
shareholder suits seeking remedy for alleged loss in shareholder value. See, e.g., Bahnmaier v. Bank of
America, Case No. 09-CV-2099 JWL/DJW (D. Kan. Feb. 27, 2009) (complaint available at
http://securities.stanford. edu/1042/BAC 01/2009227_ oO1c_092099.pdf).
BofA is also facing increased scrutiny by Congress. Louise Story, Congress Presses for Details
From Bank of America on Talks. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/09/21/business/21bank.html?_r-I&adxnnl= I&adxnnlx=I253546944-IvJIVLPkPNZ4ZX9BSzR2ew.
In
particular. from the House Committee on Oversight and Reform and its Chairman Edolphus Towns (D - NY).
Id.

466. Goldfarb and Paley. supra note 459,
violated).

1 6 (as

to whether any federal securities laws were in fact

Summer

2010

RECOUPMENT OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

451

moments before the SEC could file a complaint alleging inter alia
misrepresentation regarding the Merrill bonuses, a settlement with BofA was
reached in the amount of $33 million.467 The settlement, however, was not
approved by Judge Rakoff in the Southern District Court of New York.468
Through his multiple opinions on the matter, Judge Rakoff clearly
communicated his disapproval of the settlement as unfair to shareholders.
BofA continued the defense that it did nothing wrong, and that in fact the
matter of the Merrill compensation was disclosed publicly via several
sources. 470 In January 2010 the SEC filed new and separate charges against
BofA for misrepresentation of the Merrill losses. 471 A settlement between the
SEC and BofA for $150 million was ultimately reached and approved by Judge
Rakoff in February 2010, concluding the agency's litigation.
Attorney General CuomO 473 is also among those pursuing BofA regarding
467. SEC, Lit. Release No. 21164, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/ir2l164.htm (Aug. 3,
2009).
468. Ross Todd, Rakoff Wants More Briefing fiom Bo/A and SEC on Merrill Bonuses. Asks About
Aug. 10, 2009,
Lawyers' Role in Drafting Proxy Statement, AMLAw LITIGATION DAILY,
http://www.Iaw.com/jsp/tal/digestTAL.jsp?id=1202432932461&Rakoff WantsMore-BrieingfromBofA_
andSEConMerrillBonuses AsksAbout-LawyersRoleinDraftingProxy Statement.
469. Memorandum Order, SEC v. Bank of America, 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR) (Sept. 14, 2009) (among the key
issues Judge Rakoff continues to press both parties before him, but which neither party has adequately been
able to answer. is who in fact advised BofA how to structure the Merrill acquisition).
470. Reply Memorandum of Law on Behalf of Bank of America Corporation, SEC v. Bank of America.
No. 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR) (Sept. 9, 2009). These other sources include a provision in the merger agreement to an
undisclosed schedule. Id. The undisclosed schedule in fact did contain provisions regarding the Merrill
bonuses. Id BofA maintains the use of such undisclosed schedules is traditionally accepted party behavior in
the context of an acquisition. Id The other sources BofA alleges constituted disclosure includes media reports
that discussed the Merrill bonuses and were contemporaneous to the proxy vote. /d. A recent Judge Rakoff
ruling prohibits BofA presenting this evidence and argument at the March 1, 2010 trial. Opinion and Order,
SEC v. Bank of America, No. 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR) (Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.
com/BofAmediaruling.pdf.
471. Dan Fitzpatrick & Sara Scannell, BofA to Limit Curl s Duties: SEC Won't Sue Top OflicersWALL
ST. J., Jan. 12, 2010, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001 424052748704055104574652601305959222.html?mod=djemalertNEW
S&mg=com-wsj.
472. Judge Rakoff expressed dismay at the manner in which the Merrill bonuses and losses were
disclosed, unsure if the manner of disclosure was the result of intent or negligence. Order and Opinion,
Securities and Exchange Connission v. Bank of Anerica 09 Civ. 6829 , 10 Civ. 0215 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
22. 2010).
473. New York's Attorney General Cuomo is not the only state attorney general litigating matters
involving executive compensation. Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal tried to block a
newspaper publisher from rewarding executive bonuses of $1.7 million in light of layoffs and Chapter II
proceedings. Baldas. supra note 2, 8. Blumenthal was quoted saying the executive payout "illegally detracts
from money owed to creditors like the state of Connecticut." Attorney General Objects to Journal Register
1,
Newspaper Companvs Bonus Plan, ASSOC. PRESS, PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL NEWS, Mar. 4. 2009,
The Attorney
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2009/03/attomey-general-objects-to-jo.html.
General filed an objection to the executive payout in bankruptcy court. Assoc. Press, State Attorney General
Files Objection to Journal Register E.vecs* Bonuses. ED. & PUBLISHER. Mar. 4, 2009, 1 1, available at
The
http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news/article display.jsp?vnu content-id=1003947871.
compen- sation plan was approved in July 2009, however. Leonard Honeyman, JRC Bankruptcr Shutdown
Bonuses OK. NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT, July 8. 2009, available at http://newhavenindependent.org/
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the Merrill matter and alleged fraud.474 The Attorney General has relied on one
of New York's blue sky provisions, the Martin Act.475 The Martin Act gives
the New York Attorney General broad powers to investigate and litigate
financial fraud. 476 The purpose of the act is to prevent any form of deception
archives/2009/07/jrc-gets-ok to.php. Attorney General Blumenthal's office issued a press release that
registered disappointment and indicated the court's decision would be reviewed to "determine whether further
action [was] appropriate." Press Release, Conn. Attorney General's Office. Attorney General's Statement on
Bankruptcy Court Ruling that Allows $1.3 Million In Bonuses to Journal Register Company Executives,
available at http://www.ct.gov/AG/cwp/view.asp?A=234 l&Q=443084 (July 8, 2009).
Attorney General Blumenthal has been a vocal opponent as regards large executive compensation
packages and the New England utility industry. In 2008 Attorney General Blumenthal filed a motion for a
hearing to protest compensation at ISO, a New England utility that oversees a regional power grid.
Christopher Keating, Capitol Watch, Blumenthal Rips High Executive Salaries at ISO, HARTFORD COURANT,
Dec. 4, 2008, http://blogs.courant.com/capitol-watch/2008/1 2/blumenthal-rips-high-executive.html.
More
recently, Attorney General Blumenthal publicly criticized the executive compensation paid by a Connecticut
natural gas provider which is expected to layoff at two Connecticut subsidiaries. Eric Gershon, Blumenthal
Criticizes Energ East Paynient to Recently Departed Exec, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 4, 2009, available at
http://www.istockanalyst. com/article/viewiStockNews/articleid/3686933. Blumenthal is quoted, "[The] $21.8
million paid to a single top executive-for leaving-is four times the amount necessary to keep all 67
employees essential to safe and reliable service." Id. The Attorney General has even gone so far as to indicate
he will propose legislation to the Connecticut Legislature in 2010 that will limit executive and director pay at
public utilities. Richard Blumenthal, Taking An Aggressive Stand for Consiuners. CONN. LAW TRIBUNE. Jan.
4. 2010, available at http://www.ctlawtribune.com/getarticle.aspx'?ID=35926.
474. Michael J. de la Merced, Dealbook, BofA Sited by Cuomo. but Strikes Deal with SEC, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2010, available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/04/bofa-agrees-to- I 50-millionsettlement-in-sec-case/#Iawsuit.
475. Earlier this year, Attorney General Cuomo went to the Supreme Court in New York County in 2009
to compel former Merrill CEO John Thain to divulge who received the $3.6 billion in bonuses. New York v.
John Thain, 2009 NY Slip Op 29114 (table), 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 591 (2009) (court denied the third
party's right to intervene). Thain ultimately provided the subpoenaed information to Cuomo. subject to a
stipulation of confidentiality pending third party litigation to intervene. Id. at **2. The court found that part
of the discretionary powers of the Attorney General under the Martin Act is to divulge the information
gathered during his investigation. Id. at **8-9.
The Martin Act has also been used in claims of financial statement and reporting fraud. Markewich
v. Adikes, 422 F. Supp. 1144, 1146 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (the motion to dismiss the Martin Act claim was denied;
no subsequent procedural history suggests the parties settled out of court).
Attorney General Cuomo relied on the Martin Act again in January 2010 to demand 2009 bonus pool
information from eight companies that relied on taxpayer funds during the Fall of 2008 and Spring of 2009.
See, e.g., Karen Freifeld, N. Y.'s Cuono Seeks Bonis Data From Bailed-Out Banks (Update 4). Bus. WEEK,
Jan. II, 2010, available at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-1 I/new-york-s-cuomo-seeks-bonusdata-from-tarp-banks-update2-.htmI (Jan. 11, 2010) (demands were made upon BofA and Goldman Sachs).
476. Nicholas Thompson, Legal Affairs, The Sword of Spitzer, LEGAL AFFAIRS, June 2004, 1 3,
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2004/feature-thompson-mayjunO4.msp (June 2004). The Martin
Act, Article 23-A, provides:
1. It shall be illegal and prohibited for any person, partnership, corporation, company, trust or
association, or any agent or employee thereof, to use or employ any of the following acts or
practices:
(a) Any fraud, deception, concealment, suppression, false pretence or fictitious or pretended
purchase or sale; ...
where engaged in to induce or promote the issuance, distribution, exchange. sale, negotiation or
purchase within or from this state of any securities or commodities, as defined in section three
hundred fifty-two of this article, regardless of whether issuance, distribution, exchange. sale.
negotiation or purchase resulted.
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related to securities.47 7 The Act gives the Attorney General discretion as to
what matters to investigate, and provides power to subpoena witnesses and
produce evidence.4 78
The Attorney General may have evaluated cases such as Loengard479 as
his office progressed forward in the BofA matter. In Loengard, plaintiffs
claimed that defendants-a parent and wholly-owned subsidiary involved in a
short form merger480_acted fraudulently by not providing the minority
shareholders with notice of the merger,
and by deflating the value of the
plaintiffs' shares. 482 After lengthy litigation, 483 the District Court found that
plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action under the Martin Act for failure to
show fraudulent conduct.4 84 The Court reasoned that fraudulent conduct under
the Act was understood as a "'tendency' to deceive or mislead." 485 The Court
did not find the appraisal of plaintiffs' shares fraudulent,486 or that the
defendants had any duty under the law to provide the plaintiffs with notice of
the merger. 487 Prospectively, it should be noted that although the Martin Act
was intended to be interpreted broadly,488 there exists no private right of
action.489 Any litigation made pursuant to the Act must be initiated by the
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§352-c (2009). See also §§ 339-a, 352-353.
477.
The purpose of the [Act] is to prevent all kinds of fraud in connection with the sale of securities and
commodities and to defeat all related schemes whereby the public is exploited, the terms "fraud"
and "fraudulent practices" to be given a wide meaning so as to embrace all deceitful practices
contrary to the plain rules of common honesty, including all acts, even though not originating in
any actual evil design to perpetrate fraud or injury upon others, which do tend to deceive or mislead
the purchasing public.
People v. Lexington Sixty-first Associates, 381 N.Y.S.2d 836, 840 (N.Y. 1976).
478. Thain, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 591 at ** 1-2 (citing §§ 352(1-2)).
479. Loengard v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 1355 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), later proceeding, 639 F.
Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Though in all fairness, Loengard is cited by subsequent courts for holding that the
statute of limitations is six years for Martin Act claims, and three years for fiduciary claims (See, e.g., Grosso
v. Radice, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21233 at *25 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2009)).
480. Id. at 1356.
481. Id. at 1359: Leongard v. Santa Fe Industries. Inc., 639 F. Supp. 673, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Leongard
I1").
482. Loengard, 573 F. Supp. at 1359; Leongard II, 639 F. Supp. at 674.
483. Leongard II. 639 F. Supp. at 674 (previous decisions listed in n. 2).
484. Id. at 676-77.
485. Id at 675 (emphasis in original).
486. Id. at 675-76.
487. Id. at 676. The court also destroyed plaintiffs' allegations that the merger was for a fraudulent
purpose, as under Delaware law, a merger is proper if for the purpose of consolidating power or to simply
become private. Still construing Delaware law, the court found the merger was completed in full compliance,
and without any material misstatements or omissions. Id. at 677.
488. N.Y. v. People v. Federated Radio. 244 N.Y. 33, 38-40 (1926) (followed by People v. Bradick, 16
Misc. 2d 1080, 1081-1082 (1959)).
489. Proposed Legislation Would Provide Private Right ofAction for Certain Plaintufv Under New York 's
Martin Act. SECURITIES LAW UPDATE (Sidley Austin LLP), June 19, 2007, 3 n. 17, available at
http://www.sidley.com/files/News/ad373261-e9d9-43ef-b74b-04f29c308567/Presentation/NewsAttachment/
ae098a6b-f507-4e45-87bd-009f5b4I7984/SecuritiesLaw607.pdf (citing Rego Park Gardens Owners Ass'n v.
Rego Park Gardens Assocs., 595 N.Y.S.2d 492, 494 (2d Dep't 1993); Pro Bono Invs. v. Gerry, 2005 WL
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Attorney General.490
At the time of authorship, Attorney General Cuomo's litigation against
BofA and its executives was still pending.49'
5.

Common Law Action for Fraud

It has been suggested that a common law action for fraud may be useful
to recoup executive compensation in New York. 492 The rule was summarized
in Sterling493where the court affirmed that a plaintiff must allege "defendants
made misrepresentations of material existing fact; which were false and known
to be false by the defendants when made, for the purpose of inducing
plaintiffs' reliance; justifiable reliance on the alleged misrepresentation or
omission by the plaintiffs; and injury [sic]."4 9 4 "In addition, 3016(b) requires
that the complaint set forth the misconduct complained of in sufficient detail to
clearly inform each defendant of what their respective roles were in the
incidents complained of."495
6.

Unjust Enrichment

Unjust enrichment has also been proposed as a theory for aggrieved
plaintiffs. 496 Plaintiffs must "assert [ ] that a benefit was bestowed ... by
plaintiffs and that defendants will obtain such benefit without adequately
compensating plaintiffs," particularly where the defendants have clearly
benefited, and "equity and good conscience require that they make
restitution." 497 "The receipt of a benefit alone," however, "is insufficient to
2429787, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); CPC Int'l Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 268, 276 (N.Y. 1987)).
490. Id it should also be noted that New York courts show deference to federal precedent when dealing
with Martin Act claims. New York v. Clark E. McLeod, 819 N.Y.S.2d 213 (2006) (citing All Seasons Resorts,
Inc. v. Abrams, 68 N.Y.2d 81, 87 (1986); People v. First Meridian Planning Corp., 201 A.D.2d 145 (3d Dept.
1994)).
491. Adam O'Daniel, Former Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis Rejects Offer to Settle Fraud Charges.
CHARLOTFE Bus. J., Mar. 31, 2010, http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/blog/bank-notes/2010/03/
report-former_ bankof-america ceo ken-lewisrejectsofferto.settle fraudcharges.htmL.
492. Id. at 3 n. 18 (citing Sterling Nat'l Bank v. The Park Ave. Branch, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2888
(2006)). The suggestion was made as an alternative to inducing the New York state government to use the
Martin Act to litigate violations. Id. Conceivably, however, if an attorney general could use the Martin Act to
investigate bonuses, a plaintiff could then use common law fraud regarding stock option grants and
backdating, where proxies are involved. See supra text discussion at 44 (Martin Act used to investigate
bonuses), 26-34 (stock option grants, backdating, and proxies).
493. Sterling, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2888.
494. Id. at *13 (citing Lama Holding Company v. Smith Barney, Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413 (1996); New York
University v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 N.Y,2d 308, 318 (1995); Friedman v. Anderson, 23 A.D.3d 163, 166
(N.Y. App. Div. Ist Dept. 2005)).
495. Id (discussing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3016(b) (McKinney 2006)).
496. New York v. McLeod, 819 N.Y.S.2d 213, *15 (2006) (table), 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1227 at *15
(citing Wiener, 241 A.D.2d at 120). See also supra note 409 (New York Attorney General claim four against
Richard Grasso contained restitution language based on unjust enrichment).
497. Korff v. Corbett, 18 A.D.3d 248, 251 (N.Y. App. Div. Ist Dept. 2005) (citing Wiener v. Lazard
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establish a cause of action."A9 8
7.

Duty to Corporate Creditors

Aggrieved shareholders aside, wronged creditors may have claims
regarding executive compensation. Directors owe a duty of faithful conduct to
499
Creditors are in fact empowered by statute to pursue
corporate creditors.
both directors and officers for misconduct.500 In New York, directors and
officers of an insolvent corporation can be considered trustees of its assets on
50
behalf of the creditors.o
An action to enforce this fiduciary duty precludes
the directors and officers from placing their interests ahead of the creditors.502
8.

FraudulentConvevance

Creditor rights might also be pursued under fraudulent conveyance
principles in New York's Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, codified by
statute in Article 10 of New York's Debtor and Creditor Law.50 3 Actions can
be brought only by creditors, 504 against the transferee or beneficiaries, 505 and
amounts sought to be recovered are limited to the amount alleged to be
improperly transferred.506
Attorney General Cuomo in 2008 effectively
leveraged the threat of a fraudulent conveyance action against American
International Group ("AIG"), securing AIG's agreement to freeze salaries and
eliminate bonuses for high-level officers. 507 Cuomo continued to use the threat
Freres& Co., 24I A.D.2d 114, I19 (1998).
498. McLeod, 819 N.Y.S.2d at *15 (citing Wiener, 24I A.D.2d at 120).
499. People v. Marcus. 261 N.Y. 268 (1933) (fodlowed bY People v. Calandra, 164 A.D.2d 638 (N.Y. App.
Div. Ist Dept. 1991)).
500. N.Y. Bus CORP LAW §720(b) (McKinney 2009) provides:
"An action may be brought for the relief provided in this section. and in paragraph (a) of section 719 (Liability
of directors in certain cases) by a corporation, or a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, officer, director or judgment
creditor thereof. or, under section 626 (Shareholders' derivative action brought in the right of the corporation
to procure ajudgment in its favor), by a shareholder, voting trust certificate holder, or the owner ofa beneficial
interest in shares thereof."
501. New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau v. Weiss, 278 A.D. 501 (N.Y. App. Div. Ist Dept.
1951), affd, 305 N.Y. 1 (1953); see also Heimbinder v. Berkovitz, 175 Misc. 2d 808, 816 (1998),judginent
modified ot iotheir gioiitdi, 263 A.D.2d 466 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1999).
502. Studley v. Lefrak, 66 A.D.2d 208, 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1979) ("transfer of all of the assets
of a corporation to a sole stockholder or to a corporation controlled by the stockholder may be set aside when
made in derogation of the rights of creditors"), affJd, 48 N.Y.2d 954 (1979); cf In re Banister, 737 F.2d 225,
228-229 (2d. Cir. 1984) (breach of fiduciary duty can occur when directors and officers benefit personally at
creditors' expense).
503. Brenner v. Philips. Appel & Walden, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11539 at **9-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(citing N.Y. Fraudulent Conveyance Act §§ 270-281 (1997)).
504. Geren v. Quantum Chemical Corp., 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 39912 at *4 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing N.Y.
DEBT. & CRED. LAW §273 (McKinney 1993)).
505. Brenner, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11539a * 14 (citing FDIC v. Porco, 75 N.Y.2d 840. 842 (1990)).
506. Foufas v. Leventhal. 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7641, **9-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
507. Kevin LaCroix, Bailouts. Bonuses and Clawbacks, D&O DIARY, Jan. 30, 2009, l 13,
(citing
http://www.dandodiary.com/2009/0 1/articles/corporate-governance/bailouts-bonuses-and-clawbacks/
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of fraudulent conveyance against AIG, and recently subpoenaed the names of
those who received bonuses in March of 2009,5os as well as information on
who negotiated their compensation.509 In March 2009, public outcry resulted
in fifteen of the top twenty bonus recipients voluntarily forfeiting their bonuses
and a
to AIG. '0 These repayments have not stymied the "moral outrage,"
derivatives suit was filed in April of 2009 in California State Court against
current CEO Edward Liddy, and various other Directors and Officers.512 The
complaint alleges "no rational business purpose or justification" for the high
executive compensation, particularly in light of the companies performance
and financial condition.5' The pleadings allege corporate waste, breach of
5 14
fiduciary duty, abuse of control, and unjust enrichment.
A.

DELAWARE STATE

The directors of a Delaware corporation have the authority and discretion
to make executive compensation decisions.5 15 It is the essence of business
judgment5 16 for an independent and informed Board, acting in good faith, to
determine if "a particular individual warrant[s] large amounts of money,
Jonathan D. Glater & Vikas Bajaj, Cuomo Seeks Recovery of Bonuses at A.IG., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2008,
the attorney
(discussing
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/16/business/]6pay.html?_r-2&ref-business
general's letter and providing an active link to review it)).
508. Recall, AIG received $85 billion in U.S. federal funds to avoid bankruptcy in September of 2008.
David Cutler, TIMELINE: AIG Developments Since U.S. Rescue, REUTERS UK, Apr. 17, 2009, available at
http://uk.reuters.con/article/innovationNews/idUKTRE53G46U20090417?pageNumber-I&
virtualBrandChannel=0. Plans to make $30 billion more available to AIG were announced in March of 2009.
Id. It was publicly discovered as this time that AIG was under pre-existing contractual obligations to pay $
165 million dollars in retention payments by March 15, 2009.
509. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Deal Book, Cuomo Seeks A.I.G. Bonus Information, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
2009, 1 4, available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/cuomo-seeks-aig-bonus-information/.
510. Cutler, supra note 508, at 3. Although the bonuses are apparently being returned far more slowly
than was originally anticipated. See, e.g., Brady Dennis, AIG Executives' Promise to Return Bonuses Have
Largelv Gone Unfulfilled, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/ 2009/12/22/AR2009122203788.html.
511. Kevin LaCroix, Executive Compensation: The New Front Line in the Litigation Wars?. D&O DIARY,
Apr. 8, 2009, 1 1, http://www.dandodiary.com/2009/04/articles/corporate-governance/executivecompensation- the-new-front-line-in-the-litigation-wars/
512. Id at 1 3 (discussing AIG v. Liddy, et al., Civil Action No.: BC410879 (Apr. 1, 2009)). Complaint
available at http://www.cpmlegal.com/pdf/AiG-Bonus-Complaint.pdf.
513. Id.
5i4. Id.
515. ln Re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138 (Del. Ch. 2009). The Delaware
General Corporation Law grants every corporation the power to pay or otherwise provide officers and agents
of the business with suitable compensation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(5) (2009).
516. The business judgment rule is a presumption which protects directors from liability so long as in
making the decision, the directors "acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
The presumption can be rebutted if the plaintiffs show that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of care
or of loyalty or acted in bad faith. If that is shown, the burden shifts to the director defendants to demonstrate
that the challenged act was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders. Brehm v. Eisner. 746 A.2d
244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000).
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whether in the form of current salary or severance provisions."5 17 Courts thus
generally decline to pass judgment on what constitutes reasonable
518
compensation.
Under Delaware law, however, director discretion in setting
executive compensation is not unlimited. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court
stated that "there is an outer limit" to the Board's discretion, "at which point a
decision of the directors on executive compensation is so disproportionately
large as to be unconscionable and constitute waste." 519
1.

Seeking Recoupment of Executive Pay: Breach of FiduciaryDuty, Waste

In common law actions the typical way for shareholders to seek to recoup
excessive pay from executives of Delaware corporations is to claim that the
corporate directors breached their fiduciary duties and that the approved
payments constituted corporate waste.520
Plaintiffs may claim that the
directors breached their fiduciary duty of due care521 and/or their fiduciary duty
of loyalty522 (the latter encompassing the duty of good faith).523 The due care
claim is more difficult for plaintiffs to establish because of the substantial
protections afforded by the Delaware courts to directors under the business
judgment rule, and because the vast majority of Delaware corporations
eliminate or limit their directors' personal liability to the cororation or
stockholders for money damages for breaches of the duty of care.
Plaintiffs
517. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1215 (Del. 1996).
518. Brehm v. Eisner, 731 A.2d 342, 350 (Del. Ch. 1998).
"Sufficient consideration to the corporation may be, inter alia, the retention of the services of an employee, or
the gaining of the services ofa new employee, provided there is a reasonable relationship between the value of
the services to be rendered by the employee and the value of the options granted as an inducement or
compensation." Kerbs v. California E. Airways, 90 A.2d 652, 656 (Del. 1952).
519. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 262 n.56 (Del. 2000) (citing Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962)).
520. In Re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005). The most notable case in
which plaintiff shareholders made these claims was the long-running dispute over the lavish severance
package paid to Michael Ovitz after he was terminated as President of The Walt Disney Company after serving
for little over a year.
52 1. The fiduciary duty of due care requires that directors "use that amount of care which ordinarily
careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances." Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d
125, 130 (Del. 1963). Directors must also "consider all material information reasonably available" in making
business decisions. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 259. Shortcomings in the directors' process are actionable only if the
directors' actions are grossly negligent.
522. The fiduciary duty of loyalty "mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders
take [ ] precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and not shared
by the stockholders generally." Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (citing
Pogostin v. Rice. 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984)).
523. Until the Delaware Supreme Court decided Stone v. Ritter in 2006, there was much discussion among
the bar, the courts and academics whether the duty of good faith was a fiduciary duty separate and in addition
to the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, or whether the duty of good faith was subsumed under the fiduciary
duty of loyalty. In Re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d at 745. The Supreme Court clarified that the
duty of good faith is a component of the duty of loyalty. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 269-70 (Del. 2006).
524. The Delaware General Corporation Law allows a Delaware corporation to include in its certificate of
incorporation a provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director for monetary damages for
breach of fiduciary duty, except: for breach of the duty of loyalty, for acts or omissions not in good faith or
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have been successful in recouping executive compensation by demonstrating a
breach of the duty of loyalty where self-interested transactions occur. 525In
such cases, the business judgment rule does not apply, and the burden shifts to
the defendants to prove that the challenged transaction was entirely fair to the
corporation.526 A third basis for recouping executive pay, that the payout
amounted to waste, involves an onerous standard for plaintiffs.527 As the
following cases illustrate, the Delaware courts are vigilant about self-dealing;
but disinterested directors, even where conduct falls significantly short of
corporate governance best practices,528 who approve lucrative payouts to
officers, will not be held liable if they exercise their duties of due care and
good faith.
2.

The Disney Case: Claimsfor Breach of FiduciaryDuty, Waste

In the much discussed Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, the
plaintiffs of the Walt Disney Company ("Disney") brought a derivative action
against the Disney directors for breach of their fiduciary duties for blindly
approving an employment agreement with Michael Ovitz, President of Disney,
and for ultimately approving Ovitz's no-fault termination and the resulting
severance payment of approximately $130 million to 140 million529 made
pursuant to the employment agreement. 530 The plaintiffs contended that the
Disney directors' actions constituted a breach of their fiduciary duties to act
with due care and in good faith; and that even if the directors' actions were
protected by the business judgment rule, the payout to Ovitz amounted to
corporate waste.53 1 The plaintiffs sought rescission and/or money damages
from the Disney directors and Ovitz and disgorgement of Ovitz's unjust
enrichment.
However, the Court of Chancery determined, and the Supreme

which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of the law, or for any transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2009).
525. See infra note 551, Valeant Pharns. Int'l, 921 A.2d 732, 745 (Del. Ch. 2007); Julian v. E. States
Constr. Serv., Inc., 2008 WL 267330 (Del. Ch.).
526. In Re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693 at 756-57. Additionally, Delaware law does not
allow corporations to limit liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty. See, supra note 524.
527. In Re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693 at 748.
528. Chancellor Chandler, in his 2005 decision following trial, stated that "there are many aspects of
defendants' conduct that fell significantly short of the best practices of ideal corporate governance," but that
"[u]nlike ideals ofcorporate governance, a fiduciary's duties do not change over time." Id at 697.
529. The plaintiff shareholders' original complaint computed the value of the severance package at $140
million, Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253. The Supreme Court approximated the value of the package at $130 million.
In Re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006).
530. In Re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 277 (Del. Ch. 2003).
53 1. In Re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d at 46-47. The claim for waste is rooted in the doctrine
adopted by the Delaware courts that a plaintiff who fails to rebut the presumptions of the business judgment
rule is not entitled to any remedy unless the transaction constitutes waste. In Re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig.,
907 A.2d 693 at 747.
532. /it Re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 825 A.2d at 278. On appeal from the Chancellor's decision for
the defendants after the 2004-2005 bench trial, the plaintiffs did not contend that the Disney defendants were
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Court affirmed, that the challenged actions of the Disney defendants were
protected business judgments, did not involve breach of fiduciary duty,
nor
did it constitute corporate waste.534
The Chancellor held that in agreeing to the key terms of Ovitz's
employment agreement, the directors acted in good faith and believed that they
were acting in the best interests of the company. He further held that the
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that the directors acted in a
grossly negligent manner or that they failed to inform themselves of all
material information reasonably available when making a decision.
Similarly, with respect to Ovitz's no-fault termination and the payout of the
severance package, the Court ruled that the Disney defendants did not breach
their fiduciary duties nor act in bad faith. 36 The board did not need to
formally terminate Ovitz because the Company's governing instruments
granted the Chairman/CEO, Michael Eisner, the right to unilaterally terminate
inferior officers, and the board was informed of and supported Eisner's
decision.53 1 Similarly, the board did not need to approve the payout of Ovitz's
severance package because the board had delegated to the compensation
committee the responsibility to approve compensation for Ovitz, and the
committee's approval of Ovitz's compensation package included approval of
the severance package.538
It is very rare for Delaware courts to make a finding of corporate waste,
even in cases which challenge lavish payouts of executive compensation. 539
To prevail on a claim for waste, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
authorized "an exchange that is so one sided that no business person of

directly liable as a result of their breach of fiduciary duties. Rather, plaintiffs argued that the Disney
defendants' breach of fiduciary duties deprived them of the protections of the business judgment rule, and
required the defendants to prove that their acts were entirely fair to Disney. In Re Walt Disney Co. Deriv.
Litig., 906 A.2d at 46. The plaintiffs apparently structured their argument this way because the Disney
Certificate of Incorporation contained a provision that precluded monetary damages against Disney directors
for breaches of the duty of care. Id. at 46, n37.
533. Id at 73. As a result of this ruling, the Supreme Court did not need to consider plaintiffs' argument that
the Disney defendants needed to prove that the severance payments to Ovitz were entirely fair.
534. Id. at 75.
535. In Re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693 at 772.
536. Id. at 776.
537. Id. at 775-77.
538. Id. (affirmed in In Re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d at 69-70.)
539. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig.. 907 A.2d at 748. However, in the ongoing Citigroup shareholder
derivative litigation, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for waste in approving
the retiring CEO's compensation package. The company, pursuant to a letter agreement, paid out 568 million
to the former CEO. including bonus. salary, and accumulated stockholdings. Additionally, he was provided
with an office, an administrative assistant, and a car and driver. In return, the retiring CEO contracted to sign a
non-compete agreement, a non-disparagement agreement, a non-solicitation agreement. and a release of claims
against the company. The Chancellor noted that he was left with very little information regarding (1) how
much additional compensation the former CEO actually received as a result of the letter agreement and (2) the

real value, if any, of the various promises given by the former CEO. Without more information and taking
plaintiffs' well-pleaded allegations as true, the Chancellor concluded that there was reasonable doubt as to
whether the letter agreement constituted waste. In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Deriv. Litig.. 964 A.2d at 138.
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ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has received
adequate consideration." 540 In other words, waste is a rare, "unconscionable
case where directors irrationally squander or give away corporate assets." 541
The Supreme Court in Disney concluded that the plaintiffs' claim for
waste did "not come close" to meeting the "high hurdle" required to prove
corporate waste.542 The plaintiffs argued that the no-fault termination
provisions in Ovitz's employment agreement were wasteful because they
provided Ovitz with an incentive to perform poorly as Disney's President; and
thus be eligible to receive the lavish severance package provided for in his
employment agreement. 543 The Supreme Court noted that the challenge of a
severance payment made pursuant to an employment agreement under a waste
claim, without more, is meritless when a company is contractually obligated to
make the payments. 544 The only way that the payment of a contractually
obligated amount can constitute waste is if the contractual obligation itself is
wasteful.545 The Supreme Court held that Disney's contractual obligations
were not wasteful because the no-fault provisions in Ovitz's employment
agreement had the rational business purpose of inducing Ovitz to leave his
previous job, at which he earned tens of millions annually. 546 The Chancellor
of the Trial Court further found it unreasonable to assume that Ovitz intended
to perform just poorly enough to be fired quickly and thus be eligible for the
severance package but not so poorly that he could be terminated for cause and
thus not be eligible for his lavish payout.54 7 Moreover, the Chancellor found
that there was no indication that Ovitz brought anything less than his best
efforts to the company, that there was credible evidence that the company
would be better off without Ovitz, and that given his performance, Ovitz could
not be fired for cause. 548 Thus plaintiffs did not meet the stringent
requirements of the waste test, and the payment of Ovitz's severance package
did not constitute waste.54 9
3.

Seeking Recoupment ofExecutive Pay: Self-Interested Transactions

Plaintiffs in Delaware courts have had far more success in recouping
executive pay where directors or officers pay themselves salary or bonus
540. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000). In another formulation of the test to prevail on
corporate waste: "the plaintiff must overcome the general presumption of good faith by showing that the
board's decision was so egregious or irrational that it could not have been based on a valid assessment of the
corporation's best interests." White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del. 2001).
541. Brehm. 746 A.2d at 263.
542. In Re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d at 75.
543. Id. at 74.

544.
545.
546.
547.

Id.
Id
Id at 75.
In Re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693 at 759.

548. Id.

549. Id.
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without the approval of an independent compensation committee. Directors
its
who stand on both sides of a transaction have "the burden of establishing 550
entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.,,
Self-interested compensation decisions made without independent protections
are subject to this same entire fairness standard.5 5 ' The two components of
entire fairness are fair dealing and fair price.552 Fair dealing "embraces
questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured,
negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors
and the stockholders were obtained." 5 Fair price "assures the transaction was
and
financial
'the
economic
by
examining
fair
substantively
considerations. "554
In a Delaware case concerning a plaintiff challenging the payout to a
director who fixed his own compensation, the Court imposed upon the
recipient the burden of showing the reasonableness of his compensation.555 In
determining whether the defendant's compensation was reasonable, the Court
in that case listed numerous relevant factors, including: what other similarly
situated executives received; the ability of the executive; to what extent the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") allowed the corporation to deduct the salary;
whether the salary bore a reasonable relation to the success of the corporation;
the amount previously received as salary; whether increases in salary were
geared to increases in the value of services rendered; and the amount of the
challenged salary compared to other salaries paid by the employer. 556 The
Court concluded that the defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating
reasonableness since he failed to produce substantial evidence as to what other
executives in the industry earn, and there was doubt as to whether defendant's
work was as essential and productive as he contended. The defendant also
raised his own pay three-fold in the span of five years even though the earnin s
of the company rose only by approximately 79 percent in that time span.

550. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). Such directors "are required to
demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain."
551. Valeant Pharm. Int'l v. Jerney. 921 A.2d 732, 745 (Del. Ch. 2007). On the other hand, where an
independent compensation committee sets director compensation, the courts do not apply the entire fairness
standard. Id. at 746. Similarly, a self-interested transaction that is approved by a committee of disinterested
directors potentially brings the transaction within the scope of the business judgment rule. DEL. CODE ANN..
lit. 8, § 144(a)() 1(2009). Alternatively, a self-interested transaction may be ratified by a fully informed
majority vote of the disinterested stockholders. Id. at § 144(a)(2).
552. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. The two components of the entire fairness standard are not
independent. Rather, "the fair dealing prong informs the court as to the fairness of the price obtained through
that process. The court does not focus on the components individually, but determines entire fairness based on
all aspects of the entire transaction." Valeant Pharm.. 921 A.2d at 746.
553. Weinberger. 457 A.2d at 711.
554. Valeant Pharms.. 921 A.2d at 746 (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711).
555. Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974). This case from 1974 was decided
before the more recent development by the Delaware courts of the entire fairness standard for self-interested
transactions.
556. Id. at 615.
557. Id.
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The Court did concede that the defendant's services to the corporation
appeared to have been important to its success; and, taking into account that
the business had twenty employees and that the company's profits rose during
the contested pay period, the Court allowed for compensation in excess of an
amount suggested by an expert witness but less than the amount considered
appropriate by the IRS.558 The Court ordered the defendant to return the
excess compensation to the corporate treasury with interest. 559
In a more recent Delaware case, the Court ordered a former
director/president of a corporation to disgorge his entire bonus after the
directors and executives decided to pay themselves large amounts in
connection with a proposed initial public offering and spin-off of the
company's most valuable asset.560 In that case, the payouts were approved by
a compensation committee which was "clearly and substantially interested in
the transaction they were asked to consider."56'
Thus, even the defendant
conceded that he bore the burden of proving that the transaction was entirely
f562 In analyzing the fair dealing prong of the "entire fairness test," the
fair.
Court determined that the process for determining bonuses was dominated by
the company's chairman/CEO who predetermined the size of the bonus pool
that was later justified by the compensation committee. 563 In concluding that
the process was unfair, the Court noted that the challenged transaction was
initiated by management, and was structured, without negotiation, so that
everyone would receive a bonus.564 Also key was that the relevant parties,
including the Board, the compensation committee and the outside experts,
relied on inflated and misleading information provided by management.
The Court further held that while management did occasionally receive
bonuses in connection with extraordinary activities, the sort of event in the
given case did not justify such substantial additional bonuses, which amounted
to 2 percent of the total value of the spin-off. 6 As further support that the
bonus payments were unfair, the Court noted that the transaction involved
merely a restructuring of the biggest and most valuable asset of an already
public company into a different public company.567 Moreover, management of
the parent company was to have no further involvement in the spun

558. Id.at615-16.
559. Id.
560. Valeant Pharm., 921 A.2d at 735-36.
561. Id at 739.
562. Id. at 744.
563. Id. at 746-47.
564. Id. at 748.
565. Id. (The court's finding that the process was unfair does not end its inquiry because the transaction
could be deemed entirely fair if the defendant proves that the price was fair. However, unless the price can be
justified by reference to reliable markets or substantial and dependable comparable transactions. the burden for
proving fair price would be "exceptionally difficult.")
566. Id. at 749-50.
567. Id. at 750. (An outside expert opined that a 2 percent award might be appropriate in a smaller
transaction, such as an incubator IPO or spin-off of a small division of a larger company.)

Summer 2010

RECOUPMENT OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

463

company.
In sum, the Court held that the price terms of the bonuses could
not be justified by reference to any reliable market, and there was no proof of
substantial comparable transactions to provide support for the size of the
bonuses. 569
Where a court determines that a self-dealing transaction is unfair, the
transaction is voidable as between the parties. 570 Additionally, the underlying
breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty can give rise to other damages,
including incidental damages.57 The Court in Valeant held that the defendant
had to disgorge his entire $3 million bonus as part of a voidable-transaction.572
The defendant was also ordered to return his pro-rata share of the bonuses paid
to non-directors573 and his pro-rata share of fees and expenses of the special
litigation committee.574
B.

OTHER NOTABLE STATE POSITIONS: SCRUSHY V. TUCKER

In a 2006 decision, the Alabama Supreme Court held in Scrushy v. Tucker
that the former CEO of a publicly traded corporation involved in an accounting
scandal was unjustly enriched575 by the payment of $47 million in bonuses, and
568. Id.
569. Id. In another recent Delaware case, Julian v. E. States Constr. Service. Inc., directors awarded
themselves substantial bonuses. The directors thus had the burden to prove that the payments were entirely
fair. Three brothers owned shares in closely-held corporations when one brother announced his retirement.
The court held that the payout of the bonuses resulted from an unfair process. Just eleven days after the
brother submitted his letter of retirement, the Board of one of the corporations, composed of the other two
brothers and a third man, approved the bonuses after discussing the concept for fifteen minutes and consulting
no outside experts. The court also held that the price was unfair. The size of the bonuses greatly exceeded any
prior awards. The challenged bonuses represented 22.28% of adjusted income while bonuses in previous years
constituted approximately 3.3% of adjusted income. The court also noted that the bonuses decreased the net
book value of the corporation, thus reducing the value of the shares that the retiring brother would have to sell
back to the corporation. supra note 525 at * 1,* 18, * 19.
570. Valeant Pharms., 921 A.2d at 752.
571. Id. In another formulation of the available remedies when a transaction fails the entire fairness
standard, a court may fashion any form of equitable and monetary relief as may be appropriate. Weinberger,
457 A.2d at 714.
572. Valeant Pharms., 92 1 A.2d at 752. (The court refused the defendant's request to allow him to keep
the portion of the bonus that the court deemed "fair" and return the excess. The court also noted that there was
no suggestion that the return of the defendant's bonus would unjustly enrich the company.) the court ordered
the defendants to disgorge the bonuses and return them with interest to the company. Supra note 569 at 19.
573. Valeant Pharms., 921 A.2d at 754. (The company did not seek the return of the bonuses paid to the
non-director employees. Rather, the company sought to recover the defendant's pro-rata share of the bonuses
paid to non-directors.)
574. Id. (Delaware law allows for the recovery of special litigation committee expenses for a breach of
fiduciary duty when the plaintiff corporation prevails in court and the special litigation committee expenses
were necessary to prosecute the suit.)
575. The Delaware Supreme Court explained the theories of restitution and unjust enrichment as follows:
For a court to order restitution it must first find the defendant was unjustly enriched at the expense
of the plaintiff. "Unjust enrichment is defined as 'the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of
another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice or equity and good conscience."'
Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum. Inc., 539 A.2d 1060. 1062 (Del. 1988) (quoting 66 Am.Jur.2d Restitution
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ordered him to repay the gross amount of the bonuses.5 76 In separate
proceedings, fifteen senior executives of the corporation, HealthSouth, pled
guilty to various criminal acts, including falsifying and fabricating the
corporation's financial statements. 5 77 The former CEO and defendant in
Scrushy, Richard Scrushy, was acquitted in an earlier proceeding of any
criminal wrongdoing.57 8 The parties in Scrushy stipulated that Scrushy was not
responsible for the falsification of the company's financial statements, and
Scrushy did not dispute that the original financial statements were inaccurate
and unreliable. 579 Scrushy, however, argued that he was entitled to keep his
bonus payments because his employment agreement with HealthSouth
obligated the company to pay him annual target bonuses.580 The Court decided
that the defendant's employment agreement merely gave him "the opportunity
to earn an annual target bonus," but that the company's disclosure in its annual
proxy on Form 14A precluded the payment of bonuses because the company
sustained annual net losses.58 The company's annual proxy provided that no
bonuses would be paid unless annual net income exceeded budgeted net
income. 582 Since the company did not have net income during the years in
question, Scrushy did not have the opportunity to earn target bonuses pursuant
to his employment agreement, and the company was not contractually
obligated to pay bonuses.5 83
The Court concluded that under the law of either Delaware or Alabama,
equity and good conscience required restitution in the form of the repayment of
the bonuses because the payments were made as a result of the vast accounting
fraud perpetrated upon HealthSouth and its shareholders. 584 The Court noted
that as a manager of HealthSouth, Scrushy was responsible for the filing of
accurate financial statements, and he did not fulfill those responsibilities
adequately.
The Court stated that it would have been unconscionable to
allow Scrushy to keep millions of dollars at the expense of the corporation to
which he owed a fiduciary duty. 586
and Implied Contracts § 3, 945 (1973)). To obtain restitution, the plaintiffs were required to show that the
defendants were unjustly enriched, that the defendants secured a benefit, and that it would be unconscionable
to allow them to retain that benefit. Id.at 1063. Restitution is permitted even when the defendant retaining the
benefit is not a wrongdoer. Id. "'Restitution serves to "deprive the defendant of benefits that in equity and
good conscience he ought not to keep, even though he may have received those benefits honestly in the first
instance, and even though the plaintiff may have suffered no demonstrable losses."' Id at 1063. Schock v.
Nash. 732 A.2d 217, 232-33 (Del. 1999) (footnotes omitted; citations supplied).
576. Scrushy v. Tucker, 955 So.2d 988, 1012 (Ala. 2006).
577. Id.at 1004.

578. Id.
579.
580.
581.
582.
583.
584.
585.
586.

Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at
Id at
Id at

1012.
1007.
1008-09.
1008.
1008-09.
1012.
10 11 (quoting In Re HealthSouth Shareholders Litig.. 845 A.2d 1096, 1106 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
1012.
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IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This article has presented the legal foundations and theories parties will
encounter when dealing with executive compensation litigation. Several
aspects of executive compensation law are favorable for plaintiffs, such as the
34 Act or the federal Bankruptcy Code. However, defense counsel may find a
more favorable litigation environment for their clients under Delaware State
law. Both sides, however, will have to consider and address the impact of new
regulation such as TARP. The ongoing economic crisis has created an
antagonistic political and social energy that will continue to shape the
executive compensation issue for all actors involved. This article should serve
as a suitable starting point for practitioners litigating executive compensation
issues in the years to come.
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